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ABSTRACT
RECONCILING DICHOTOMIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF AN INTERACTIVE EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTION
FEBRUARY 1991
CARL D. BRELL, JR., B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Philip Eddy

Recent decades have witnessed the growing emergence of a
conception of higher learning as entailing the interaction of individual
tendencies with physical and social conditions. The present study
explores the theoretical and practical implications of this conception
across several key areas of the literature, including higher education
reform, critical thinking, moral education, college writing, and college
teaching.
Generally speaking, educational interactionism is the attempt to
explain intellectual and moral growth in terms of the ongoing and
reciprocal interaction of human beings and their physical and social
environments. It accordingly seeks to reconcile the historical antipathy
between inner-directed theories (rationalism, idealism, romanticism)
and outer-directed theories (empiricism, positivism, essentialism) of
human agency, meaning, and growth. In terms of educational
practice, educational interactionism seeks to resolve the persistent
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tension between attention to students' individual needs and interests
and the transmission of a socially viable body of subject matter. It
does so chiefly by asserting that neither has any meaning without the
other.
In projecting this interactive conception across what are for the
most part discrete literatures, the present study seeks to illustrate
how similar principles operate across these areas and to encourage
dialogue between them. It should be viewed as a first step in a larger
effort to integrate and clarify the general features of an interactive
educational conception, eliminate many present inconsistencies, and
outline its implications for educational policy and teaching practice.
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CHAPTER 1

BELIEF AS A CONDITION OF KNOWLEDGE;
THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
IN THE REFORM OF HIGHER EDUCATION

In his recent study, College: The Undergraduate Experience in
Americg,^ Ernest Boyer writes urgently of the need for a guiding
vision of iiberal education which would give meaning and direction to
American undergraduate institutions. Like many educational observers,
Boyer is disturbed by the divisions he sees both between colleges and
the larger human community and within colieges themselves. Arguing
that the undergraduate experience plays a unique and crucial role in
preparing people for productive and meaningful lives in an
interdependent worid, Boyer maintains that above ail else colleges
need to foster a sense of integrity and responsibiiity in the minds and
hearts of undergraduates. To do this, he maintains, colleges must
themselves forge connections between the various aspects of campus
life such that all facets of the college experience contribute towards
the ideal of the liberally educated person: a person who understands
and appreciates the shared concerns of humanity and who uses her
knowledge, skills, and habits of lifelong learning both as vehicles of
personal growth and fulfillment and in the service of others.
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Boyer outlines a broad sketch of concrete recommendations from clarifying admission requirements to creating more meaningful
student living arrangements to improving institutional governance for revitalizing American colleges. At the heart of his proposals lies an
academic program comprised of three main components: an
"integrated core” of liberal learning, an "enriched major" which
complements rather than supplants general education, and a four-year
language requirement" wherein the development of reading,
speaking, listening, and, above all, writing skills forms an integral part
of all course work. The idea behind this program is, first, to lead
students towards a greater understanding and appreciation of the
place of their specialized and general knowledge in the larger context
of humanity's shared concerns, and, secondly, to help them learn to
apply that knowledge towards improving the quality of life as a whole,
with the understanding that learning so applied is essential to a
fulfilling life.
Approaching the topic from a somewhat different perspective,
the Study Group on the Conditions of Excellence in American Higher
Education, in a study entitled Involvement in Learning: Realizing the
Potential of American Higher Education.^ focuses less on a
comprehensive analysis of the undergraduate experience and more
narrowly on certain key conditions of effective higher learning. While
sharing many of Boyer's basic assumptions about the role of college in
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producing thoughtful and productive citizens, the Study Group bases
Its recommendations instead on a theory of effective learning which

revolves around three principles: student involvement in the learning
process, clear and public standards of student performance that
reflect the complexities of genuine learning, and the need for
appropriate assessment and feedback measures as levers for student
involvement and guides to teaching improvement.
In a series of recommendations that bear some remarkable
similarities to Boyer's, the Study Group emphasizes its conviction that
educational practices and policy decisions should be based on a clear
conception of the desired outcomes of liberal learning, rather than on
the pressures of market demand, as they all too often are. The Study
Group includes among its list of desired outcomes the abilities to think
critically, to communicate effectively, and to synthesize and apply
learning from various disciplines towards the handling of real life
problems -- outcomes very similar to Boyer's, in substance, if not in
tone.

Problem Statement

The present study takes as its starting point the shared
conviction that undergraduate education in the United States is in
need of precisely the sorts of recommendations suggested in these
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two studies, particularly with regard to establishing a clear and
unifying vision of the purpose of higher learning. It also recognizes the
breadth of such an undertaking and accordingly seeks to limit its
attention to an especially central aspect of the problem: the
articulation of a philosophically and practically sound conception of
higher learning, particularly as that conception is manifesting and
being discussed in four crucial areas of the current literature in higher
education - critical thinking, moral education, college writing, and
college teaching. The reason for focusing on the articulation of a
conception of higher learning is that even the most well-intentioned
and seemingly constructive educational recommendations will
inevitably go astray if they are not rooted in a model of learning that is
sufficiently dynamic to capture the complexities of actual human
learning.
The Involvement in Learning study is a good example, for
despite a wealth of constructive recommendations, it nevertheless
bases too many of its proposals on an incomplete analysis. For
instance, the Study Group wisely prescribes that assessment and
feedback measures "should reflect the level of subtlety and
complexity at which college subjects are taught and learned" and
accordingly cautions against reliance on "simplistic multiple-choice
examinations as measures of student performance."^ But their
analysis of how assessment and feedback should be used to enhance
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student involvement" is not entirely consistent with this advice.
Citing evidence which indicates that "at the elementary and secondary
levels, clearly and publicly stated high standards of performance act
as spurs to greater achievement, largely because students come to
share those standards with their schools," the Study Group assumes
that the same will hold true at the college level.Reasoning that since
"students respond positively to information on their performance in
relation to institutional expectations," the Study Group asserts that
"[t]he use of assessment information to redirect effort ... serves as a
powerful lever for student involvement."®
While clear and public standards are certainly the necessary
bases upon which all course design, instruction, and evaluation should
be based, the assumption that students will absorb those standards
"directly" - simply by being kept apprised of their progress relative to
them — contradicts what we have come to understand about learning
in recent years. While it is certainly true that college teachers need to
develop, communicate, and utilize clear standards, there are
nevertheless serious psychological, ethical, and epistemological
difficulties which suggest that basing an assessment policy on the
assumption that students will thereby adopt those standards could
actually serve to undermine the kind of learning we want to
encourage.
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Psychological Diffictjltips

In the first place, developmental research® would seem to
indicate fairly conclusively that while external standards issued from
persons in authority are major determinants of the values and
perspectives of children and even adolescents, the influence of such
standards decreases as people mature. The college years in particular
seem to be marked by major reconstructions of a person's cognitive
structures and values based on a complex network of criteria issuing
from cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and environmental factors.
The Study Group acknowledges this widely accepted fact
when, in an effort to balance the need for student autonomy with its
own objectives, it suggests that "colleges should understand what
students expect, and should reciprocate by clearly communicating to
students the learning objectives of college-level programs and
courses".^ While this recommendation seems fair enough, it
completely bypasses the questions (1) of how to reconcile student
and institutional expectations when they conflict, and, more
importantly, (2) of how to lead students to see and embrace (or
intelligently reconstruct) institutional standards as a function of their
own autonomous judgement rather than because of the power of
institutions to grant or deny credit. All ethical considerations aside,
the developmental evidence indicates that there are good reasons to
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doubt the psychological adequacy of standards which students
themselves have not adopted through their own autonomous
deliberations. While I am no more suggesting that "student
expectations should arbitrarily govern curriculum and the content of
individual courses"® than is the Study Group, I am saying that the
interaction between student expectations and institutional standards is
more complex psychologically than the Study Group's proposals
would indicate.

Ethical Difficulties

In addition to these psychological difficulties, there are closely
related ethical considerations which pertain to the Study Group's
recommendations concerning the role of institutional standards and
assessment measures in securing student involvement. The Study
Group acknowledges that "Learning is enhanced when both
expectations and standards are clear, and when they are actively
shared by faculty and students."® But everything would seem to
depend on how students come to share such an understanding. If one
of the goals of a college education is, as both the Involvement in
Learning and Boyer studies maintain, to produce open-minded,
thoughtful, and autonomous moral agents, it seems vital that we
respect students' right to construct their own standards, guides, and
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characters through independently arrived judgments, as opposed to
any form of indoctrination, no matter how benevolent.
For one thing, the psychological evidence cited earlier suggests
that moral principles arrived at by any means other than autonomous
deliberations are relatively unstable psychologically and inadequate for
active participation in our democratic way of life. Moreover, it would
seem that only the moral agent who arrives at her principles of
tolerance, exchange, and personal and social integrity independently
can be trusted to uphold those standards under duress and to help
others develop in the same direction. Finally, the moral question of
how to balance students' rights to their own values and standards
with institutional expectations is far from settled. In this regard, the
Study Group's recommendation that assessment information be used
to secure student involvement comes dangerously close to coercion.
None of this is to suggest that students should arbitrarily set
the moral tone or agenda of their schools, but it is to say that clear
and public standards and assessment measures, while certainly
necessary conditions of effective formal learning, are insufficient to
the development of autonomous morality in students. While the goal
is obviously not to free students from the responsibility of measuring
up to institutional expectations, neither is it to get them to adhere to
impersonal standards of performance and "excellence," the bases and
implications of which they do not fully grasp, no matter how valid
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those standards may be from the viewpoint of the institution. In short,
the moral intricacies involved in the balancing of students' reasoning
and institutional expectations would suggest the need for a more
thorough consideration of the role institutional standards play in
students' moral development than that implied by the Study Group's
recommendations.

Epistemological Diffictjlries

A third area of difficulty with the Study Groups' proposal, and
one which requires a longer exposition, is epistemological. The Study
Group quite correctly stresses the importance of designing educational
policies and practices in the light of a clear understanding of desired
student outcomes and accordingly cautions against the superficial use
of vague and grandiose terms like "critical thinking" and "value
education" as substitutes for concrete statements of observable
objectives. In their effort to define student outcomes in concrete
terms, however, the Study Group chooses behavioral indicators that
do not well reflect the epistemological difficulties involved in making
attributions of knowledge and commitment.
Consider, for example, this passage on "student involvement":
Highly involved students demonstrate their commitment
in a variety of ways: by devoting considerable energy to
studying, by working at on-campus rather than offcampus jobs, by participating actively in student
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organizations, and by interacting frequently with faculty
members and student peers.’®
While these indicators may accurately reflect certain types of
involvement, they are neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions
of learning. That they are not necessary is evidenced by those highly
involved students who do not exhibit these behaviors. (The one
exception here is that highly involved students clearly do devote
"considerable energy" to studying, but this is the one indicator in the
Study Group's list which is not an observable behavior. Devoting
"energy" to studying can assume many different forms, most of
which are impervious to simplistic behavioral descriptions.) That these
indicators are not sufficient conditions of learning is illustrated in the
following statement by a typical high school senior in the Boyer study:
"Students don't join the French Club to experience French culture but
because Yale will be impressed."” If colleges were to require
evidence of commitment on the basis of such observable behaviors,
one can easily imagine students going through the motions of "being
involved" without actually learning anything.
While the Study Group assuredly has in mind more substantive
indicators of academic achievement, their emphasis on assessment as
a lever for securing student involvement is prone to the same basic
difficulty: students would be too likely to try to perform in accordance
with external standards they did not necessarily embrace or
comprehend. How often, for example, have we, as college teachers
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striving to get our students to think more deeply, creatively, or
critically about something, had students respond to even our explicit
requirements and feedback with questions such as these: "So you
want me to take a position?" "So you want me to cite my sources?" "
So I should try looking at things from other viewpoints?" Any teacher
who has experienced the frustration of such responses knows that
explicit statements of what we expect from students, even when
coupled with careful feedback as to how well students have met
those expectations, are still no guarantee that students will really get
them, in the sense of believing and adopting them as active principles
of their own reasoning. It is just as probable that students will only
adopt our imposed standards for classroom purposes, while resorting
in real-life to whatever standards happen actually to guide them.
This is not to suggest, of course, that clear and public
statements of objectives are unimportant. On the contrary, they are
the very foundation upon which all effective teaching, course design,
and evaluation are based, and students certainly benefit from
knowing, as precisely as possible, both what it is we expect from
them and how well their work measures up to those standards. But
securing involvement in learning is not so simple a matter as making
explicit our expectations and evaluating students' performance
accordingly, though the Study Group is quite right that the adoption

11

of such measures could make for a substantial improvement in much
of the teaching that goes on.
Genuine teaching requires something more. Specifically, it
requires engagement of and interaction with students' existing beliefs.
To overlook this dimension of teaching would be to take inadequate
account of the belief component in knowledge, particularly of the way
people at all levels of cognitive development structure and commit
themselves to their own knowledge/belief systems.

Three Conditions of Knowledge

The prevailing contemporary view of knowledge is often
formulated as follows:
S knows P
if and only if:
(i) S believes P,
(ii) S has adequate evidence of P,
and (iii) P is true.^^
A frequent criticism of school learning’^ is that it often satisfies (i)
and (iii) but not (ii). In other words, it is often the case that students
will "learn" something and come to believe it without having adequate
reasons for doing so. In such cases, they could be said to be in
possession of "true opinions" but not "knowledge."
In a similar manner, it is equally possible for school learning to
satisfy (ii) and (iii) but not (i). In this case, students are given, and can
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reproduce on demand, "adequate” reasons for something generally
taken to be true, while not actually subscribing to it themselves. As a
writing teacher, for example, I have often received solid papers
arguing particular viewpoints, only later to discover in informal
discussions or tutorials that the students themselves held entirely
different opinions but felt they couldn't defend them in accordance
with the standards they believed both I and other teachers required. In
contrast, the students who take such conflicts as opportunities to
examine more critically the grounds for their own beliefs are precisely
the ones who are also willing to challenge external standards — the
irony, of course, being that in so doing they engage in precisely the
kind of thinking and learning we are trying to teach. To state the point
directly: it is those students who are driven to construct and justify
their own standards, by both challenging and entering into dialogue
with what are otherwise imposed standards, who engage in genuine
college level learning.
Of course, for students merely to challenge external standards
is not enough. It is for this reason that I include "entering into
dialogue with existing standards" as a condition of genuine college
level learning. Much could be (and will be) said about this condition,
but the crucial point for now is that genuine college level learning, like
all genuine learning, involves the engagement and reworking of
students' beliefs and belief systems. And merely providing explicit
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standards and feedback does not ensure such involvement. To be
genuinely involved, students must be motivated by something other
than grades or their need for approval or the desire to measure up;
they must be motivated by challenges, both indirect and direct, to
their existing beliefs and belief systems. Only when they are brought
to the point where they question the grounds of their own
’knowledge," beliefs, and convictions will they become genuinely
engaged in learning.

Scheffler's Analysis

Israel Scheffler's analysis of the belief condition of
knowledge’'^ both supports and enlightens this thesis. Scheffler
begins by rejecting the theory, put forth, among others, by B.F.
Skinner^®, that belief manifests itself as the tendency to produce
certain verbal responses in answer to questioning -- largely on the
grounds that many other factors than belief can account for even
ingrained tendencies towards given verbal responses (e.g., desire for
approval, fear of punishment, ulterior motive, extenuating
circumstances, etcetera).’® It is, moreover, often the case that a
person believes he subscribes to a belief while acting in a way that is
completely at odds with it. For example, Oliver North and his admirers
quite obviously believed themselves champions of democracy yet
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sanctioned the most undemocratic behaviors. Or again, a man may
sincerely "believe" in the equality of men and women yet in his
relations with women treat them as inferiors.
Such instances would seem to suggest that attributions of
belief must be based more broadly on a person's actual physical
behaviors over time than on merely verbal responses in specific
situations. Charles S. Peirce’^ suggested such a view with his
pragmatic notion that belief ultimately manifests itself "operationally"
as a general disposition to act in certain ways. Scheffler, however,
rejects this notion as still too narrow, on the grounds that the actual
factors affecting all behaviors are too numerous, complex, and
intertwined to permit attributions of any single belief.’® For example,
to suppose that a man who believed it was slushy outside would wear
his galoshes would be to assume a variety of things which were
logically independent of that belief: "that he wants to go out, wants
to keep his feet dry, believes that his galoshes will serve the purpose,
does not feel in too much of a hurry to put them on, et cetera..."’®
As Scheffler sees it, beliefs themselves are so inescapably
interlocked, not only with other beliefs but with attitudes, aims, and
circumstances, that the only way to describe any one belief is to look
at the whole system of attitudes, aims, contextual factors, and related
beliefs that support it.^° Scheffler ends up settling on the view that
"belief is ... a 'theoretical' state characterizing, in subtle ways, the
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orientation of the person in the world" and cannot be reduced to
descriptions which rely solely on discrete observable phenomena.^’

Implications for Higher Learning

This view has important educational implications, particularly
for higher learning, as this is the educational level at which the
process of belief formation becomes deliberate and self-critical. To
begin with, if by "knowledge" we mean something that students will
take with them and use in their lives outside of school, then we must
insist that "belief" is a condition of "knowledge," in any significant
sense of the latter term. Scheffler's view thus suggests that
attributions of student knowledge must include evidence that they
have constructed that knowledge in such a way as to function
harmoniously within their active belief systems. It further implies that
the process of belief/knowledge formation itself entails the complex
reconstruction of an entire network of cognitive, emotional,
perceptual, and behavioral factors, and cannot be reduced to the sort
of simplistic approbational model implied by the Study Group's
recommendation that assessment information serve as the means for
securing student involvement.
Above all, this analysis suggests that if we want students to
use their school knowledge as an active part of their lives, we must
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teach them in such a way that they work out the connections and
relevance of that knowledge in their own lives for themselves. The
way to do this is not through the coercive, though well-meaning, use
of assessment information as a lever for student involvement (for
coercion is what it amounts to if students do not see the intrinsic
advantages of adopting those standards for themselves) but rather by
creating those conditions which lead students to discover for
themselves the pertinence of those standards in helping them realize
and modify their own evolving aims and interests. The Study Group's
recommendation that assessment information be used as a lever for
student involvement thus misconceives the bases upon which
students actually become involved in learning and is in general too
simplistic to serve as an intelligent guide of educational policy and
practice.

Hypothesis

The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to suggest
the psychological, ethical, and epistemological complexity of higher
learning, and to argue the need for a philosophically sound and
practically useful conception of higher learning which takes that
complexity into account. In the process, the thesis that higher learning
necessarily entails the engagement of students' existing beliefs and
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belief systems has also been advanced. Taken by itself, this thesis
would suggest an incomplete conception of learning which puts more
weight on students' existing beliefs and interests than on subject
matter. In truth, subject matter figures predominantly in all education,
though it does not determine the aim of education so much as its
means. This notion is not self-evident, however, and requires some
historical and philosophical background.
First forwarded by John Dewey^^ in the early part of this
century, and developed most notably since by Lawrence Kohlberg,^^
one of the dominant models in educational philosophy today posits
three basic schools of educational thought and practice: (1) that
which views education as a shaping from without, (2) that which sees
it as an unfolding from within, and (3) that which conceives of it as
the "interaction" of external conditions with internal tendencies. While
each of these three perspectives prescribes that education should
move in the direction of growth, the sources, conceptions, and
hypothetical 'end points' of their respective agendas differ in some
important ways. For the first school, which Dewey labelled the
"traditional" approach, but which Kohiberg more accurately named the
"cultural transmission" school, the aims of education have traditionally
been defined by the dominant values and knowledge of the culture.
Education, from this perspective, consists first and foremost of the
passing on of a common body of accepted knowledge and moral
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standards from the past, to which the accomplished learner can
eventually contribute, once initiated into the ranks of 'knowledge
makers.' Some noteworthy spokespersons of this approach in recent
years have been William Bennett,^'^ Allan Bloom,and E.D. Hirsch,
Jr.2«
The second school, referred to by Kohiberg as "romantic," has
its roots in Rousseau, and has twice achieved popular acceptance in
the history of American education: first, during the progressive
education movement of the early part of this century, and, more
recently, during the open education, free school, and alternative
school experiments of the 1960's and 1970's. As educational
historians Lawrence Cremin^^ and Diane Ravitch^® have both noted,
the romantic perspective seems periodically to gain force largely as a
response to perceived shortcomings in the cultural transmission
approach (which in its turn resurfaces in reaction to the romantic -thus creating the "pendulum" effect so often referred to in educational
discussions). For our present purposes it is enough to summarize the
chief criticism romantic educators have advanced against the cultural
transmission school: that, in setting up as the end of education a fixed
body of pre-established knowledge and morals, the cultural
transmission approach tends to overlook students' own interests and
concerns, resulting in a general failure to secure student involvement
in the "learning" process. (It is in response to this difficulty.
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incidentally, that the Involvement in Learning study developed its
recommendation that publically stated standards be used as levers of
student involvement -- hardly the sort of reform romantic educators
support.)
As many educational scholars^® have argued, however,
despite the legitimacy of the romantic critique, romantic educators
have tended in practice to go to the opposjte extreme of the cultural
transmission school and have typically devalued content in education,
elevating in its place the natural tendencies and interests of students
themselves. In the 1920's and 1970's in particular, education in this
country witnessed a general abandoning of teacher authority and
standard subject matter in favor of students' own inclinations and
initiatives, which were generally assumed to have an innate, educative
power of their own. As at least one prominent cultural transmissionist
(Hirsch, 1987) has argued, the result has been a general decline in the
amount and quality of shared cultural knowledge.
Despite its excesses, however, the romantic perspective
contains some valid principles, not the least of which is that in order
for learning to take place what goes on in the classroom must be
continuous with the learner's experience; {the most common mistake
in this regard comes from construing the meaning of "experience" too
narrowly as constituting something that is strictly subjective and
personal, overlooking its objective and social aspects). Some of the
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more well-known practitioners and/or advocates of this approach
today include Peter Elbow,^° Carol Gilligan,^’ and the authors of
what is perhaps the most significant work to come out of the
romantic perspective in recent years, Women's Wavs of Knowina.^^
The third and final perspective in this model has historically
gone by the label "progressive" education, though it is alternatively
known as the "interactive" approach — by virtue of the dynamic
relation it posits between the natural structuring tendencies of
individuals with an objective environment that both challenges and is
in turn changed by the explanatory frameworks people impose on
it.^^ The main proponents of educational interactionism have been
John Dewey, Lawrence Kohiberg, and Jean Piaget, though a list of
present-day adherents might include such diverse theorist-practitioners
as Ann Berthoff, Dwight Boyd, Richard Paul, Richard Rorty, and Israel
Scheffler. (This perspective should not be confused with Cartesian
mind-body dualism, which also goes by the name "interactionism" but
which has no connection to modern educational theory.) For better or
worse, the term "progressivism" in education has historically been
associated with the aims and methods of romantic educators.
Owing to this confusion, and to the fact that "interactive" is more
descriptive of the actual principles underlying this perspective, we will
henceforth use the more modern term.
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Even here, though, the term "interactive" is often used to refer
generally to such instructional methods as open discussions, peer
collaboration, and student-centered classrooms, which obviously
involve a lot of student interaction but which may or may not be
"interactive" in the sense used here. "Interactionism," as both Dewey
and Piaget use the term, denotes the ongoing and dynamic process by
which an individual constructs, tests, and adopts or revises behavioral
and explanatory frameworks in response to challenges posed by the
environment. The chief function of education from this perspective is
to create those conditions which challenge students not only to
reassess their existing cognitive, affective, and behavioral structures,
but, more importantly, to develop new ones which are not mere
extensions of the old but more inclusive and differentiated
reconstructions of them. The aim of education, according to this view,
is to get students to the point where they initiate and sustain this
learning process themselves.
The role of subject matter in this scheme is a source of much
educational confusion. Generally speaking, cultural transmissionists
(e.g., Hirsch) concede the importance of students being actively
engaged in learning, but not at the expense of absorbing the requisite
subject matter. Educational romantics (e.g.. Elbow), on the other
hand, generally acknowledge that transmission of subject matter is
important, but not at the cost of securing active student involvement
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in the learning process. As Dewey points out, however, the same
assumption underlies both positions: that the subject matter which
schools have traditionally sought to impart stands in some sort of
opposition to the natural inclinations and interests of students, and
vice-versa.^®
From the interactionist perspective, the debate over subject
matter stems primarily from its being conceived as the end of
education, rather than as a means to increased understanding,
appreciation, and control of experience. When subject matter is
presented as an educational end, as has traditionally been the case, it
holds no intrinsic attraction for students, and artificial means, such as
the imposition of external standards (for example, as recommended in
the Involvement in Learning study -- though, again, it is not the
standards which are artificial but their use as levers for student
involvement) must be utilized to coerce students into learning it. The
typical result is what Alfred North Whitehead refers to as "inert
ideas,knowledge which students possess but which serves no
active function in their lives. The solution, however, is not to diminish,
as romantic educators have typically done, the importance of subject
matter (or objective standards) in favor of students' natural interests,
but rather to make the educational function of subject matter more
closely match its actual social and intellectual function: as a means
better to understand, appreciate, and control experience.
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Central to this idea is the interactionist conception of an
interest not as an end to be pursued for its own sake (which is how
the romantic educator generally conceives it) but as a dynamic
tendency in a person's psychological make-up which compels that
person to try to secure certain ends-in-view, whether they be
physical, affective, or intellectual in nature. Interest so conceived
gives us

purpose," especially when some challenge in our

environment frustrates our attempts to secure those ends-in-view.
And it is this purposefulness in the face of an unaccommodating
environment which compels us to organize our knowledge and actions
along increasingly more sophisticated lines.
The formal disciplines are both the result of this purposefulness
and a means of achieving future purposes. From the standpoint of the
disciplinary expert, this dual function is obvious. But from the
standpoint of the novice, the formal content and organization of the
subject areas is just one more thing to be learned - unless the teacher
can do two things: (1) find, or create, within the experience of
learners those interests which for their fulfillment would require the
superior organization of the subject areas, and (2) find or create those
conditions which will frustrate students' attempts to achieve their
purposes, thus compelling them not only to seek answers within the
appropriate disciplines but also to construct their own conceptual
frameworks for achieving, and modifying, those purposes. The role of
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the teacher in this educational scheme is thus to create those
conditions which will elicit, sustain, and, most difficult of all, regulate
the processes by which students construct their understanding of and
discourse with the world.
Creating and maintaining such conditions, is, of course, no
simple task; in fact, it is probably the most fundamental of all
educational problems. The proposed study is accordingly guided by
the following general hypothesis: that three of the most basic
conditions for engaging students' existing belief systems, and thus for
initiating and sustaining higher learning, are (1) doubt, (2) dialogue,
and (3) commitment. They are, respectively, the cognitive, social, and
moral components of a stimulating college environment.

Method

Rather than explore this hypothesis directly, the present study
uses it as a general reference point from which to launch separate but
complementary forays into key areas of the literature on higher
education. An in-depth study of this specific hypothesis would in any
case entail comparative-classroom, cross-disciplinary, and longitudinal
studies far beyond the scope of the present project, which seeks
primarily to suggest a way of conceptualizing higher learning that is
both philosophically sound and practically useful. That conception,
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which I am calling "interactive" and the broad features of which were
just outlined, is very much in evidence in four key areas, and it is to
those which we now turn.
The past two decades have witnessed the birth and expansion
of at least four significant trends in higher education: the "critical
thinking,

moral education," "writing-as-process," and "college

teaching" movements. Entire organizations, journals, series of books,
and cross-disciplinary symposia have appeared to accommodate the
growing interest in these areas nationwide. While a central concern in
all of these areas has been the articulation of a conception of higher
learning, especially pertinent to the present study is the fact that in all
four literatures the same interactive conception has been emerging for
some time.
The present study explores the interactive model in each of
these areas by concentrating in each case on an issue which has
received attention in recent years - in the critical thinking literature:
the debate over the transfer of thinking skills; in moral education: the
gender question in moral development; in college writing: the apparent
tension between individual cognition and social context as sources of
meaning and invention; and in college teaching: the relation of
educational theory to teaching practice as pertains to the growing
popularity of collaborative learning techniques. A separate chapter is
devoted to each issue, exploring it in the context of the appropriate
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literature. In general, the method consists of selecting dichotomous
models from the relevant literature, exploring their strengths and
weaknesses, and suggesting how an interactive conception
transforms what was previously thought to be an irreconcilable
conflict into a more inclusive, integrated, and dynamic educational
conception.
There are three basic reasons for conducting the study in this
manner: first, to illustrate how the same interactive principles operate
across several key areas of the literature, second, to begin exploring
the connections between literatures which might otherwise remain
discrete, and third, to generate five or six discrete essays suited to
diverse audiences (but nonetheless held together by the same basic
principles).
There are three chapters in addition to the four topic essays.
The first consists of this prospectus itself. The second is entitled
"Hirsch on Dewey: Setting the Record Straight,” and aims to describe
the interactive educational perspective in the context of the current
debate over a national curriculum. It is intended as a more detailed
introduction to the interactive model than that offered in the
hypothesis section of this proposal. Finally, a brief concluding chapter
offers summary remarks that reconsider the six main chapters in their
relation to one another. Abstracts of the separate chapters, and a
description of how they contribute to the dissertation overall, follows.
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g^gpter 1 - Belief as a Condition of Knowledge: The NppH f^r ^
PhilQgQphicgl Perspective in the Reform of Higher Edurati^r^

In an effort to illustrate the need for a philosophical perspective
in higher education reform, this chapter begins with a discussion of
specific shortcomings in the federally-sponsored study, Involvement in
Learning: Realizing the Potential of American Higher Education. It
argues primarily that this study takes inadeguate account of the belief
condition of knowledge and, in so doing, makes recommendations
which undermine one of its chief objectives: that students develop
habits of learning and commitment which would enable them to apply
their school knowledge in non-educational settings. The chapter goes
on to discuss a more dynamic conception of human learning which
better reflects the intricacies of actual human growth than that which
underlies the Involvement in Learning study.
In terms of the dissertation, this chapter illustrates the practical
need for a philosophically sound conception of higher learning. It also
advances the key interactive notion that genuine learning entails the
engagement of students' existing beliefs and belief systems. In the
interactive conception, human beings construct their understanding of
the world in response to the challenges posed by an
unaccommodating environment. Posing such challenges as compel
students to reconstruct their prior conceptual frameworks is the only
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sure path to securing genuine, wholehearted student involvement, and
is the teacher's primary (but by no means only) function.

Chapter Twp - Hirsch on Dewev: Setting the Record Straight

In his book. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to
Know (1987), E.D. Hirsch, Jr. advances the thesis that American
schools should all teach the same fundamental body of culturally
shared information. In the process, he perplexingly traces the rise in
this country of the "content-neutral" curriculum to John Dewey,
somehow missing the fact that Dewey staunchly opposed all
educational schemes which separate attention to students' individual
needs and interests from the transmission of a socially viable body of
subject matter. This chapter attempts, first, to set straight Hirsch's
mischaracterization of Dewey and, second, to explain how Dewey
sought actually to preserve the formal content of education while also
making it play a more dynamic role in the formation of students'
habits of constructive communication and inquiry. Dewey's
educational philosophy is presented as providing a more encompassing
framework within which Hirsch's otherwise beneficial
recommendations take on new meaning.
In the context of the dissertation, this chapter gives a more
complete exegesis of the interactive conception than that offered in
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the hypothesis. It does this by reframing Dewey's formulation of the
interactive conception (without a doubt the most complete and
penetrating of its kind) in the context of the current debate over
curricular reform. The essay distinguishes Dewey's interactionism
from both Hirsch's cultural transmissionism and Rousseauan
romanticism. It seeks to reconcile the apparent dichotomy between
attention to students' personal development and the transmission of
subject matter (by discussing how neither has any meaning except
insofar as it interacts with and regulates the other).

Qpgptpr Three -- Critical Thinking as Transfer: The Reconstructive
iQtQgrstion of Otherwise Discrete Interpretations of Experience

Recent work in the delineation and teaching of critical thinking
skills has led some theorists to question the extent to which skills
learned in one context can be transferred to others. Although there
exists a range of positions on the subject, the lines of the debate have
nevertheless been relatively clear-cut, with one side arguing that
thinking skills are specific to discrete subject areas, and the other that
they are transferable. The present chapter begins by attempting to
capture and clarify the major themes of the transfer debate. The chief
purpose of this discussion is to reveal that underlying the arguments
of both sides is a fundamentally shared conception of "thinking" as
something that is not so much comprised of skills (whether they be
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subject-specific or general) to be transferred as it is itself a process of
transfer through which otherwise discrete interpretations of
experience become integrated. The chapter concludes by arguing that
while the teaching of both subject-specific and general thinking skills
is important, our chief concern should be with fostering in students
those habits of reflective inquiry and ongoing transfer by which they
seek to construct ever more inclusive and integrated knowledge
systems, or what is generally referred to as "the critical spirit."
This chapter poses an interactive solution to the apparent
dichotomy between teaching for skill and teaching for content.
Thinking is presented as the process by which people reconstruct and
integrate what would otherwise remain discrete interpretations of
experience. Such a conception makes the promotion of students'
habits of reflective inquiry the primary educational concern. For more
important than skill or knowledge themselves is the development of a
disposition which inclines a person actively to seek moral and
intellectual integrity. Genuine and wholehearted involvement, in other
words, is the necessary basis upon which the learning of content and
skills must take place if they are to play an active role in students'
larger lives. This thesis is but a restatement of the idea that engaging
students' existing belief systems is a necessary condition of genuine
learning.
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ghgpter Pqmt -- Justice and Carina and the Problem nf
pgigtivism; Peframinn the Gender Question in Fthi^^

The relatively recent addition of women's voices to the study of
moral development has led to the postulation of two separate moral
contexts defined by gender, each with its own dominating concerns,
guiding principles, forms of reasoning and hypothetical end point.
While many developmental theorists agree that mature moral
reasoning entails some sort of integration of these two perspectives,
the exact nature of that reconciliation is a matter of considerable
speculation and debate. This chapter begins with the premise that the
mark of a moral developmental model's philosophical adequacy is its
handling of the problem of moral relativism. It examines the strengths
and weaknesses of the justice and caring approaches in regulating the
contextual relativism inherent in genderized moralities. And it
concludes by proposing that only by reframing the gender question in
broader, more teleological terms than present theories have attempted
can the problem be resolved.
This chapter again poses an interactive resolution to a topic
which has received much attention in recent years. Kohiberg's justice
model and Gilligan's caring model alike share the interactive
assumption that moral development proceeds through the ongoing
revision of previous structures in the context of challenges posed by
an objective environment. The main point of this chapter, however, is
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that neither model takes the implications of its underlying
interactionism far enough. Whereas the justice and caring conceptions
both assume that the problem of moral relativism is an inevitable
outcome of the irreconcilability of conflicting conceptions of the Good,
a fully interactional model posits that the problem is ultimately one of
how to go about reconstructing a more encompassing and integrated
teleological conception. The interactionist conception, in other words,
offers the possibility of a reflective transformation of moralities
previously assumed to be irreconcilable. The educational implication is
once again that our primary concern should be the development in
students of the active propensity to seek moral and intellectual
integrity.

Chapter Five -- The Indeterminacy of Knowledge and Discourse
Communities: How Cognition and Context Interact in Reflective
Thinking and Writing

Despite the growing popularity of the "process approach" to the
teaching of writing, many versions of this approach currently vie for
dominance. As part of a wider effort either to negotiate the
differences between these varying conceptions, or at least to make
more informed educational choices regarding them, a model positing
three basic process-oriented rhetorics has emerged. While all three
rhetorics are seen as having arisen in response to the shortcomings of
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the traditional, product-oriented approach, each has evolved according
to Its own particular sensitivity. The "expressive" school, which
surfaced in the 1970's. views writing primarily as a means by which
people construct or discover and communicate to others their deepest
or most authentic selves. The "cognitive process" school, which
achieved widespread popularity and institutional support during the
1980 s. focuses chiefly on the thinking and composing strategies by
which successful writers make and communicate meaning. And the
social constructionist" school, which by all indications will dominate
composition studies in the 1990's. concerns itself mainly with the
various discourse communities and overarching social and cultural
forces which shape our knowledge, language-use. and purposes.
At the present time, the most active debate is between the
cognitive process theorists and the social constructionists. Although
proponents of the two schools frame what is being debated
somewhat differently, the following formulation more or less captures
the gist of that debate. Social constructionists basically accuse
cognitive theorists of holding a positivistic conception of language as
nothing more than a medium of communication which people use to
achieve purposes formed independently of their sociolinguistic
contexts, contexts which social constructionists believe are actually
the major determinants of how we perceive and act in the world.
Cognitive theorists, in their turn, charge social constructionists with a
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social determinism that too hastily dismisses the role of the selfconscious individual in negotiating among and between socially
constrained options, options which cognitive theorists admit may
indeed shape a great deal of our thinking but which do not override
the capacity of individuals to construct their own meanings and
achieve their own purposes. In terms of the actual teaching of writing,
the issue is over which to emphasize: the cognitive processes by
which people construct meaning, or the social contexts and discourse
communities within which people's thinking and writing take place.
Theorists from both schools have called for a reconciliation
whereby the principles of one approach would enlarge our
understanding of the other. One such attempt has even been labelled
"interactive."^^ The present essay supports these efforts but seeks
to take the interactive conception further than either of them. It
argues that neither general cognitive strategies nor particular social
arrangements are intrinsically thought-provoking or thought¬
generating; hence neither can induce students to think and write in
meaningful ways. Taking its inspiration from the conception of
"reflective thinking" outlined by Dewey,the essay argues instead
that the construction of meaning entails the interaction of objective
social and physical conditions with a structuring self and arises where
a perplexing situation leads one to a state of doubt about what to
believe or do. The key educational condition for eliciting reflective
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thinking and writing from this perspective is neither the social
groupings or apprehension of discrete academic discourse conventions
advanced by social constructionists nor the process strategies or
cognitive-developmental capabilities advanced by cognitive theorists.
It is rather the teacher's structuring of a perplexing situation (from the
students as well as the academic community's viewpoint) into a task
requiring reflective inquiry and reconstructive dialogue for a creative
and satisfying resolution.
In terms of the dissertation, this chapter explores more directly
the practical implications of an interactive theoretical conception, a
relationship which is addressed explicitly in the sixth chapter.

Chapter Six — Personal and Philosophical Reservations About
Collaborative Learning

An increasing number of university faculty from a wide range of
disciplines are turning to "collaborative learning" as an alternative to
more traditional modes of instruction. The term itself denotes a
general pedagogical style which emphasizes cooperation - either
among students or between students and faculty - as the basic mode
of learning. Founded on the premise that learning is fundamentally a
social process, collaborative learning seeks to replicate that process in
the classroom. In practice, it can take the form of small-group
exercises, collaborative research projects, peer-review methods.
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cooperative course development, or reconfigured lecture formats - to
name some of the more widely used techniques.
This chapter begins with a personal account of my experience
in a variety of collaborative learning situations -- first as a high school
and college student, then as a college teacher. The chapter then
considers three learning outcomes which proponents of collaborative
learning claim it is supposed to achieve: (1) increased responsibility for
learning, (2) the understanding that knowledge is socially constructed,
and (3) the development of higher order reasoning skills. The purposes
of this inquiry are, first, to caution against the dangers of ascribing to
collaborative learning educative powers which it does not necessarily
possess, second, to give a more cautious account of what
collaborative learning actually achieves and under what conditions,
and third, to suggest avenues for further inquiry and research.
In general, this chapter argues that collaborative techniques are
excellent motivators and extremely helpful in promoting tolerance,
critical thinking, and the understanding of the social nature of
knowledge. However, learning and motivation depend finally on the
learning task, how it interacts with students' interests, abilities, and
existing belief systems, and how it is structured to sustain and
regulate the interplay of skepticism and belief in students' reasoning.
This thesis is but a restatement, in a particular context, of the
interactive conception being put forth in the dissertation overall.
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Summary Remarks

Almost everywhere one turns in the literature on higher
education, the same basic conception of learning as the interaction of
internal tendencies with external conditions is emerging as an antidote
to the enduring educational dichotomies: process versus product, skill
versus content, student versus curriculum, method versus subject
matter, and so on. A single study which would consider the various
conversations in their relation both to one another and to the
interactive conception as a whole could produce valuable new insights
and encourage dialogue between otherwise discrete discourse
communities.
The proposed study takes a first step in that direction. It aims
to formulate an interactive conception of higher learning across
several key areas of the literature -- including critical thinking, moral
education, college writing, college teaching, and higher education
reform. The study integrates concerns from epistemology, ethics,
rhetoric, learning theory, and policy analysis, and, in so doing, seeks
to outline a more unified philosophical conception which draws on
recent advances in each of these areas.
Generally speaking, educational interactionism is the attempt to
explain intellectual and moral growth in terms of the ongoing and
reciprocal Interaction of human beings and their environments, both
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physical and social. It accordingly seeks to reconcile the historical
antipathy between rationalism and empiricism (and, more recently,
social constructionism) — that is, between the assumption that
meaning resides in the mind and the assumption that it resides in
objective reality (whether that be defined empirically or socially). In
terms of educational practice, educational interactionism seeks to
resolve the persistent tension between attention to students'
individual needs and interests and the transmission of a socially viable
body of subject matter (by asserting that neither has any meaning
without the other).
This study is but a first step in a much larger effort which
would aim to integrate and clarify the general features of the
interactive conception, eliminate many present inconsistencies, and
outline its implications for educational policy and teaching practice.
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CHAPTER 2

HIRSCH ON DEWEY:
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

Lawrence Cremin once wrote of John Dewey's educational
writings that the grossest caricatures of his work have come from
otherwise intelligent commentators in the United States and
abroad."’ Cremin's observation is unfortunately as true today as it
was thirty years ago, and manifests itself in the form of E. D. Hirsch,
Jr.'s conspicuous misrepresentation of Dewey's thoughts on the role
of subject matter in education.^ Hirsch, in advancing his thesis-that
American schools should all teach the same fundamental body of
culturally shared information, perplexingly traces the rise in this
country of the "content-neutral” curriculum to Dewey, somehow
missing the facts that Dewey not only staunchly opposed all
educational schemes which divorce method from content, and the
teaching of skills from subject matter, but openly criticized (though
probably not forcefully enough) the separation of students' individual
needs and interests from the transmission of an organized body of
shared cultural knowledge.
Indeed, it is arguable that if Dewey were alive today he would
support the idea of teaching a common national culture, and for many
of the same reasons as Hirsch. This is not to say, however, that there
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are not important differences between Hirsch's and Dewey's
educational visions. But those differences are not, in general, the ones
Hirsch identifies. The truly unfortunate thing about Hirsch's
mischaracterization is that in maligning Dewey, Hirsch not only
neglects the counsel of a powerful opponent of educational formalism,
but steers countless others away from examining this advice also.
The present essay attempts, in some small way, to rectify this
situation. It begins with a brief overview of Hirsch's thesis that the
most important function of education is the transmission of a
society's shared cultural knowledge -- a thesis which Hirsch presents
as standing in opposition to Dewey's educational agenda. The essay
next addresses the specific distortions which Hirsch commits against
Dewey -- including his characterization of Dewey as a disciple of
Rousseau, an opponent of formal subject matter, and an advocate of
content-neutral skills and social utility as educational aims -- and
offers numerous and striking counterexamples to these charges from
Dewey's own writings. {The unusual number of quotations cited in
this and the following section is warranted by the need to
demonstrate that Dewey actually said the things which I attribute to
him. It is also hoped that they might motivate readers to examine the
works cited herein for themselves.) This discussion reveals the many
important ways in which Dewey in fact anticipated and agrees with

47

Hirsch about the role of subject matter in education, particularly with
regard to its socializing function.
The essay then examines that part of Dewey's writings most
neglected by Hirsch: his concern about the dangers of over-formalizing
both subject matter and basic skills and the means by which he
sought actually to preserve the formal content of education while also
making it play a more dynamic role in the formation of students'
habits of reflective inquiry and discourse. Finally, in what constitutes
something of an appendix, the essay attempts to account for Hirsch's
misrepresentation of Dewey by elaborating on Lawrence Cremin's
three-part explanation for the persistent mischaracterizations of
Dewey which he has observed in his work as an educational historian.
In the end the reader should see that Hirsch, in mistaking his
own skewed and fragmentary misinterpretation for the whole of
Dewey's educational philosophy, not only commits an intellectual
injustice and social disservice but fails to avail himself of a
philosophical framework of greater scope and integrity than his own, a
framework within which his own otherwise beneficial research and
recommendations take on new meaning.
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Teaching the National Culture

In his book, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to
Know, E. D. Hirsch, Jr. sets forth his "anthropological" thesis that the
primary function of schooling should be the transmission of that body
of specific cultural information necessary for participation in the social
life of a community.^ His basic argument is that effective
communication, particularly in an advanced society, depends upon its
people being familiar with a wide range of shared information more or
less specific to that society. This body of shared information, he
argues, lies below the surface of all communication, and anyone
unfamiliar with its contents simply cannot partake in the give and take
of ideas and information which characterizes all successful societies.
Recent research in the psychology of reading, Hirsch
persuasively argues,"^ supports this idea. Reading, it turns out,
involves much more than the mere decoding of the specific
information and ideas symbolized in a given text. Readers, in fact,
bring to any text a vast background of previously structured
information without which the task of decoding would be virtually
impossible -- or at least so time-consuming and laborious as to be
absurdly impractical. The name given by reading researchers to these
previously structured bodies of information is schemata,

and they

function basically the same way as Piaget's "structures": as dynamic
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networks of meaning with which new information must be integrated,
through a process of mutual adjustment of both the schema and the
new data, in order to take on meaning.
Effective communication, Hirsch argues, depends upon people
having learned the same basic schemata, for without them people
would have to expend tremendous amounts of time and energy
familiarizing themselves with the structure of each other's background
knowledge. In essence, it would be like learning a new language.
Hirsch's rationale® is again convincing. The history of the ontogenesis
of national languages forcefully demonstrates that nations which
consciously normalize their languages through national educational
systems are much better able to meet the demands of industrialized
living than those which fail to do so. As Hirsch points out, what is
less obvious is the fact that such nations conceive and transmit their
national cultures consciously as well, as educators in this country did
for nearly two centuries following the American Revolution. Thus,
Hirsch argues, literate Americans could, until recently, assume a
shared body of knowledge and corresponding schemata within which
their national dialogue could take place.
The problem with our present educational system, according to
Hirsch, is that we have relinquished responsibility for the construction
and transmission of a national culture in favor of one that is both
dangerously fragmented and substantively sparse. The culprits, Hirsch
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believes, are primarily school administrators and professors of
education fixated on misguided notions of "natural" student
development and "content-neutral" learning, the origins of which
Hirsch traces to Rousseau and Dewey via the curricular upheavals of
the progressive and open education movements. These misguided
notions, he argues, have given rise to an era of what he alternatively
refers to as "romantic formalism" and "educational formalism,"
wherein skills assumed to be general and transferable are taught with
reference to students' immediate and parochial interests rather than
within the context of a coherent body of culturally shared subject
matter. "The inevitable effect of this fundamental educational
mistake," writes Hirsch, "has been a gradual disintegration of cultural
memory, causing a gradual decline in our ability to communicate."®
Despite his opposition to many current educational practices,
however, Hirsch advocates no simple return to traditional methods of
instruction, as some of his critics have charged,^ acknowledging that
certain important educational advances have come about in recent
decades. Among these he includes respect for individual and cultural
differences, imaginative and flexible presentation of subject matter, an
appreciation of the active nature of genuine learning, and the use of
intensive study to promote deeper and more comprehensive
understanding.

51

It is not entirely clear, however, whether Hirsch subscribes to
the epistemology of traditional Lockean pedagogy — which generally
likens the mind to a blank slate onto which teachers can inscribe
subject matter - or to the modern view that unless students are led
somehow to structure that subject matter for themselves they will
neither grasp it nor be able to apply it in non-educational settings. His
discussion of the way in which readers must organize and adjust
existing schemata in order to make sense of new information,® along
with his assertion that subject matter "should be taught not just as a
series of terms, or list of words, but as a vivid system of shared
associations,"® would seem to suggest an active epistemology. At
other times, however, Hirsch seems to advocate a very passive
epistemology. In particular, he claims that young children not only can
but should absorb adult information before they fully understand it.^°
And although he acknowledges that only through "intensive study and
experience" can students "understand how isolated facts fit together
in some coherent way,"" he nevertheless maintains that, "in the
early grades, truly intensive study is in any case difficult to
pursue.'"^
In the end, Hirsch winds up advocating a two-part model of
education comprised of both an "extensive curriculum of culturally
shared information and an "intensive curriculum" of detailed and
active study adapted to the needs and interests of individual
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students — a proposal which reflects his apparent desire for a
reconciliation of traditional and so-called "progressive" pedagogies.
Arguing, first, that a curriculum can be "pluralistic in its materials and
modes of teaching but nonetheless provide ... our children with a
common core of cultural information,"^^ and, secondly, that a failure
to specify the contents of a national extensive curriculum will leave
students at the mercy of a "curriculum of cultural fragmentation and
illiteracy,"’'^ Hirsch goes on to present his famous list of items, the
meaning of which "every American needs to know."

Hirsch's Mischaracterization of Dewev

Throughout his book, Hirsch contrasts his "anthropological
theory of education" with the "content-neutral conception of
educational development"’® that he more or less plausibly diagnoses
as dominating American pedagogy today. According to this contentneutral model - which Hirsch tells us was first advanced by Rousseau
and later popularized in this country by Dewey - schooling
emphasizes natural human growth and the development of general
intellectual skills with little regard for the specific knowledge and
traditions which make up a society's culture. Thus, for example,
children are taught to read through the use of Dick-and-Jane-type
texts which are accommodated to children's particular developmental
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needs but devoid of any specific cultural content -- the premise being
that what children need is not a lot of adult information but practice in
the rudimentary decoding skills which will form the basis of later
literacy.

Dewey's Critique of Rousseau's Conception of Natural Development

In fact, while a case can be made for the claim that this
content-neutral approach to education has at least some basis in
Rousseau, the same cannot be said of Dewey, who criticized
Rousseau precisely for the rift the romantic educational philosopher
created between natural human development, on the one hand, and
induction into a shared culture, on the other. Hirsch, however, entirely
misses this crucial distinction, and in so doing not only fails to
enlighten us as to the profound differences between Rousseau's and
Dewey's educational philosophies but unwittingly perpetuates the
very sort of uninformed generalizing to which one might suppose he
would object.
To begin with, to emphasize as Hirsch does the content-neutral
strain in Rousseau's educational philosophy is misleading, for it diverts
attention away from Rousseau's primary concern — that children
should learn to think and choose for themselves. For Rousseau, the
problem with education as it was practiced in his day was that it
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coerced children into accepting the intellectual frameworks and moral
values of society without the exercise of their own native intelligence.
According to him, before they are indoctrinated by society, children
well know the difference between acting from necessity and acting in
order to conform to authority. And since education, as he saw it,
relied on the latter, it caused a profound division between children's
"genuine" selves and their "social" selves, resulting in a state of
chronic artificiality and hypocrisy.
Rousseau's solution (if we are to take the Emile as prescriptive
of what education ought to be) was to structure the entire educative
experience so that children always act from a perceived necessity and
never from a restriction placed upon them by authority (an idea' of
enormous and, for the most part, unrealized educational import).
Where Rousseau went wrong was in assuming that this meant
education must proceed outside the existing social order -- that is, as
it would "in nature," with children acting in pursuit of their own
perceived best interests as opposed to any socially-imposed
expectations. Only this way, Rousseau believed, could children's will
and personal integrity be preserved.’®
Now Hirsch writes that in Schools of To-Morrow’^ Dewey
"acknowledges Rousseau as the chief source of his educational
principles" (though he in fact does no such thing), ostensibly on the
grounds that "The first chapter ... carries the telling title 'Education as
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Natural Development' and is sprinkled with quotations from
Rousseau.

Those who have read Dewey's other educational

writings, especially Democracy and Education, will find this statement
particularly remarkable, as Dewey spends more time telling us what
Rousseau got wrong than what he got right.’® That situation is,
however, conspicuously reversed in Schools of To-Morrow, the first
chapter of which does indeed read like a paean to Rousseau, of whom
Dewey writes:
[H]is insistence that education be based upon the native
capacities of those to be taught and upon the need of
studying children in order to discover what these native
powers are, sounded the keynote of all modern efforts
for educational progress.^®
Even here, though -- in the sentence immediately preceding that
just cited, in fact -- Dewey remarks that "Rousseau said, as well as
did, many foolish things,"^’ a comment which evidently piqued
neither Hirsch's curiosity nor his scholarly instincts enough for him to
pursue. Had he done so, he would have found that according to
Dewey there is an enormous difference between the notion that
growth should proceed "naturally," that is, by stimulating the native
interests and abilities of children, and the rather absurd notion that it
can only do so in isolation from the social milieu in which children live.
And this difference goes to the heart of Dewey's critique of Rousseau;
The recognition ... that great historic institutions are
active factors in the intellectual nurture of mind was a
great contribution to educational philosophy. It indicated
a genuine advance beyond Rousseau, who had marred
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his assertion that education must be a natural
development and not something forced or grafted upon
individuals from without, by the notion that social
conditions are not natural.
Actually, Dewey greatly admired Rousseau's contention that
the child's present abilities and interests form the starting point of
education (an educational principle which I later argue Hirsch himself
must be constrained to admit — even if he will not follow it through to
its logical conclusion). But Hirsch goes too far when he maintains that
Dewey shared Rousseau's conception of natural development "on
analogy with the development of an acorn into an oak." Writes Hirsch:
[T]he theory ... has its drawbacks, one of which is that a
child is not in fact like an acorn. Left to itself, a child will
not grow into a thriving creature; Tarzan is pure fantasy.
To thrive, a child needs to learn the traditions of the
particular human society and culture it is born into.^^
In fact, Dewey criticized Rousseau on precisely the same
grounds:
Rousseau and his followers ... made much use of the
analogy of the development of a seed into the full-grown
plant. They used this analogy to draw the conclusion that
in human beings there are latent capacities which, if they
are only left to themselves, will ultimately flower and
bear fruit. So they framed the notion of natural
development as opposed to a directed growth which they
regarded as artificial.
But ... [e]ven the seed of a plant does not grow
simply of itself. It must have light, air and moisture in
order to grow. Its development is after all controlled by
conditions and forces that are outside of it... A stunted
oak, a stalk of maize that bears few ears with only a few
scattered grains, exhibit so-called natural development as
truly as does the noble tree with expanding branches or
the ear of maize that wins the prize at an exhibition.
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According to Dewey, Rousseau's error lay in mistaking an
educational means -- the child's native curiosity, impulses, and
interests — for an educational end.
Rousseau was right, introducing a much-needed reform
into education, in holding that the structure and activities
of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the
use of the organs; but profoundly wrong in intimating
that they supply not only the conditions but also the ends
of their development. ..[T]he notion of a spontaneous
normal development of these activities is pure
mythology. The natural, or native, powers furnish the
initiating and limiting forces in all education; they do not
furnish it ends or aims.^®
A child's native capacities, in other words, can never fix the goal of
education, any more than her experience can be construed as
something that exists apart from social conditions. At the same time
that education must take the child's present interests and abilities into
account, the direction of education, according to Dewey, comes from
a source outside the child.

Dewey's Advocacy of an Organized Body of Shared Cultural Subject
Matter

Contrary, then, to Hirsch's characterization of Dewey as
opposing the transmission of an organized body of shared cultural
knowledge, Dewey maintained that it is precisely such knowledge as
this that determines the direction of education. Far from advocating
that the actual content of education is a matter of indifference,
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Dewey believed that the transmission of the shared knowledge and
traditions of a society constitutes one of education's primary
functions. Like Hirsch, Dewey justified this notion on anthropological
grounds:
The primary facts of the birth and death of each one of
the constituent members in a social group determine the
necessity of education. On one hand, there is the
contrast between the immaturity of the new-born
members of the group -- its future sole representatives -and the maturity of the adult members who possess the
knowledge and customs of the group. On the other hand,
there is the necessity that these immature members be
not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but
that they be initiated into the interest, purposes,
information, skill, and practices of the mature members:
otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life...
Education, and education alone, spans the gap...^®
Much like Hirsch, Dewey also argued the need for a common
subject matter, particularly in a pluralistic culture where the interests
of smaller groups, communities, and sub-cultures can easily cause
cultural divisiveness.
[Wjith the development of commerce, transportation,
intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the
United States are composed of a combination of different
groups with different traditional customs. It is this
situation which has, perhaps more than any other one
cause, forced the demand for an educational institution
which shall provide something like a homogeneous and
balanced environment for the young... The intermingling
in the school[s] ... of different races, differing religions,
and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader
environment. Common subject matter accustoms all to a
unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to
the members of any group while it is isolated. The
assimilative force of the American public school is
eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and
balanced appeal.
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Hirsch, however, incorrectly lumps Dewey together with
Rousseau and his followers, and accuses them all of failing to show
"an adequate appreciation of the need for transmission of specific
cultural information."^® In reality, Dewey not only maintained that
children need to learn the shared information of the culture, but he
criticized so-called progressive educators in his own time precisely on
the grounds that they had overreacted against the tendency of
traditional schools to impose factual knowledge without securing
student involvement.
[I]t is often held that since traditional education rested
upon a conception of organization of knowledge that was
almost completely contemptuous of living present
experience, therefore education based upon living
experience should be contemptuous of the organization
of facts and ideas.
Dewey warned against this tendency as early as 1902, in The Child
and the Curriculum. He later criticized it, among other places, in a
1928 speech to the Progressive Education Association entitled
"Progressive Education and the Science of Education,"^® in a 1930
essay entitled "How Much Freedom in the New Schools?,in a
1934 essay entitled "The Need for a Philosophy of Education,
and, most notably, in his 1938 critique of the progressive education
movement. Experience and Education.
In fact, so pervasive is this theme in Dewey's educational
writings that it is difficult to understand why Hirsch neglects to
mention it. Indeed, two of Hirsch's chief historical sources, Patricia
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Graham

and Lawrence Cremin,^^ document at length and in the

plainest terms Dewey's struggles with the opponents of organized
subject matter. Graham, for instance, cites Dewey's 1928 speech to
the Progressive Education Association, where Dewey said that he
wondered "whether this earlier and more negative phase of
progressive education has not upon the whole run its course, and
whether the time has not arrived in which these schools are
undertaking a more constructive organized function."^® Graham
writes that in this speech "Dewey then urged that the schools attempt
to organize subject matter along intellectual lines and to study
conditions favorable to learning."^®
The point is taken up in even more detail by Cremin, whom I
quote at length.
[Tjhere is a point to be made here, one that Dewey
argued for the rest of his career but never fully
communicated to some who thought themselves his
disciples. A teacher cannot know which opportunities to
use, which impulses to encourage, or which social
attitudes to cultivate without a clear sense of what is to
come later. With respect to character, this implies a
conception of the kind of individual who is to issue from
the school; and with respect to intellect, this implies a
thorough acquaintance with organized knowledge as
represented in the disciplines... In short, the demand on
the teacher is twofold: thorough knowledge of the
disciplines and an awareness of those common
experiences of childhood that can be utilized to lead
children toward the understandings represented by this
knowledge. As Dewey himself pointed out, the demand is
weighty indeed, and easily side-stepped. For simple as it
is to discard traditional curricula in response to cries for
reform, it is even simpler to substitute for them a
succession of chaotic activities that not only fail to
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facilitate growth but actually end up miseducative in
quality and character.^^
Hirsch, however, quite remarkably misses all of this,
characterizing Dewey instead on the basis of selected and often
uncharacteristic quotes which he either takes out of context or
grossly misinterprets. One example of a quote taken out of context is
a passage to which Hirsch alludes, ironically, in Dewey's defense.
"Dewey," he writes, "in fact, became appalled by the neutral
scientism of those American educational administrators who began to
institutionalize progressive ideas.While this claim is true enough,
the passage Hirsch cites to support it has absolutely no connection
whatsoever to Dewey's critique of scientism in education. On the
contrary, when Dewey wrote that "[tlhere is always the danger in a
new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which
it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than
positively and constructively,"^® he was criticizing precisely the
detractors of organized subject matter with whom Hirsch incorrectly
identifies Dewey! (As anyone who has actually read Experience and
Education knows.) In fact, I know of no passage in that entire book
where Dewey takes the "scientific managers" of education to task, so
focused is he on trying to correct the misconceived child-centeredness
of the progressive education movement.
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An example of a misinterpreted quote is Hirsch's citation of
Dewey as strongly second[ing] Rousseau's opposition to the mere
accumulation of information”:
Development emphasizes the need of intimate and
extensive personal acquaintance with a small number of
typical situations with a view to mastering the way of
dealing with the problems of experience, not the piling up
of information/®
In the first place, to deduce from this passage, as Hirsch does, that
Dewey believed "that a few direct experiences would suffice to
develop the skills that children require" entails the most obvious of
fallacies, as can be seen simply by examining the quoted passage: to
"emphasize" direct acquaintance is by no means to declare that it is a
"sufficient" condition of learning.
More to the point, however, is the fact that it is the "mere
accumulation" and the "piling up of information" to which Dewey was
opposed, and not the learning of information per se.
Things remote in space and time affect the issue of our
actions quite as much as things which we can smell and
handle... Information is the name usually given to this
kind of subject matter. The place of communication in
personal doing supplies us with a criterion for estimating
the value of informational material in school. Does it
grow naturally out of some question with which the
student is concerned? Does it fit into his more direct
acquaintance so as to increase it efficacy and deepen its
meaning? If it meets these two requirements, it is
educative.
The difference between information which is educative and that which
is not resides, then, according to Dewey, in whether or not the
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student is able to create a place for it within his own active cognitive
structures.
It is no objection to information that it is clothed in
words; communication necessarily takes place through
words. But in the degree in which what is communicated
cannot be organized into the existing experience of the
learner, it becomes mere words: that is, pure sensestimuli, lacking in meaning.
The irony is that Hirsch himself attacks the mere accumulation
of knowledge on precisely the same grounds: "Indeed, if traditional
facts were to be presented unimaginatively or taught ignorantly or
regarded as ends in themselves, we would have much to deplore in a
return to traditional education."'*^ Writing of the "extensive
curriculum" of shared cultural information, he goes on to say: "Of
course, this curriculum should be taught not just as a series of terms,
or list of words, but as a vivid system of shared associations.In
fact, Hirsch ends up endorsing the very principle of intensive study for
which he criticizes Dewey:
[Tjhe extensive curriculum is not a sufficient basis for
education by itself... The intensive curriculum, though
different, is equally essential. Intensive study encourages
a fully developed understanding of a subject, making
one's knowledge of it integrated and coherent. It
coincides with Dewey's recommendation that children
should be deeply engaged with a small number of typical
concrete instances.
"To understand how isolated facts fit together," he continues, "we
must always acquire mental models of how they cohere, and these
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schemata can come only from detailed, intensive study and
experience."**®
In spite of Hirsch's characterization that Dewey endorsed only
the intensive curriculum, Dewey in fact agreed with Hirsch's
estimation of the need for both an extensive body of shared cultural
knowledge and a program of intensive study to secure that knowledge
in students' cognitive and communicative repertoires.
The parceling out of instruction among various ends such
as acquisition of skill (in reading, spelling, writing,
drawing, reciting), acquiring information (in history and
geography), and training of thinking is a measure of the
ineffective way in which we accomplish all three.
Despite this seeming similarity, however, there are important
differences here between Hirsch and Dewey, one of which would
seem to be the question of emphasis. Before considering these
differences, however, let us first look at two more ways in which
Hirsch mischaracterizes Dewey: as an advocate of content-neutral
skills and of social utility as educational aims.

Dewey's Rejection of Formalized Skills and Social Utility as
Educational Aims

Hirsch blames many of today's educational ills on "educational
formalism," a pedagogical approach which he characterizes as
follows:
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Educational formalism holds that reading and writing are
like baseball and skating; formalism conceives of literacy
as a set of techniques that can be developed by proper
coaching and practice... Educational formalism assumes
that the specific contents used to teach "language arts"
do not matter so long as they are closely tied to what the
child already knows... Current schoolbooks in language
arts pay little systematic attention to conveying a body
of culturally significant information from grade to
grade.^®
Teaching reading as a content-neutral skill, he maintains, fails socially
because cultural literacy requires culturally specific knowledge, with
the result that a content-neutral reading curriculum leads to poor intrasocietal communication.
In the course of this otherwise sound argument, however,
Hirsch falsely identifies Dewey as one of the forerunners of presentday educational formalism. Along with several unexplained and
unsupported references to the "content-neutral curriculum'"^® and
"content-neutral ideas of Rousseau and Dewey,he writes that
"Dewey assumed that early education need not be tied to specific
content."®’ In actuality, Dewey deplored the separation of skills and
subject matter in education. To begin with, he believed that although
we can draw a distinction between them in theory, they cannot in
fact be separated in human intellectual functioning. In an extended
critique of what he calls the "theory of 'formal discipline,'"®^ Dewey
wrote that
the fundamental fallacy of the theory is its dualism: that
is to say, its separation of activities and capacities from
subject matter. There is no such thing as an ability to see

66

or hear or remember in general; there is only the ability to
see or hear or remember something. To talk about
training a power, mental or physical, in general, apart
from the subject matter involved in its exercise, is
nonsense.®^
Even more pertinent to Hirsch's critique are Dewey's comments
on the negative consequences that accrue from divorcing the teaching
of skills from the transmission of socially desirable subject matter (a
practice which he attributed, in part, to the misguided psychological
doctrine of formal discipline just cited).
If the how and the what, the psychological and the
social, method and subject matter, must interact
cooperatively in order to secure good results, a hard and
fast distinction between them is fraught with danger. We
want a method that will select subject-matter that aids
psychological development, and we want a subjectmatter that will secure the use of methods
psychologically correct. We cannot begin by dividing the
field between the psychology of individual activity and
growth[,] and studies or subject-matters that are socially
desirable, and then expect that at the end In practical
operation the two things will balance each other.
With specific regard to the teaching of reading, Dewey wrote
that "[t]he question of what one learns to read is thus inextricably
bound up with the question of how one learns to read."®® In
discussing the dangers of basing educational practice on incomplete
psychological theories, Dewey complained that "the tools that are
recognized to be social [e.g., literacy] are not treated socially but are
relegated to the mechanics of psychology."®® He then went on to
give the following illustration of the ills which result from this
separation:
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The kind of reading-matter that now most abounds
socially, as may be gathered from a glance at
newsstands, is largely of a socially undesirable character.
Yet It can be sold only to readers, to those in possession
o the so-called social tools. Pages of exposition would
not speak more eloquently of what is bound to happen
when educational theory separates, in the name of
science, the psychological processes that regulate the
mere mechanism of acquiring a skill from the social
conditions and needs which have to do with the
application of that skill.®^
Far from arguing, then, that skills can or should be taught apart from
subject matter, Dewey agreed with Hirsch's opinion that reading,
writing, and even figuring are social skills, tied to specific social
content.
But what of the charge that Dewey advocated social utility
itself as an educational aim? Once again, Hirsch flagrantly
misrepresents Dewey in this regard. Hirsch refers to "Dewey's
pragmatic emphasis on direct social utility as an educational goal,"®®
and maintains that the emphasis on "utility and the direct application
of knowledge" which the NEA's Commission on the Reorganization of
Secondary Education advanced in its 1918 report Cardinal Principles
of Secondary Education®® originated in "European romanticism and
American pragmatism as amalgamated in the educational philosophy
of John Dewey.
In fact, Dewey adamantly opposed social utility as an
educational aim on several grounds. In the first place, he maintained
that studies which aim to prepare people for specific vocational
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callings fail precisely because vocational callings themselves are not
stable but subject to constant change.
As a matter of fact, industry at the present time
undergoes rapid and abrupt changes through the
evolution of new inventions. New industries spring up,
and old ones are revolutionized. Consequently an attempt
to train for too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its
own purpose. When the occupation changes it methods,
such individuals are left behind with even less ability to
readjust themselves than if they had a less definite
training.®’
Hirsch makes precisely the same point when he writes that
[tjhe flaw in utilitarianism is its lack of utility for the
modern world. Narrow vocational education, adjusted to
the needs of the moment, is made ever more obsolete by
changing technology. Vocations have multiplied beyond
the abilities of the schools to accommodate them. What
is required is education for change, not for static job
competencies.®^
Indeed, Dewey believed that the subject matter of a genuinely
vocational education should be largely traditional in content.
[A]n education which acknowledges the full intellectual
and social meaning of a vocation would include
instruction in the historic background of present
conditions; training in science to give intelligence and
initiative in dealing with material and agencies of
production; and study of economics, civics, and politics,
to bring the future worker into touch with the problems
of the day and the various methods for its improvement.
Above all, it would train power of readaptation to
changing conditions so that future workers would not
become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon them.®^
Following this same basic line of reasoning, Dewey further
attacked social utility as an educational aim on the grounds that
preoccupation with present-day social needs is often bought at the
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expense of the very historical and accumulated past knowledge which
would enable people to understand and cope with current problems.
[Tlhe achievements of the past provide the only means at
cornmand for understanding the present. Just as the
individual has to draw in memory upon his own past to
understand the conditions in which he individually finds
himself, so the issues and problems of present social life
are in such intimate and direct connection with the past
that students cannot be prepared to understand either
these problems or the best way of dealing with them
without delving into their roots in the past.®^
Again, Hirsch advances much the same point in his attack on the
Commission's 1918 report:
History was seen as an indirect and inefficient means of
achieving ... social goals, and was transformed into
social studies. Like vocational courses, social studies
courses were directed "to the activities of life rather than
to the demands of any subject as a logically organized
science."®®
Not only did Dewey agree, then, with Hirsch's estimation that
the "antitraditional goals of the progressive movement have turned
out to depend upon traditional information,"®® but he stated as a
matter principle that educational values must never be subordinated to
present societal conditions.
[TJhe belief that social conditions determine educational
objectives ... is a fallacy. Education is autonomous and
should be free to determine its own ends, its own
objectives... To look to some outside source to provide
aims is to fail to know what education is as an ongoing
process. What a society is, it is, by and large, as a
product of education, as far as its animating spirit and
purpose are concerned. Hence it does not furnish a
standard to which education is to conform.®^
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According to Dewey, education ultimately finds its direction in
the democratic principle of growth, by which he meant not
Rousseau's spontaneous development of individual potentialities but
rather growth in the range and depth of understanding,
communication, and shared purposes between people in a democratic
society.®® Indeed, Dewey's suggestion that all social institutions
(including the contents of its shared cultural vocabulary) should be
judged in terms of the extent to which they promote democratic
growth seems, if anything, less utilitarian than Hirsch's suggestion
that the contents of a national vocabulary should be judged only in
terms of the extent to which they are already shared.®® Be that as it
may, Dewey and Hirsch clearly agree not only that communication
between the people in a society is a fundamental aim of education,
but that a body of shared cultural information is crucial to the
realization of that end, and should not be sacrificed to misguided
notions of spontaneous natural development, deprecation of traditional
knowledge, or content-neutral skills and direct social utility as
educational aims.

Three Crucial Differences Between Hirsch and Dewey

Despite this shared commitment to the transmission of shared
cultural knowledge, Dewey would take issue with Hirsch on three
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crucial points, all having to do with the way in which shared cultural
knowledge is taught. First, Dewey's epistemology is more active (or at
least more consistent) than Hirsch's, and assigns a more active role to
the learner. Second, Dewey maintained that shared meanings could
not be transmitted through direct formal presentation but could only
be learned in the context of shared activities and concerns. Third,
Dewey's primary concern was not with transmitting cultural
knowledge per se but with promoting rational habits of reflective
inquiry and social-minded discourse, of which shared cultural
knowledge is but one component.

The Principle of Interaction

The first place where Dewey would disagree with Hirsch
concerns the point on which Hirsch himself is the most inconsistent.
Within an individual's cognition, by Hirsch's own account, a vital
system of stored information must be organized in a meaningful
pattern in order for it to be accessible. Such organization can only be
achieved, he says, through active individual processing: "To
understand how isolated facts fit together in some coherent way, we
must always acquire mental modes of how they cohere, and these
schemata can come only from detailed, intensive study and
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experience."^® Hirsch cites the prototypical example of the reading
process:
[T]he reader is not just passively receiving meaning but
actively selecting the most appropriate schemata for
making sense of the incoming words. Then the reader
actively adjusts those schemata to the incoming words
until a good fit is achieved. This process can work
efficiently only if the reader has quick access to
appropriate schemata.
Quick access depends on existing schemata having themselves
been constructed into meaningful systems.
[Slchemata perform two essential functions that are
relevant to literacy. The first is storing knowledge in
retrievable form; the second is organizing knowledge in
more and more efficient ways, so that it can be applied
rapidly and efficiently. Without appropriate background
knowledge, people cannot adequately understand written
or spoken language. And unless that knowledge is
organized for rapid and efficient deployment, people
cannot perform reading tasks of any complexity.
Hirsch correctly construes this need for organized background
information as an argument in favor of his extensive curriculum of
shared cultural knowledge. What he seems to overlook, however, is
the way in which individuals organize this body of information in the
first place. Rather than acknowledging that young children must be
led somehow to organize their background knowledge for
themselves -- which would seem to follow from the premise that
"[wle are able to make our present experiences take on meaning by
assimilating them to prototypes formed from our past experiences
- Hirsch seems to want to short-circuit the process by giving children
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quantities of unassimilated adult information upon which they can
then begin organizing future experience.
Of course, we must always present material to children
in an interesting way. But very young children are
interested in extensive, limited information. In the early
grades, truly intensive study is in any case difficult to
pursue. The predicted difficulties of teaching the
extensive curriculum simply do not apply to young
children... They like to pick up adult information long
before they can make sense of it... Young children are
fascinated by straightforward information and absorb it
without strain... Children don't have to be forced to
memorize facts; they do it anyway.
What Hirsch does in this passage is essentially to postulate that
what is true of adults -- that they make sense of experience through
the mutual adjustment of present and prior experience -- is somehow
different for children -- who seem to have the mysterious ability to
absorb knowledge in prearranged systems. This claim is not only
unsupported (especially when compared to Hirsch's scholarly defense
of reading as an active process of cognitive reconstruction), but it
contradicts the very evidence Hirsch cites to support his claim that
reading is not a content-neutral skill but depends upon relevant
information having been organized into accessible systems.
The real conclusion to be drawn from the need for an organized
system of background information is not that we must first transmit it
to children directly so that they can then begin the task of making
sense of experience. It is rather that we must somehow lead children
to organize this knowledge for themselves from the first. Dewey
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called this the principle of interaction -- in reference to the view,
advanced by Hirsch himself, that intellectual growth entails the mutual
adaptation, or interaction, of existing mental structures and the data
of present experience. The difference is that for Dewey the principle
of interaction applied to the whole spectrum of learning, not just to
the more advanced levels.
[T]he educator cannot start with knowledge already
organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses... [T]he
active process of organizing facts and ideas is an ever¬
present educational process. No experience is educative
that does not tend both to knowledge of more facts and
entertaining of more ideas and to a better, a more
orderly, arrangement of them.^®
The difference between Hirsch's and Dewey's views is
highlighted by their distinct anthropological conceptions. Whereas
Hirsch asserts that cultures simply transmit their past learning to the
young, Dewey notes that how this is done changes as cultures
progress. It is worth quoting Dewey at length:
For the most part, [subsistence cultures] depend upon
children learning the customs of the adults, acquiring
their emotional set and stock of ideas, by sharing in what
the elders are doing... But as civilization advances, the
gap between the capacities of the young and the
concerns of adults widens. Learning by direct sharing in
the pursuits of grown-ups becomes increasingly
difficult... Without ... formal education, it is not possible
to transmit all the resources and achievements of a
complex society... But there are conspicuous dangers
attendant upon the transition from indirect to formal
education... There is the standing danger that the
material of formal instruction will be merely the subject
matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter of
life-experience.^®
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We are thus met by the danger of ... the tendency to
assume that pupils have a foundation of direct realization
of situations sufficient for the superstructure of
representative experience erected by formulated school
studies../^
What Dewey here warns against is precisely the trap into which
Hirsch has fallen when he recommends that children in the early
grades do not need intensive study but should be made to memorize
quantities of adult information. Dewey, by contrast, advocated a very
different approach:
Before teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts
and ideas through the media of signs, schooling must
provide genuine situations in which personal participation
brings home the import of the material and the problems
which it conveys. From the standpoint of the pupil, the
resulting experiences are worth while on their own
account; from the standpoint of the teacher they are also
means of supplying subject matter required for
understanding instruction involving signs, and of evoking
attitudes of open-mindedness and concern as to the
material symbolically conveyed.^®
Children, in other words, need more than traditional information; they
need to learn it in a way that is continuous with their past and present
experience. Only that way can they construct it such a manner that it
is integral with their active knowledge and beliefs. The teacher's job
thus becomes that of finding or creating conditions which will compel
students to learn subject matter in the course of making sense of their
own experience.
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Shared Meanings Are Learned in a Social Context

Experience, however, is not something that goes on only in the
mind and heart of the individual, as romantic educators have tended
to conceive it. Nor is it something that can be separated from past
and present social conditions, as Rousseau had advocated. Rather,
experience is social and requires a social context to develop. Herein
lies a second point on which Dewey would find fault with Hirsch. For
although Hirsch maintains that children should learn the social
meanings of the contents of the national vocabulary, he makes no
particular provision by which they can in fact learn those meanings.
"Successful communication,” writes Hirsch, "depends upon
shared associations. To participate in the literate national culture is to
have acquired a sense of the information that is shared in that
culture."^® With regard to reading, he writes:
The comprehending reader must bring to the text
appropriate background information that includes
knowledge not only about the topic but also the shared
attitudes and conventions that color a piece of writing...
Our children can learn this information only by being
taught it.®°
Hirsch seems to think that children will acquire a sense of these
shared attitudes and meanings simply by absorbing the contents of
the national vocabulary: "Only by piling up specific, communally
shared information can children learn to participate In complex
cooperative activities with other members of their community.
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Dewey s more complete anthropological conception once again
suggests the superficiality of this view. According to him, people learn
shared meanings not through the formal presentation of subject
matter, but through shared activity where information is exchanged in
the context of achieving and negotiating shared purposes.
The development within the young of the attitudes and
dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive
life of a society cannot take place by direct conveyance
of beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. It takes place
through the intermediary of the environment... The social
environment ... is truly educative ... in the degree in
which an individual shares or participates in some
conjoint activity. By doing his share in the associated
activity, the individual appropriates the purpose which
actuates it, becomes familiar with its methods and
subject matters, acquires needed skill, and is saturated
with its emotional spirit.®^
Hirsch, by contrast, cites the example of children learning
sports statistics as evidence that they can memorize and learn the
meaning of complex adult information:
At an early age when their memories are most retentive,
children have an almost instinctive urge to learn specific
tribal traditions. At that age they seem to be fascinated
by catalogues of information and are eager to master the
materials that authenticate their membership in adult
society. Observe for example how they memorize the
rather complex materials of football, baseball, and
basketball, even without benefit of formal avenues by
which that information is inculcated.®®
Dewey's view suggests a different interpretation. Children who
memorize sports statistics not only have an active interest in these
things; they share it with their peers, elders, and the larger culture.
Formal avenues of instruction are not only unnecessary to such

78

learning, they would almost certainly detract from the sense of vital,
shared experience which such children feel with regard to this
information. If anything the example illustrates that children memorize
and develop a sense of the meaning of facts for reasons vital to their
own, socially-motivated interests and not through some intrinsic
desire to absorb adult culture irrespective of their ability to understand
it.
For Dewey, shared cultural knowledge must be constructed
through conjoint, purposeful activity.
To have the same ideas about things which others have,
to be like-minded with them, and thus to be really
members of a social group, is ... to attach the same
meanings to things and to acts which others attach... [I]n
shared activity, each person refers what he is doing to
what the other is doing and vice-versa. That is, the
activity of each is placed in the same inclusive situation...
[l]f each views the consequences of his own acts as
having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes
into account the consequences of their behavior upon
himself, then there is a common mind...®'^
By the same token, shared meanings can only be learned in a
social context.
In social situations the young have to refer their way of
acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This
directs their action to a common result, and gives an
understanding common to the participants... This
common understanding of the means and ends of action
is’the essence of social control ... [which] is intrinsic to
the disposition of the person, not external and coercive.
To achieve this internal control through identity of
interest and understanding is the business of
education.®®
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But in an advanced culture, where instruction must necessarily
be removed from the social purposes that normally motivate learning,
it becomes necessary to provide those conditions consciously.
While books and conversation can do much, these
agencies are usually relied upon too exclusively. Schools
require for their full efficiency more opportunity for
conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so
that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers
and of the materials and appliances used.®®

Democratic Participation as the Aim of Erlnratinn

Where Dewey would perhaps take the greatest issue with
Hirsch is with the lack of provision in Hirsch's educational scheme for
the ways in which citizens in a democratic society learn to negotiate
their shared knowledge and purposes among themselves. Hirsch's
educational agenda does not prepare students for such active
citizenship because it does nothing to foster such rational and sociallyminded habits of inquiry and discourse as are necessary to negotiate
knowledge and purposes in a democracy. In some respects, Hirsch's
agenda may even work against the inculcation of such habits.
Hirsch seems to think that by simply transmitting the shared
vocabulary of the culture (to be sure, a necessary part of a democratic
education), democratic results will thereby follow. Writes Hirsch:
Putting aside for the moment the practical arguments
about the economic uses of literacy [that it is ultimately
more utilitarian than narrow vocational training], we can
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contemplate the even more basic principle that underlies
our national system of education in the first place -- that
people in a democracy can be entrusted to decide all
important matters for themselves because they can
deliberate and communicate with one another... Illiterate
and semiliterate Americans are condemned not only to
poverty, but also to the powerlessness of
incomprehension... They do not feel themselves to be
active participants in our republic, and they often do not
turn out to vote. The civic importance of cultural literacy
lies in the fact that true enfranchisement depends upon
knowledge, knowledge upon literacy, and literacy upon
cultural literacy.®^
True as this passage's concluding sentence and implicit
criticism of the content-neutral curriculum are, the passage leaves
completely unanswered -- indeed, the question is not even asked -how people learn to "feel themselves active participants in our
republic." Hirsch seems to think that if people are taught the literate
culture, they will not only feel ownership of that culture, but they will
know how to deliberate about its mutual concerns and even be
inclined to do so. He overlooks that how people acquire cultural
literacy is at least as important as the fact that they acquire it. Not
only does his educational scheme fail to provide the conditions by
which people learn to deliberate together, but his recommendation
that children should acquire the basic framework of the literate culture
through rote memorization offers an educational foundation which is
quite at odds with the sort of active, democratic disposition he wants
to foster in the long run.
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Dewey's remarks concerning the teaching of reading as a
content-neutral skill are instructive in this regard:
[EJducationally speaking the problems of attendant
radiations, expansions and contractions ... are in the end
more important [than whether or not skill in reading is
acquired]... Nor is it satisfactory to say that the part
must be mastered before the whole can be attacked. For,
by the riature of the case, the whole enters into the part,
that is, it is a determining factor in the way in which one
learns to read. Thus the consideration of how one learns
to read in its connection with its effect upon future
personal development and interests demands attention to
desirable subject-matter.®®
Dewey here points out the fallacy in believing that reading skills
acquired in isolation from particular subject matter will eventually
secure desirable reading habits, a criticism with which Hirsch is clearly
sympathetic. By the same token, however, it is just as fallacious to
assume that subject matter acquired through rote means will thereby
secure an active disposition with regard to that subject matter.
Dewey attributed both mistakes to a failure to grasp the
principle of collateral learning: "Collateral learning in the way of
formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and
often is much more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in
geography or history that is learned. For these attitudes are
fundamentally what count in the future."®® He severely criticized the
belief that students should be prepared for future life by imparting
upon them knowledge and skills in isolation from the sorts of contexts
in which those things were later to be used.
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The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the
future contradicts itself. It omits, and even shuts out, the
very conditions by which a person can be prepared for
his future. We always live at the time we live and not at
some other time, and only by extracting at each present
time the full meaning of each present experience are we
prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is
the only preparation which in the long run amounts to
anything.®®
It is in the context of Dewey's democratic vision of education
that these ideas achieve their full expression, as reflected in the
following passage -- among the most famous Dewey ever wrote:
The devotion of democracy to eduction is a familiar fact.
The superficial explanation is that a government resting
upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those
who elect and who obey their governors are educated...
But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more
than a form of government; it is primarily a mode-of
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.
The extension in space of the number of individuals who
participate in an interest so that each has to refer his
own action to that of others, and to consider the action
of others to give point and direction to his own, is
equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of
class, race, and national territory which kept men from
perceiving the full import of their activity. These more
numerous and more varied points of contact ... secure a
liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as
the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a
group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many
interests.
The widening of the area of shared concerns, and
the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities
which characterize a democracy, are not of course the
product of deliberation and conscious effort... But after
greater individualization on one hand, and a broader
community of interest on the other have come into
existence, it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and
extend them... A society which is mobile, which is full of
channels for the distribution of a change occurring
anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated
to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, they
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will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are
caught and whose significance or connections they do
not perceive.®’
The primary educational aim in a democracy, according to
Dewey, thus becomes that of securing active habits of democratic
participation and deliberation:
A society which makes provision for participation in [the]
good of all its members on equal terms and which
secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through
interaction of the different forms of associated life is in
so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of
education which gives individuals a personal interest in
social relationships and control, and the habits of mind
which secure changes without introducing disorder.®^
For Dewey, this meant that education should provide a context
that replicates those features which most characterize the democratic
way of life, namely, interaction among its people towards the
negotiation and accomplishment of communal purposes. The teacher's
role in such an environment is twofold. From the students' point of
view, she is primarily a more knowledgeable participant, an elder of
the community who embodies its knowledge, purposes, and animating
spirit. From the teacher's own standpoint, she is an organizer of such
an environment as will elicit students' natural social impulses, and
progressively order them into more intelligent patterns through the
acquisition of knowledge, skills, and reflective habits of mind.®®
When measured against Dewey's criteria of participation and
readjustment through interaction, Hirsch's educational agenda comes
up short. For in making no provision for the ways in which people

84

learn to negotiate knowledge and purposes, Hirsch assumes a level of
homogeneity and stability that is neither attainable nor desirable. We
do need a shared national vocabulary, and we do want students to
acquire a knowledge of what others are likely to know and feel. And
Hirsch IS quite right to criticize content-neutral curricula on the
grounds that they fail to provide for such common understanding. But
even if subject matter could be poured into children like water into
cups, like-mindedness and common understanding cannot be
transmitted in such a fashion, for the simple reason that social
conditions are not static. What Hirsch elsewhere says of technological
knowledge is also true of cultural knowledge: it is changing and
diverse. He attempts to acknowledge this fact by suggesting that the
contents of the national vocabulary will change with time, but he
makes no mention of how. The contents of the national vocabulary
change through negotiation among the citizens in a democracy, and
people learn to partake in such negotiation through education. What
we need to do educationally, then, is to foster in students an
intellectual and socially-minded disposition which will enable and
encourage them to inquire, discuss, and negotiate such a vocabulary
and such knowledge and purposes for and among themselves.
By this means, Dewey hoped that eventually his educational
ideal might be realized: "that we may produce in schools a projection
in type of the society we should like to realize, and by forming minds
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in accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant
features of adult society."®'* This point is well summarized by
Cremin:
[Dewey] wanted education constantly to expand the
range of social situations in which individuals perceived
issues and made and acted upon choices. He wanted
schools to inculcate habits that would enable individuals
to control their surroundings rather than merely adapt to
them. And he wanted each generation to go beyond its
predecessors in the quality of behavior it sought to
nurture in its children. Progressive societies, he
counseled, "endeavor to shape the experiences of the
young so that instead of reproducing current habits,
better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult
society be an improvement on their own."®®
The notion that education should thus be an agent of the progressive
and ongoing reconstruction of communal experience lies at the heart
of Dewey's educational writings. It is an idea which Hirsch not only
ignores in Dewey's writings but which he fails to consider in his own
educational vision.

Three Reasons Why People Mischaracterize Dewev

What has led otherwise thoughtful scholars to mischaracterize
Dewey's work in education? Cremin®® offers three explanations. First
is Dewey's writing style, which is infamous for the remarkable (some
would say impossible) complexes of meaning it ascribes to key words
Cremin cites "experience," "growth," "inquiry," and

interest as

examples, though almost as noteworthy are democracy.
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"interaction," "continuity," and "habit." The problem with Dewey's
penchant for intricate meanings is not that he used them to mask
inconsistencies or sloppy thinking. On the contrary, most devoted
scholars of Dewey's work will tell you his use of terminology is part
and parcel of a remarkably inclusive and consistent philosophical
system.®^
The problem is rather that Dewey's complex use of language
opened the way for his key terms to be construed in all manner of
ways which Dewey himself never intended. As Cremin points out, the
culprits were chiefly those people who either did not read Dewey
thoroughly, or did not read him at all. For example, "interest," which
for Dewey was a value-neutral term denoting an object or goal
towards which our behavioral and attitudinal tendencies compel us,
was stripped by educational romantics of its empirical meaning to
connote instead a spontaneous impulse to be encouraged for its own
sake. Dewey, by contrast, construed interests as the termini of native
tendencies which generally need to be frustrated in order to lead
students to develop reflective habits of mind.®® The romantic
interpretation of "interest" is, of course, the one that stays with us
today.
A second and related explanation cited by Cremin is that
Dewey's influence was so widespread that people frequently learned
of his philosophy indirectly, through secondary and still more distant
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sources. As an example, Cremin cites William Heard Kilpatrick, a
student and noted disciple of Dewey's whom Dewey allegedly
challenged for certain misapplications of Dewey's work.®® According
to Cremin, Kilpatrick taught some 35,000 graduate students during
his forty year tenure at Columbia.And, to paraphrase Cremin,
who can guess what influence these students had? As the popular
misinterpretation of the term "interest” illustrates, the interpretations
to which people were many times exposed not only frequently ran
counter to Dewey's original meaning, but were often espoused by
some of his most ardent "supporters." Such distortions led many
critics to believe that they were attacking Dewey's ideas, when in
fact they were as often as not advancing criticisms of progressive
education very similar to Dewey's own.
The final and, for Cremin, the most important explanation of
why otherwise intelligent commentators have mischaracterized
Dewey's work is the tendency to interpret influential ideas in terms of
present social needs and concerns rather than in the light of their
original historical contexts. In order to understand the meaning of
Dewey's writings, both at the time of their origin and in terms of
present conditions, we must understand the evolving social climate
that engendered them and of which they became an integral part.
Otherwise, we may interpret them in the light of present educational
conditions alone, conditions which at any given historical moment are
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likely to offer a very different set of problems than confronted Dewey
in the early part of this century. As Dewey himself observed:
[Wle do not emphasize things which do not require
emphasis -that is, such things as are taking care of
themselves fairly well. We tend rather to frame our
statement on the basis of the defects and needs of the
contemporary situation... It is, then, no paradox requiring
explanation that a given epoch or generation tends to
emphasize in its conscious projections just the things
which it has least of in actual fact. A time of domination
by authority will call out as response the desirability of
great individual freedom; one of disorganized individual
activities the need of social control as an educational
aim.’®’
In particular, turn of the century schools were much more
formal and dogmatic than they have ever been since or are likely ever
to be again, and the educational experiments of the Progressive Era
had not yet occurred. Dewey no doubt felt he could thus assume of
his initial audience a basic respect for cultural traditions and the role
of the school in transmitting those traditions to the next generation.
Indeed, given the educational practices of his day, his first concern
was to point out the fallacy of assuming that children would
automatically share their parents and teachers' enthusiasm for, and
grasp of, the formal products of culture. He noted many times that
the more sophisticated and technological a culture becomes, the
greater the distance there is between the immediately social interests
of the young and the formal organization of the academic disciplines.
His most often repeated educational prescription was accordingly that
we must do what we can to bridge that gap, so as best to initiate
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students into the conceptual and ethical norms of society but which
they are unable to assimilate in adult form.
It would, moreover, be a very great mistake to assume that
Dewey broadly supported the radical practices advanced in his name.
On the contrary, Dewey was, as I have tried to demonstrate here, one
of the progressive education movement's harshest critics. The
optimistic tones with which Dewey and his daughter, Evelyn, wrote of
the experimental efforts of such progressive educators as the
Rousseauan-influenced Marietta Johnson in Schools of To-Morrow
reflected not so much his support of their specific practices as they
did his approval of the general climate of educational experimentation
of the 1910's. Indeed, as Cremin notes:
[T]he reader ... derives the unmistakable sense that all
the systems expounded are not of equal worth. Mrs.
Johnson's Rousseauan pedagogy, which comes first in
order, is not allowed to stand alone but is soon
incorporated into a larger social reformism that bears the
earmarks of Dewey's own philosophy. Moreover, while
each of the individual schools is supposed to exemplify
one or another of the central principles of progressivism,
the further one reads in the volume, the more
comprehensive the example.
Patricia Graham adds to this explanation that "[t]he
fundamental difficulty in assessing Dewey's own attitude toward
progressivism results from his apparent unwillingness in his later years
to criticize specifically those who called themselves his followers and
who justified their work by his phrases."’®^ She later goes on to
mention his seemingly limitless "patience with overzealous and
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underbright' disciples."’®^ William Brickman completes the picture in
his introduction to Schools of To-Mnrmww when he writes that
Dewey might have dwelled to some extent on the
shortcomings of the schools which were presumably
putting his doctrines into practice. In 1938, he was to
pin-point criticism of some tendencies in Progressive
education. Had he done so in 1915, it might have been
less necessary in the succeeding decades.^®®
Finally, contrary to the popular misconception that Dewey's
ideas underwent significant transformations as a result of failed
progressive educational experiments, Dewey's later educational
writings are almost entirely consistent with those from before his
experience with the progressive schools. The changes in tone and
emphasis are the result not of some transformation in his philosophy
but instead of changed social and educational conditions brought
about in large part by those "disciples" who distorted his early work,
taking it to extremes unforseen by Dewey himself. For in their zeal to
attend to students' "interests," progressive educators frequently
eliminated the curriculum, instead of finding ways to match the two
as Dewey had advocated. And, in their ardor to "democratize" the
classroom, they often dispensed with the teacher's authority
altogether, rather than using it, as Dewey had recommended, to guide
students towards an active understanding of cultural traditions,
especially as they relate to present social concerns.
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Summary

Transmitting the shared cultural information of a society is but
a means to the end of preparing people for active participation in the
affairs, decision-making processes, and characteristic way of life of
that society. This principle is equally present in Hirsch and Dewey.
Hirsch, however, does not fully come to terms with the question of
how to transmit that knowledge in a way that promotes democratic
habits of participation. The very evidence which he cites to support
his claim that familiarity with the shared knowledge of a society is
crucial to being able to participate in that society's affairs
simultaneously demonstrates the need to learn that knowledge in the
context of actively and socially constructing one's own knowledge
and belief systems. Hirsch, however, disregards this need in the
education of children on the dubious and self-contradictory claim that
children do not, or do not need to, learn in the same way as adults. In
contrast, Dewey's principles (1) that the content of education must
interact with students' present experience, and (2) that the method of
education must provide for the collateral learning of constructive
attitudes and habits of continued learning, both show the need for an
educational context that is not only active but social as well. For
Dewey, teaching students to construct knowledge in the process of
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negotiating and realizing shared purposes is the primary way to
prepare people for the democratic way of life.
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CHAPTER 3

CRITICAL THINKING AS TRANSFER: THE
RECONSTRUCTIVE INTEGRATION OF OTHERWISE
DISCRETE INTERPRETATIONS OF EXPERIENCE

One of the most debated issues in the current critical thinking
literature is whether critical thinking should be taught as a single body
of general, transferable skills, or as a body of diverse sets of skills,
each peculiar to an academic subject area. In his landmark paper, "A
Concept of Critical Thinking,"^ Robert H. Ennis, building on the work
of John Dewey, Max Black, and B. Othanel Smith,^ identified twelve
general "aspects" of critical thinking which he claimed were both
teachable and transferable, and, in so doing, laid the groundwork for
the present critical thinking movement. The list has since been revised
and added to by many, including Ennis,^ and has acquired something
of the status of a taxonomy, itself being further broken down into
composite sets of "dispositions" and "abilities." The basic premise
behind such inventories is that identifying the general components of
critical thinking constitutes a major step towards teaching people to
be critical thinkers. Proponents of this general skills approach hold
that these aspects, once learned, can be transferred from one content
area to another, given adequate knowledge of the subject area in
question. Accordingly, they maintain that critical thinking can be

102

taught both in general skills courses and in courses that "infuse"^
general skills into the subject areas.
In Critical Thinking and Education.^ John E. McPeck challenges
the basic premise of the critical thinking movement by claiming that
since all thinking is necessarily thinking about X, there can be no such
thing as a set of general critical thinking skills, dispositions, or abilities
that can be applied in all contexts, and that to teach critical thinking
"in general" is therefore fruitless, perhaps even misguided. McPeck
bases his argument on the notion that all thinking develops and occurs
within the specific epistemological and logical frameworks of discrete
subject areas, and cannot, therefore, be separated from the
conceptual, evidential, semantic, and logical norms that comprise each
of them. McPeck defines "critical thinking" as "the appropriate use of
reflective skepticism"® to establish "good reasons for various
beliefs,"^ and maintains that since what constitutes "good reasons"
depends on the peculiar epistemological and logical norms of the
subject area in question, critical thinking necessarily varies from one
domain to the next. Rather than trying to teach critical thinking in
general, McPeck believes we should concentrate instead on giving
students a more thorough grounding in the epistemological
underpinnings of the key subject areas.
Although McPeck's critique has stirred a good deal of
controversy, there is nevertheless widespread agreement that it has
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revealed the need for a closer examination of the claim that critical
thinking is transferable. Not surprisingly, this need is being met in
large part through public, dialogic exchanges -- a mode of knowledge
construction that, in the eyes of at least one prominent theorist,®
captures the essence of what it means to think critically. Although
these dialogic exchanges are being supplemented by empirical
research In the cognitive sciences and education,® our main concern
here will be with a conceptual analysis of the transferability question - on the grounds that all empirical studies are unavoidably guided by
theory (not overlooking the fact that they, in turn, inform it). In short,
whenever we pursue or interpret "facts," we invariably impose certain
theoretical perspectives, whether consciously or not. One purpose of
the present analysis, then, is to make the theoretical underpinnings of
the transfer question more explicit.
Rather than giving separate summary analyses of the
viewpoints in question,^® the present essay discusses them in
something of a dialogic fashion intended to delineate and clarify some
of the key interactions between the two main sides in the debate.
Among the conclusions which emerge from this discussion are the
following: (1) that although McPeck may be correct that mastery of
subject-specific knowledge and skills is the major challenge in learning
to think critically, general concepts and procedures of thinking
nevertheless exist, are teachable, and are potentially useful
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instruments of improved thinking and knowledge transfer, (2) that
although McPeck's denial of the existence and teachability of general
thinking skills is overstated, it should not obscure his otherwise
legitimate point that thinking can neither occur nor be taught
independently of the epistemological norms of some frame of
reference or knowledge domain, and (3) that, although both general
and subject-specific knowledge and skills are important conditions of
critical thinking, the teaching of neither adequately addresses the
fundamental problem of getting students to transfer their knowledge
and skills to new areas. This is because critical thinking ability is not
so much comprised of general and/or subject-specific knowledge and
skills to be transferred {though it is that, too) as it is itself a habit of
ongoing transfer, reconstruction, and integration of otherwise discrete
interpretations of experience.
The present essay concludes by reasserting, in a modified form,
a thesis put forward most notably by Richard Paul -- that the foremost
task in the teaching of critical thinking is less the transmission of any
particular knowledge and/or skills than it is the fostering in students of
those habits of reflective and reconstructive inquiry which ultimately
lead to an ongoing disposition to seek intellectual, moral, and social
integrity, or what is sometimes referred to as "the critical spirit.
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The Argument for Subiect-Snecificity

McPeck's claim that there are no such things as general,
teachable skills of critical thinking begins with the following, much
cited argument from the first chapter of his book:
It is a matter of conceptual truth that thinking is
always thinking about X, and that X can never be
'everything in general' but must always be something in
particular...
Thinking, then, is logically connected to an X...and
so critical thinking, too, must be directed toward
something...
In isolation from a particular subject, the phrase
'critical thinking' neither refers to nor denotes any
particular skill. It follows from this that it makes no sense
to talk about critical thinking as a distinct subject and
that it therefore cannot profitably be taught as such.”
The argument basically consists of the following chain of inferences:
(1) Thinking must be about X.
(2) Hence there can be no thinking which is not about
something.
(3) Thus there can be no general thinking skills.
(4) Therefore thinking cannot be taught as such.
Clearly, there is no denying that the second premise follows from the
first, just as the fourth follows from the third. The crux of the
argument, then, lies in the notion that because we cannot think about
everything in general, there are no such things as general thinking
skills.
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Counterargument: Topic-Specificitv Not Exclusive of General Skills

As more than one of McPeck's critics has pointed out,
however, the argument is invalid: because thinking must be about
some topic, it does not follow that there are no general skills which
apply to many topics. Drawing an analogy between bicycling and
thinking, for example, Harvey Siegel holds that "the general activity of
thinking is [no more] 'logically connected to an X,'... than the general
activity of cycling is logically connected to any particular bicycle."
Siegel continues:
It is true that any given act of cycling must be done on
some bicycle or other. But it surely does not follow that
the general activity of cycling cannot be discussed
independently of any particular bicycle. Indeed, we can
state, and teach people, general skills of cycling {e.g.,
"lean to the left when making a left-hand turn," "slow
down before cornering, not during cornering," etc.), even
though instantiating these maneuvers and so exhibiting
mastery of the general skills requires some particular
bicycle.
Similarly, Ennis holds that McPeck "has failed to prove his point about
general thinking and logic," maintaining that common sense shows us
many examples of general skills:
With respect to general thinking, there are a number of
concerns and problems that bridge fields, including:
assumption identification, definition strategy, detecting
and avoiding equivocation, being clear, inferring to an
explanation, seeing possible alternative explanations,
consistency, and judging credibility of putative
authorities, to mention a few."’^
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Response: The Pomain-SDecificitv of Epistemological Norms

In the first instance, however, McPeck responds that what is
true of cycling does not necessarily hold true for thinking. The
difference between them, according to him, is that:
"cycling”... denote[s] a specific skill, whereas "thinking”
does not... Cycling has a rather limited, if not unique set
of standards and criteria which determine what counts as
effective cycling. But there is no similar set of finite
criteria which determine (or define) effective thinking...
Different destinations and purposes do not change the
specific nature of the skill of cycling. But different
problems and purposes do change the inherent nature of
the skills required in thinking.
In the second instance, McPeck argues that although we can ascribe
to any one of the "general thinking skills” the same label -"identifying assumptions,” "recognizing fallacies,” etc. -- because of
the specific semantic, conceptual, and evidential norms peculiar to
separate knowledge domains, the skills themselves vary, sometimes
dramatically, from one domain to the next:
Take, for example, "the ability to recognize underlying
assumptions.” That this is not a singular ability can be
appreciated by considering the fact that to recognize an
underlying assumption in mathematics requires a different
set of skills and abilities from those required for
recognizing them in a political dispute, which are
different again from those required in a scientific dispute.
Thus, the phrase "ability to recognize underlying
assumptions” does not denote any singular ability, but
rather a wide variety of them.^®
It is important to note, however, that McPeck includes in these
and similar rebuttals a premise not found in his initial argument, but to
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which a major portion of his book is actually devoted. He began that
argument, it will be recalled, from the premise that "thinking is always
thinking about X [-- X being the particular topic at hand],'”® when
what he really seems to be advancing is the notion that thinking is
always thinking within X - X being the epistemological norms of a
particular subject area. He does not undertake the necessary
explanation, however, until chapter 2, though it is best summarized in
the following passage from his concluding chapter:
In chapter 2 it was argued that epistemology is, in effect,
the analysis of good reasons for belief, including their
specific character and foundation. Also, because
collective human experience has discovered that different
kinds of belief often have different kinds of good reason
supporting them, it follows that there will be many
different epistemologies corresponding to different fields
of human endeavor. A corollary of this is that logic itself
is parasitic upon epistemology, since logic is merely the
formalization of good reasons once they have been
discovered. Thus epistemology, and to some extent logic,
have intra-field validity but not necessarily inter-field
validity (see chapter 2).’^
Because McPeck does not reveal this claim to the epistemological
subject-specificity of thinking in his initial argument, however, it is not
as clear as it should be that it comprises his key premise. As such, it
is helpful to put it in the context of some of his related assumptions.
Borrowing from the philosophy of science, McPeck draws a
distinction between two related contexts of thinking: the "context of
discovery" - that side of thinking concerned with generating and
formulating plausible hypotheses to solve problems and explain
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relationships -- and the "context of justification" -- that side concerned
with determining the adequacy of hypotheses once they have been
formulated.’® According to McPeck, deductive, formal logic (for
him, the one aspect of thinking that can be at all divorced from
subject-specific content) is restricted to the context of justification,
and affects the context of discovery only insofar as it eliminates
certain possibilities as logically invalid. But, he maintains, formal logic
cannot generate possible solutions itself, as these are necessarily
contextual; i.e., they depend on knowledge of and familiarity with the
epistemological - semantic, conceptual, and evidential’® - norms of
the relevant problem-areals). Moreover, even though the context of
discovery is, for McPeck, restricted to content-bound or inductive
modes of thinking, it is evident that the context of justification admits
of both inductive and deductive modes, as an hypothesis must be
subjected to criteria of empirical truth as well as of logical validity to
determine its adequacy. And, according to McPeck, these evidential
criteria are again peculiar to specific subject areas. Thus, for McPeck,
any complete act or description of thinking necessarily entails both the
formulating and the testing of plausible hypotheses within the
epistemological norms of the subject areals) in question, and therefore
cannot be separated from them.
In short, then, the essence of McPeck's critique of the general
skills approach hinges, not on the premise that thinking must be about
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some topic (a premise which, so far as I can tell, is superfluous to his
argument), but rather on the premise that thinking must occur within
the epistemological norms of some specific subject area.^° One of
the apparent consequences of this postulation of the epistemological
subject-specificity of thinking, for McPeck, is the subject-specificity of
thinking skills. For him, "skills are born of knowledge of, and
experience in, specific areas," and, hence, "are parasitic upon detailed
knowledge of, and experience in, parent fields and problem areas.
The key argument in his critique of the general skills approach,
therefore, would be more accurately stated as follows: that because
thinking must occur within the epistemological norms of some specific
subject area, there can be no such things as general thinking skills.

The Argument for General Skills

For general skills proponents, however, the existence of
subject-specific norms and skills no more precludes the existence of
"general" skills than does the claim to the topic-specificity of thinking.
(Thus, Siegel's assertion that "there are readily identifiable reasoning
skills which do not refer to any specific subject matter"^^ could just
as easily read that 'there are readily identifiable reasoning skills which
do not refer to any specific subject area.') While not specifically
denying that many, perhaps "most." reasoning skills are subject-
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specific, general skills proponents believe that there are nevertheless
certain "general" skills, or certain generalizable features of otherwise
subject-specific skills, which enable us to refer to them with a general
nomenclature.^^ Thus, the general skill of "assumption identification"
would include knowing both what an assumption is and how generally
to go about looking for one (in the most basic sense, by identifying
the premise and conclusion of an argument, then formulating the
missing premise). Moreover, practice in "assumption identification"
would improve one's ability to identify assumptions generally.

Counterargument: Facility with General Concents and Procedures Not
the Same as Critical Thinking Ability

This latter claim, however, is precisely the sort to which
McPeck so adamantly objects, because for him there is no "general
ability" to "identify assumptions." A moment ago I said that
"assumption identification" as a "general skill" would include both a
knowledge of what an assumption is and a knowledge of how to look
for one generally. While McPeck has no particular objection to either
of these claims as such, he does object to the implication that a
knowledge of general concepts and procedures constitutes a general
"skill" in thinking:
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There is certainly something to be said for understanding
what an assumption is, what a deductive inference is,
etc. But I...object to such understanding being cashedout as providing general "critical thinking skill.
This is because, for McPeck, while it would be possible to know what
an assumption is (the concept) and even how to go about looking for
one generally (the procedure), the actual "skill" of "assumption
identification" would be peculiar to the particular knowledge domain
being thought about: "the so-called 'thinking skills' are an inherent
part of the warp and woof of the various disciplines, and must,
therefore, be taught as part of them."^® Moreover, according to
McPeck, in any situation where the grounds for belief are uncertain i.e., in any situation which calls for critical thinking -- it is not so much
the general form or logical validity of the relevant claims that is hard
to assess as it is the subject-specific content or truth of the premises:
[l]n deciding upon real public questions it is usually not
the logical validity of an argument that we find difficult
but rather the task of determining whether certain
premises are in fact true. And this latter difficulty
invariably takes us into the unfamiliar ground of some
technical subject area, where each question seems to
generate several others and epistemological uncertainties
abound.^®
As far as McPeck is concerned, the general skills approach reverses
this order by creating the misleading impression that learning to think
critically is primarily a matter of mastering a given body of generai
thinking concepts and procedures.
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Thus, the problem with the general skills approach, for McPeck,
seems not so much to be that certain general concepts and
procedures of thinking do not exist as it is (1) that, even with the
addition of subject-specific knowledge, an understanding of general
thinking concepts and procedures does not automatically translate
into critical thinking ability in that subject area, and (2) that, on the
whole, an understanding of these general concepts and procedures is
not really very important compared to field-specific knowledge and
skills themselves in imparting critical thinking ability. To achieve that
kind of ability, McPeck maintains, it would make much more sense to
concentrate instead on "explaining and laying bare, as it were, the
epistemic foundations and logical peculiarities of the various
disciplines."^^

Response: General Skills as Supportive of Multi-Looical Thinking

McPeck's point, however, has not been lost on general skills
advocates, who readily concede that a thorough grounding in the
peculiar norms of a subject area is necessary to thinking critically
within that subject area. As Ennis states: "I do not know of anyone
who thinks that having the relevant information and concepts in a
discipline is not a necessary condition for understanding a good
reason in [that] discipline.”'® Nevertheless, according to Ennis, while
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a knowledge of subject-specific concepts and procedures is a
necessary condition of critical thinking, it is not a sufficient one, as
there are "many people who are educated conceptually and
informationally in a field of study, but make a range of logical and
critical thinking mistakes in [it].”^® Obviously, however, instruction in
general skills is no guarantee of critical thinking ability, either. Indeed,
as McPeck has pointed out, such instruction does not even appear to
be a necessary condition, as "is evidenced by the fact that many
people can and do display critical thinking who have never been
directly taught, and perhaps never heard of, the specific skills
supposedly required of critical thinkers."^® Of course, this does not
prove that these people do not possess such skills; it only proves that
they did not need to be taught them in a general skills course. Ennis,
however, never claims otherwise. His main concern is only to argue
that there are good reasons for believing that instruction in general
thinking skills can help people become more critical thinkers.
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One reason Ennis considers the general thinking skills helpful in
learning to think critically is that they appear to play a particularly
useful role in the transfer of thinking from one domain to another,
especially in those situations where the topic being thought about is
not confined to any single, established subject area. According to
Ennis:
[Mjany issues calling for good thinking are not
within a single discipline, nor is it reasonable to expect
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that most people exposed to them would have mastered
all of the disciplines involved in the issue. Nor is it even
clear in many issues what all the disciplines would be...
So, even if McPeck were right about good thinking within
a discipline being achieved by study of the discipline,
there is a large set of significant situations that would
not thus be provided with previous thinking instruction
under his plan...
Thus, though McPeck may have successfully
argued that information and a grasp of field-specific
concepts are necessary conditions for critical thinking in
and out of a discipline, he has not shown that they are
sufficient conditions for thinking within and outside of a
discipline. He has not shown that logic and general
critical thinking skills and instruction therein do not also
help.^^
Ennis's point is that McPeck's subject-specific approach to teaching
critical thinking does not adequately prepare a person to think about
problems that fall into more than one subject area, or into subject
areas other than those in which a person has background. General
skills, on the other hand, seem to be useful in helping us learn to think
both between discrete subject areas and within new ones, since they
provide a general conceptual and procedural basis from which to
launch even unfamiliar lines of inquiry.
Richard Paul makes a similar point when he argues that:
Even concepts and lines of reasoning clearly within one
category are also simultaneousfly] within others. Most of
what we say and think...is not only open but multitextured as well. For example, in what logical domain
does the (technical?) concept of alcoholism solely belong:
disease, addiction, crime, moral failing, cultural pattern,
lifestyle choice, defect of socialization, self-comforting
behavior, psychological escape, personal weakness,....?^
How many points of view can be used to illuminate it?
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Like Ennis, Paul is arguing that background in the epistemological
norms of discrete subject areas does not prepare one to think about
those topics which fall into more than a single subject area. The basic
inference of both passages seems to be that because problems often
fall into more than a single subject area, thinking itself is not
constrained by subject-specific norms; hence critical thinking
instruction should not be either.

Counterargument: Cross-Disciolinarv Nature of Problems Not
Sufficient Grounds for the Claim to Multi-Looical Thought

While I agree with this conclusion, the inference is not a valid
one, as is evident in McPeck's counterresponse:
My answer to all these questions [raised by Paul] is that
it depends on what, precisely, you want to know or say
about alcoholism. If one is interested in how widespread
it is, or in which age-group, then it is a sociological
question. If one wants to know if it is right or wrong,
then it is a moral question. If one wants to know why
people become alcoholics, then it is a psychological
question. If one wants to know whether it is sinful, then 1
suppose this is a religious question.
In other words, from the premises that topics do not always fall neatly
into one subject area or another, and that they can, in fact, be
approached from the perspectives of many different subject areas
simultaneously, it does not necessarily follow that thinking itself must
be cross-disciplinary or that it should be taught through a crossdisciplinary or general approach.- Rather, as the McPeck passage
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makes evident, it is also plausible to infer that we simply apply to the
same topics epistemological and logical norms from discrete subject
areas or knowledge domains. Thus, for McPeck, the best way to learn
to think critically about topics which fall into more than one subject
area is to learn the epistemological norms of a wide range of them:
One of the reasons I have been such a strong advocate
of liberal education to develop critical thinking capacity is
because I believe such an education helps to anticipate
the multi-categorical nature of most problems. A person
needs several different kinds of knowledge and
understanding to appreciate the different dimensions of
most real problems.^®

Response: Intuitive "Wrongness” of Strict Epistemological Relativism

There is in McPeck's counterresponse, however, a certain
rigidity about the separateness of discrete knowledge domains that
both Paul and Ennis find objectionable. As Paul states:
From a logical atomist's point of view {everything to be
carefully placed in an appropriate ^ generis logical
category, there to be settled by appropriate specialists in
that category), dialectical, multi-categorical questions are
anomalous. When noticed the tendency is to try to
fabricate specialized categories for them or to break them
down into a summary complex of mono-categorical
elements. Hence the problem of peace in relation to the
military industrial complex would be broken down by
atomists into discrete sets of economic, social, ethical,
historical, and psychological problems, or what have you,
each to be analyzed and settled discretely.®^
Drawing on their work in transfer research, David Perkins and Gavriel
Salomon express much the same sentiment:
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To be sure, general heuristics that fail to make contact
with a rich domain-specific knowledge base are weak.
But when a domain-specific knowledge base operates
without general heuristics, it is brittle - it serves mostly
in handling formulaic problems.^®
And, indeed, the McPeck passages do leave him open to such
criticisms.

Critical Thinking as a Process of Reconstructive Transfer

In truth, however, McPeck no more subscribes to the view that
thinking is mono-categorical than Paul subscribes to the view that
simply because problems fall into many domains, thinking itself must
be inter-disciplinary. Rather, they both operate from a premise which
not only makes the claim to multi-categorical thought a necessary
conclusion, but which has significant implications for the entire
transfer question as well. For, according to both, what we think In
one context or domain usually, perhaps Inevitably, affects what we
think in others -- indeed. It must do so if what we think is to be
considered rational - with the obvious implication that thinking in one
domain must, at times, transfer to others;
Consider for example Copernicus' statements about the
earth in relation to the sun. These are, you may be
tempted to say, astronomical statements and nothing
else. But if they become a part of concepts and lines of
thought that have radically reoriented philosophical,
social, religious, economic and personal thought, as
indeed they have, are they merely in that one
category?^®
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McPeck agrees, but he is careful to distinguish between the
notion that thinking is multi-categorical and the notion that it is a
general skill:
One kind of knowledge about things (like alcoholism) can
often affect other beliefs one has about it as well. For
example, if you believed alcoholism to be a disease, then
you might not view it as a sin. But all of these cross¬
influences, and multi-texturedness, does not gainsay the
existence of categories through which we perceive, talk
and think about things. Indeed, rational belief and action
is often predicated on seeing things from these different
perspectives.'^®
That thinking always occurs within a given frame of reference
is, in fact, a point on which Paul agrees with McPeck: "The process of
gaining knowledge is at its roots dialogical. Our minds are never
empty of beliefs and never without a point of view. They cannot
function framelessly."'^^ But whereas McPeck's concern is to warn
against the dangers of conceiving of thinking in excessively formalistic
terms -- that is, as something that can be reduced to a body of
universal skills, principles, and procedures that transcend the various
contexts and content areas in which thinking occurs -- Paul's concern
is to warn against the dangers of conceiving of thinking in excessively
relativistic terms - that is, as something that is so subject-specific
that there remains no basis on which to consider the impact of
discrete frames of reference on one another. In fact, however, where
both McPeck and Paul come out is with a view of thinking as a
process by which the perspectives of otherwise discrete frames of
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reference enter into a reconstructive dialogue tending towards greater
integrity.
Indeed, as the remainder of this essay wiil argue, we might all
be better served than we are with the present debate by a conception
of thinking itself as transfer, or at least as the means by which
transfer occurs. For what else can thinking be than the reconstruction
and application of knowledge and skills gleaned in one context to
meet the demands of new contexts? And if thinking is transfer, then
criticai thinking is critical transfer, or the deliberate attempt to
postulate, test, account for, use, and mutually reconstruct otherwise
field-dependent semantic, conceptual, evidential, and logical norms in
and in light of new situations for the purposes of solving problems,
explaining relationships, and, above all, constructing increasingly
powerful knowledge systems that integrate previousiy discrete frames
of reference. Thus, while the general skills advocates are correct that
knowledge and skills learned in one context can transfer to others, the
means by which that transfer takes place is not so much through the
use of "general thinking skills" as it is through "thinking itself, which
is, as McPeck says, highly contextual. The chief limitation, then, of
the general skills approach is that it fails to take adequate account of
the fact that transfer is neither general nor automatic, but subjectspecific and constructive in a way general taxonomies fail to capture.
At the same time, however, in rejecting the notion of general skills in

I
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favor of an apparently strict epistemological relativism, McPeck offers
no clear explanation of how integrated knowledge systems can be
constructed, a function which both he and Paul seem to regard as the
pinnacle of critical thought.

Thinking and the Construction of Integrated Knowledge Systems

Richard Paul, of course, is already known for his advocation of
a model of critical thinking as a dialogical process culminating in the
construction of increasingly more integrated world views. But consider
the following passage by McPeck:
The process of justifying one's beliefs...has two
distinguishable dimensions. One is to assess the veracity
and internal validity of the evidence as presented, and
the other is to judge whether the belief, together with its
supporting evidence, is compatible with an existing belief
system. If it is not compatible, then an adjustment
somewhere In the system will be required: there is
something amiss either with the new evidence or with
the system of beliefs. The importance of this process of
assessing, fitting and adjusting beliefs cannot be
overemphasized because it is this process that makes the
belief 'belong' to a person as distinct from being merely a
proposition or belief that he knows about.'^^
Paul makes precisely the same point, when, utilizing Whitehead's
notion of "Inert knowledge" as "knowledge that we in some sense
have but do not use when logically relevant, knowledge that just sits
there in our minds, as it were, without activating force," and his own
notion of "activated ignorance" as those "beliefs that are firmly
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entrenched in instinctual egocentric thinking [despite their
inconsistency with knowledge gleaned through more rational
means],he says the following:
Students leave school not only with unreconstructed
[i.e., unintegrated] mathematical and physical ideas but
with unreconstructed personal, social, moral, historical,
economic, and political views. Students leave school not
knowing what they really, that is deeply, believe.
Students leave school with a great deal of inert
knowledge and even more activated ignorance.
Therefore, students do not understand how to read,
write, think, listen, or speak in such a way as to organize
and express what they believe.
What Paul and McPeck are both concerned with in these
passages is that education should lead to the active reconstruction
and integration of existing belief systems with and in light of new
knowledge or evidence, a process which they both equate with the
term "critical thinking." Such a conception, moreover, bears a striking
resemblance to Piaget's conception of cognitive development as a
process of ongoing "equilibration,"^® where every instance of
thinking sees the assimilation of some new knowledge or belief into
an existing belief system together with the simultaneous adjustment
of the existing belief system to accommodate the new knowledge or
belief. "Critical thinking," by this conception, would similarly entail the
deliberate reconstruction, transfer, and integration of otherwise
discrete interpretations of experience, as is evident in both the Paul
and McPeck passages.
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Reconciling the General and Domain-Specific Aspects of Thinking

Despite this conceptual similarity, however, there are certain
important differences in Paul's and McPeck's respective accounts of
critical thinking and how It should be taught. Not surprisingly, high
among these is the relative emphasis each places on the general
versus the subject-specific features of thinking. According to Paul:
The most important place that knowledge has in any lives
is, on my view, that of shaping our concept of things
uberhauDt. our system of values, meanings, and
interpretive schemes.... Logical synthesis, cutting across
categories, extracting metaphors from one domain and
using them to organize others, arguing for or against the
global metaphors of others, are intellectual acts that are
grounded ultimately not in the criteria and skills of
specialists, not in some science or other or any
combination thereof, but in the art of rational-dialecticalcritical thought.
He goes on to say that "a global perspective....can be assessed only
by appeal to general dialectical skills, not domain or subject-specific
ones."^^ McPeck, on the other hand, argues that thinking is
grounded ultimately not in some general art or skill of critical thinking
but in the epistemological structures of the various knowledge
domains which humanity has evolved over time:
Paul states in several places that a person's "world
view," or knowledge "uberhaupt," plays a crucial role in
their critical thinking capacities. I could not agree more.
However, if Paul would take the time to examine
seriously the ingredients of a person's "world view," I
think he would find it composed of certain kinds of
beliefs and knowledge structures (i.e. cognitive
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schemata) which is precisely what liberal education
attempts to influence and enlighten/®
From the perspective of a conception of critical thinking as
culminating in the construction of integrated knowledge systems,
however, this dichotomy over which is more important -- the general
form or the domain-specific content of thought - is more apparent
than real, as the McPeck quotation begins to suggest. Such a
perspective is, curiously enough, even more evident in the following
passage by Paul:
The only way to test whole frames of reference without
begging the question is by setting the frames of
reference dialectically against each other so that the
logical strength of one can be tested against the logical
strength of the contending others by appealing to
standards not peculiar to either.'^®
What Paul is doing in this passage is describing the process which he
alternatively refers to as "the art of rational-dialectical-critical thought"
or as being composed of "general skills of critical-cross¬
examination"®® in such a way as to make apparent that the
necessary referents upon which beliefs are justified, and integrated
knowledge systems constructed, are not just the general principles of
dialectical thought to which he refers but also the overlapping norms
of the otherwise discrete knowledge domains about which one is
thinking. In other words, the general, dialogical, and procedural form
of critical thinking is no more the ultimate arbiter of knowledge
construction than are subject-specific epistemological and logical
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norms. In fact, the general and field-dependent norms of thinking
necessarily work together in such a way that to conceive of them
separately inevitably oversimplifies the actual dynamic process by
which multi-categorical belief systems are constructed.
A further clue as to how such knowledge construction works
lies in the following response by Paul to what he sees as McPeck's
excessively rigid conception of the domain-specificity of particular
lines of thought;
The category a thing is in is logically dependent upon
what it is like, but all things (including conceptual
schemes) are like any number of other things (other
conceptual schemes for example) in any number of ways
and so are in, dependent on our purposes, any number of
logical domains.®’
Paul seems to be arguing that concepts and conceptual schemes have
points of similarity that effectively put them in each others' domains,
and, moreover, that these points of similarity vary according to the
diverse contexts which call forth our deliberations about them. If this
is his point, I would go one step further and argue, as Dewey does in
How We Think, that "thinking" entails, in this regard, precisely the
intentional grasping of these common elements:
Similar qualities are always the bridge over which the
mind passes in going from a former experience to a new
one. Now thinking....is a process of grasping in a
conscious way the common elements. It thus adds
greatly to the availability of common elements for
purposes of transfer. Unless these elements are seized
and held by the mind....any transfer occurs only blindly,
by sheer accident.®^
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In other words, knowledge and skills learned in a previous context
(including a knowledge domain) apply in new contexts (new
knowledge domains included) in the degree to which the new
contexts share features with the old. And it is thinking which makes
the grasping of such similarities possible.

Thinking and the Construction of New Knowledge

This conception of critical thinking as including the grasping of
similarities between otherwise discrete contexts of reasoning also has
important implications for what we consider a "subject area" or
"knowledge domain." Whereas McPeck seems to adhere to the
conventional taxonomy of subject areas that comprise a liberal
education, Paul holds a more flexible notion:
On my view the logics we use, and which we are daily
constructing and reconstructing, are far more mutable,
less discrete, more general, more open- and multitextured, more social, more dialectical, and even more
personal -- and hence far less susceptible to domainspecific skills and concepts -- than McPeck dares to
imagine.®^
Although the present essay's account of the role of subject-specific
norms in knowledge reconstruction challenges Paul's notion that our
ways of reasoning are in any way exempt from domain-specific
concepts and skills, it does suggest that our definition of a subject
area should almost certainly be more flexible and progressive than the

127

traditional taxonomy of liberal education admits.®^ For although the
conventional academic disciplines are the most reliable and powerful
conceptual systems we have (their criteria and procedures having
been constructed over time through ongoing and progressive dialogue
regarding the recurring issues and concerns of the communities of
people working within those frameworks), a conception of critical
thinking as including the reconstruction and integration of otherwise
domain-specific norms carries with it the implication that the
conventional academic disciplines neither delineate nor circumscribe
all the possible ways of thinking or knowing. Indeed, if thinking entails
the reconstructive transfer of otherwise discrete concepts and norms,
then it also entails the ongoing construction of new and potentially
more integrated ways of understanding and explaining the world.

Broadening the Scope of Our Conception

This view of thinking as a process of ongoing construction,
reconstruction, and integration of otherwise discrete knowledge
systems brings to light the major shortcoming of both the general
skills and subject-specific approaches. For although general and
subject-specific knowledge and skills are perhaps both necessary
conditions of the mutual reconstructive integration of otherwise
discrete frames of reference, those models of critical thinking which
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emphasize them do not capture the highly constructive nature of
actual thinking, a process from which the natural human drive for
connectedness and integrity®® simply cannot be separated. Such a
conception suggests to me that the guiding criterion against which all
thinking can or should be measured is as much moral as it is rational,
the two terms being highly complementary.
On this point I agree wholeheartedly with Richard Paul, who
has so strongly advocated that our goal in teaching critical thinking
should be the cultivation of critical thinking in the "strong sense" -that is, of critical thinking as including an ongoing disposition of fairmindedness and self-examination that makes intellectual, emotional,
behavioral, and, indeed, social, integrity possible. Rationality and
morality alike dictate that we think, feel, and act in a self-consistent
manner. And while it is unclear which criterion -- rationality or morality
— ultimately motivates us to broaden actively the range and depth of
our understanding so as to include, even enlist, the viewpoints of
others, the important point is that growth in understanding and
appreciation is a universal criterion against which all rational acts can
be measured. It is no accident, in this regard, that Paul and McPeck
alike take for granted the value of having or constructing a world
view," for the valuing of such an ideal is implicit in the very concept
of rationality.
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Teaching for Transfer: A Moral Task

In "Questions and Answers about the Nature and Teaching of
Thinking Skills, " Robert J. Sternberg asks what he considers to be
"the fundamental question in the teaching of thinking skills": "What
can we do to maximize transfer of training for thinking skills to
students' everyday lives?"®® For McPeck, the answer seems to be
that we should better acquaint students with the epistemological
underpinnings and real-life applications of the subject areas -- on the
grounds (1) that thinking cannot be separated from the subjectspecific norms of discrete knowledge domains, and (2) that familiarity
with a wide range of conceptual and procedural norms is the best
preparation for dealing with complex, real-life problems. For general
skills proponents, the answer seems to be that we should teach
general concepts, procedures, and principles of thinking which are
common to many subject areas -- on the grounds that such skills are
applicable to a wide range of multi-dimensional, everyday problems for
which no person could ever be adequately prepared using a strictly
subject-specific approach.
Not only do both approaches seem sound - McPeck's, because
the power and range of applicability of the subject areas is formidable,
and the general skills advocates', because general skills can provide
students with familiar means of approaching unfamiliar topics - but
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they seem complementary as well. Indeed, the trend in critical
thinking research and instruction seems to be towards just such a
conception, alternatively labelled the "mixed model" or "synthesis"
approach, and according to which, as Ennis puts it, "there is a
#

separate thread or course aimed at teaching general principles of
critical thinking, but [where] students are also involved in subjectspecific critical thinking instruction."®^ Such an approach, write
Perkins and Salomon, acknowledges that "there are general cognitive
skills; but [that] they always function in contextualized ways."®®
Nonetheless, while both approaches supply skills that are both useful
and necessary in dealing with real-life problems, neither one {alone or
even, necessarily, together) really answers the question of how to get
students themselves transferring and applying -- actively, creatively,
and autonomously — the particular skills it advocates. The irony of this
situation is that such transfer is tantamount to thinking itself. That is,
for students to transfer their thinking skills they would have to think
about the relevance and applicability of those skills to new contexts.
Sternberg, in answer to his own question of how to maximize
transfer, begins by suggesting that we should be sure to teach those
"executive” or "metacomponentiar' thinking skills that would help
students plan, monitor, and evaluate their own thinking, thus helping
them to become more aware of how to apply their thinking skills in
new contexts.®’ Such "skills" as Ennis's "identifying or formulating
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questions,” "identifying or formulating criteria for judging possible
answers," and "keeping the situation in mind"®° would function, in
other words, somewhat as skills of transfer.
As Sternberg himself acknowledges, however, merely
acquainting students with such skills still will not ensure that students
will learn to transfer them. He thus goes on to emphasize not what
thinking skills we should teach but how we should teach them.
Towards this end, he recommends such strategies as presenting
thinking skills across a range of disciplines, in concrete, abstract,
academic, and practical situations, and using a variety of presentation
techniques (video, audio etc.). And, indeed, showing students, by a
variety of methods, how thinking strategies and skills function across
a range of fields and exemplars is excellent pedagogical advice. But it
still fails to address directly the question of how to get students
initiating and extending such transfer themselves.

Dispositions. Not skills, the Essence of Thinkinq

The dilemma brings home the already obvious fact that
"thinking skills” and "thinking" are not the same thing. As Sternberg
writes: "Unless students can learn to think flexibly, look for
opportunities to transfer their skills, and seek analogies between past
and future situations, transfer is most unlikely to ensue."®’ What is
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interesting about this passage (and many others like it, by many other
writers) is that the verbs -- "learn," "think," "look," "transfer," and
"seek" -- all refer not to "skills" but to "ongoing behaviors," or
"dispositions." Indeed, critical thinking as a "disposition" is almost
always invoked in the wake of the anticipated failure of skills
instruction to impart autonomous critical thinking ability. And yet, the
treatment of critical thinking as a disposition, with the notable
exception of Richard Paul's work, usually amounts to little more than
obligatory concluding statements to the effect that 'the teaching of
thinking skills is all for naught unless we can develop in students a
critical disposition.'
In fact, as long as we emphasize the transmission of skills in
the teaching of critical thinking, we will continue to formulate the
problem of transfer as the problem of how to get students to transfer
their thinking skills to new contexts. A concept of critical thinking as
transfer, on the other hand, calls attention to the fact that teaching
for transfer is less a matter of transmitting knowledge, skills,
strategies, and principles of thinking (though it is that, too) than it Is
of fostering in students from the start an inquiring disposition, by
which I mean a "readiness"®^ to consider the bearing of apparently
discrete frames of reference on one another and towards the
construction of a more integrated world view.
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Herein, then, lies the educational bearing which framing the
concept of critical thinking in moral terms has on the question of how
to teach for transfer. For if critical thinking entails the ongoing
construction, reconstruction, and integration of a person's world view
and ways of knowing, then the aim of "critical thinking instruction"
(indeed, the aim of education) is not so much the transmission of
time-tested knowledge and skills (though these are, of course,
important!) as it is the fostering of those habits of rational inquiry that
lead a person always to seek the expansion, deepening, and
integration of her own belief structures. Familiarity with subjectspecific and general conceptual and procedural norms may be a
necessary condition of critical thought - it is certainly a primary aim
of a liberal education - but more important is a disposition that
consistently leads one to strive for intellectual, emotional, and
behavioral integrity, or what is sometimes called "the critical
spirit."®'^ And dispositions are not so much taught as nurtured, by
creating the appropriate educational conditions.
In fact, the only way to develop in students the disposition to
pursue actively the integrity and expansion of their own belief
systems is to lead them to conclude for themselves that such a
pursuit is worthwhile, and this means creating educational conditions
that simultaneously challenge and engage the interests of students as
individuals.*' Difficult as this may be. it necessarily follows from a
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conception of thinking as the constructing of integrated knowledge
and belief systems. For, as I will discuss momentarily, it is only by
engaging, then tactfully challenging, the habitual belief patterns to
which students uncritically cling, that they will be motivated to
examine critically and reconstruct their own otherwise unexamined
assumptions.

Some Educational Guidelines

In this regard, educators concerned with the teaching of critical
thinking have forwarded many ideas as to the necessary conditions
for fostering a critical disposition. One such condition, on which at
least three prominent theorists agree,®® is that teachers themselves
should model critical thinking. In light of the view advanced in the
present essay, such modeling would consist largely in public,
interactive, dialogic exchanges with both class materials and students
themselves, resulting in visible reconstructions of the teachers'
knowledge and beliefs in light of class content and the students'
input. Such modeling should not, of course, usurp the teacher's
authority; it should rather demonstrate that even someone with more
extensive knowledge and experience continues to grow intellectually
by reconstructing and integrating new points of view with the old.

135

The whole purpose of modeling, of course, is to encourage
students to follow the teacher's lead. And this means that the teacher
must raise issues, or allow students to raise issues, that not only, as
Richard Paul has suggested, engage students' egocentric or
unexamined beliefs,®^ but which the teacher is confident she can
challenge without intimidating or unduly discouraging students.
Although one temptation here might be to get involved in students'
immediate or personal concerns, such an approach tends only to
reflect back to students their own egocentric beliefs, when what we
really want to be doing is encouraging them to reexamine critically
those beliefs in light of frames of reference with which they are as yet
unfamiliar. My own strategy as a writing teacher has been to engage
students' activated {and often uncritical) public beliefs on such issues
as abortion, gay rights, public smoking, drug policies, SDI, etc., where
I can help them locate and/or generate the alternative points of view
that stimulate multi-logical reflection. Working with a range of issues
such as these is relatively easy in a writing class, but teachers in the
subject areas can similarly engage and challenge students' habitual
thinking patterns: in the sciences, for example, by creating doubtful
situations to which students themselves must seek answers, or, in the
humanities, by having students generate and compare alternative
interpretations of, and explanations and metaphors for works,
theories, and points of view that intrigue them.
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The key to making such issues into vehicles for learning to think
critically, and a third condition for getting students to do so, is that
students be required, much as Richard Paul has suggested,®® to
formulate, articulate, and respond to alternative viewpoints from
competing frames of reference, (in the sciences, for example, by
generating, formulating, and testing competing hypotheses -- which is
the way actual scientific inquiries typically operate). With highly
opinionated students, teachers should generally concentrate on
getting them to see and articulate the strengths of alternative
arguments and theories, and the weaknesses of their own. Vacillating
and indecisive students, on the other hand, should typically be asked
to do the near opposite: to formulate and develop their own ideas in
light of the many viewpoints between which they cannot decide. In
both cases, the educational principle is the same: Put in students' way
only such obstacles as are necessary to prevent them from being
satisfied with habitual trains of thought but which do not discourage
them from attempting to construct new ones. The artful teacher is the
one who has taken the time to acquaint herself with the thinking
habits of her individual students, so that she knows when and how to
challenge, and when and how to offer support.
A good deal more could be said about what educational
conditions best foster a critical disposition, for example, concerning
the appropriate social contexts of learning.®’ For now, though, I
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conclude with a single, modest suggestion. As teachers concerned
with the difficulty we see students having initiating and sustaining
their own lines of inquiry, I believe we would all do well to study
closely Dewey's classic work in this field. How We Think.^° For
more than any other source I have seen, this book outlines the
conditions which provoke "reflective thinking" (which Dewey basically
defines as the search for reliable grounds for belief) and translates
them into educational principles. The book is often misconstrued as an
attempt to outline a five step model of inquiry, but only someone who
skimmed the chapters dealing with that model could miss Dewey's
repeated reminders that the "five steps" are neither linear, discrete,
nor restricted to five in number. What the book really attempts is to
describe in considerable detail the dynamic processes involved in
"reflective thinking" and the educational conditions which elicit,
regulate, and sustain those processes. In this author's opinion, it is
the most significant work in the field of critical thinking instruction to
date, and one which I hope, in future essays, to discuss in the light of
recent developments in the critical thinking literature.
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45. Jean Piaget, Structuralism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970.)
46. Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes," p. 41.
47. Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes," p. 42.
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48. McPeck, "Paul's Critique," p. 52.
49. Paul, "Dialogical Thinking," p. 128.
50. Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes," p. 41.
51. Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes," p. 40.
52. Dewev,_How We Think, p. 67.
53. Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes," p. 42.
54. Recent developments in ethics, for example, have come about
largely through cross-disciplinary mergings of philosophical and
biological concepts and procedures, or, again, of philosophical and
psychological ones. Our own "discipline" of "educational philosophy"
is itself a non-traditional blending of what have often been considered
discrete domains, with which new ones (cognitive science,
developmental psychology, etc.) are constantly being crossreferenced.
55. The question of whether human beings are by nature egocentric
or benevolent is, of course, one of the enduring philosophical
questions. I personally share Mill's view that while moral feelings may
not be innate, they are acquired naturally through social intercourse:
"The deeply rooted conception which every individual ... has of
himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural
wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims
and those of his fellow creatures." See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1861/1957), pp.42-43.
56. Robert J. Sternberg, "Questions and Answers about the Nature
and Teaching of Thinking Skills," in Baron & Sternberg, Teaching
Thinking Skills, p. 258.
57. Ennis, "Subject Specificity," p. 5.
58. Perkins and Salomon, "Are Cognitive Skills," p. 19.
59. Sternberg, "Questions," p. 252.
60. Sternberg, "Questions," p. 252.
61. Sternberg, "Questions," p. 258, emphases added.
62. To use Dewey's term. See How We Think, p. 34.
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63. Indeed, I am led to wonder if many of the so-called "general
thinking skills" might not themselves be just as fruitfully thought of as
"dispositions." Take, for example, Perkins and Salomon's references
to "the strategy of looking for counterexamples to test claims" (in
"Are Cognitive Skills" pp. 19-20). On the basis of four criteria of
generality — that the pattern (a) shows a seeming use, (b) plays an
important role, (c) is demonstrably transferable, and (d) is commonly
absent from people's everyday reasoning — the authors informally
conclude that the strategy of seeking counterexamples is a "general
cognitive skill." While their argument certainly advances a useful set
of conditions for generality, what strikes me about it are its inherent
dispositional overtones. The seeking of counterexamples, which is
itself a form of considering alternative perspectives (I am reminded of
how Socrates, in the presence of his Athenian audiences, would
allude to the way the Spartans did things), would seem to evolve out
of its perceived usefulness and importance in constructing more
integrated knowledge systems. And its common absence, as opposed
to its general application (or transfer), in the thinking of most people
seems more descriptive of a disposition or, to use Perkins and
Salomon's phrase, a "habit of mind" than of any skill per se.
64. It is worth noting that the "critical spirit" is often thought of or
referred to as an "attitude" or "affect." By "disposition" I mean
something like Aristotle's hexis - something not only affective but
behavioral as well, in the sense that a critical thinker not only has
certain knowledge and attitudes but is also in the habit of employing
them. See Nicomachean Ethics. II. 4, 1105a30-35, in Martin Ostwald,
trans., Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp.
39, 308-9.
65. Such individualization of instruction, incidentally, constitutes
Sternberg's sixth and final suggestion. See Sternberg, "Questions,"
pp. 258-259.
66. See McPeck, Critical Thinking, p. 19; Paul, "Dialogical Thinking,"
p. 142; and John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical," in R.S.
Peters, ed.. The Concept of Education (London; Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1973), p. 28.
67. Paul, "Dialogical Thinking," p. 140.
68. Paul, "Dialogical Thinking," p. 140.
69. See fn. 55.
70. Dewey, How We Think.
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CHAPTER 4

JUSTICE AND CARING AND
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL RELATIVISM:
REFRAMING THE GENDER QUESTION IN ETHICS

Recent psychological research by Carol Gilligan and others
suggests that men and women, as a result of certain general features
of their respective gender experience, tend to develop morally
somewhat differently, a fact which previous research into moral
development overlooked. It appears that whereas men tend to
construe moral problems in terms of the competing rights of separate
individuals, women tend to do so in terms of the conflicting
obligations they feel towards individuals with whom they feel
connected.’ Gilligan has referred to the masculine moral experience
as a "justice" or "fairness" orientation, and the feminine as a
"responsibility" or "caring" orientation, and has argued that in each
case these are the criteria by which men and women tend to make
their moral decisions.
Whether or not men and women do, in fact, develop along
these two different lines,^ Gilligan's thesis has not only given rise to
arguments concerning the scope of inquiry into moral development,
but it has also refueled old debates concerning the nature of morality
itself. Among the many philosophical questions which this
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genderization of moral development has raised is that of which
criterion, caring or justice, if either, defines a more mature form of
moral reasoning, and, by implication, a more adequate morality.
Most theoreticians of men's and/or women's moral
development agree that the developmental crisis which marks the
transition from conventional, adolescent morality to principled, mature
moral reasoning is the confrontation with the problem of moral
relativism -- the apparent contradiction between the philosophic
assumption that morality is in some sense universal and the fact that
people's moral beliefs differ. The hallmark of mature moral reasoning,
for most theorists, is that it offers some way out of the problem
without lapsing into dogmatism -- the arbitrary proclamation that one
set of beliefs is right and all others wrong.
Despite these similarities, however, developmental theorists
disagree as to what constitutes a viable resolution of the problem.
While none of them advocates unlimited moral relativism
- the belief that there are no shared moral standards, i.e., that right
and wrong are strictly matters of personal opinion -- conceptions of
what constitutes mature moral reasoning range from Gilligan's notion
of multiple moral contexts regulated by contextually relative criteria,
which include caring and justice, to Kohiberg's notion of conflicting
individual goods regulated by 3 single, universal justice criterion.
Although Gilligan and Kohiberg alike maintain that justice and caring
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are both proper moral concerns, and that a resolution is desirable,
neither has articulated just how the two might work together to form
a more comprehensive morality that transcends "gender" differences.
Such a resolution could serve as a valuable guide for educators
concerned with creating sufficiently integrated educational
environments to foster moral autonomy in students.
This paper examines the problem of moral relativism as it
pertains to the gender question in moral development. It begins by
reviewing the debate between Kohiberg and Gilligan as to whether
mature moral reasoning uses formal or contextually relative criteria.
The function of this review is to reveal and clarify the strengths and
weaknesses of both positions for the purpose of setting the scene for
a reframing of the problem of moral relativism. I argue that neither a
justice nor a caring ethic by itself can solve the problem of moral
relativism — which is ultimately a question of how to choose between
alternative conceptions of the good -- since neither ethic addresses
adequately the teleological question of what constitutes a quality life.
Only by combining the justice and caring approaches can we
sufficiently broaden the scope of morality to provide a principled
referent for integrating the alternative moral constructions that give
rise to the problem of moral relativism. I conclude by suggesting that
John Dewey's postulation of growth as the ultimate moral standard
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provides a principled, naturai criterion that integrates the formaiism of
justice and the contextual relativism of caring.

Hohlberg's Deontolooical Formali.«^m

The problem of moral relativism amounts to this. If what is
considered moral varies from person to person, or from culture to
culture, then what guide do we have for choosing between alternative
moral constructions when they conflict? Kohiberg's answer begins
with the claim that while the specific content of our moral beliefs will
inevitably differ, the forms of our moral reasoning are nevertheless
universal. To cite a famous example, stage 2 boys in a Taiwanese
village said a husband ought to steal food for his starving wife
because a funeral would cost a lot of money if she died. Boys at the
same stage in an Atayal village, in contrast, said he ought to steal the
food because he needs his wife to cook for him. As Kohiberg points
out, although the content of the two groups' judgments differs, the
form of their reasoning is the same: the husband should do what is
ultimately most convenient.^ There are similarly "universal" forms and
criteria for all the stages.
While the form/content distinction does not, in itself, offer a
guide for choosing between conflicting moral constructions, it
suggested to Kohiberg that it is within the forms and not the content
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of moral judgments that a universal moral criterion might be found. In
other words, he rejects locating his criterion of moral adequacy in the
content of moral judgments on the grounds that the content is
contextually relative and therefore incapable of yielding a universal
moral criterion:
The focus of Piaget and myself on morality as
deontological justice springs, in part, from a concern with
moral and ethical universality in moral judgment. The
search for moral universality implies the search for some
minimal value conception(s) on which all persons could
agree, regardless of personal differences in detailed aims
or goals.^
As the above quotation implies, Kohiberg includes individual
aims and goals in his definition of "content." As such, he believes
them to be subjectively relative. And although he does not explicitly
state the connection, Kohiberg sees individual aims as being derived
from subjectively relative conceptions of the good, a connection
which is implicit in this citation of Dwight Boyd by Kohiberg, Levine,
and Hewer:
[F]or Rawls or Kohiberg..., pursuit of the good and
human perfection is subordinated as a concern to
adjudicating differences among individuals on how the
good and human perfection are to be defined, furthered
and distributed. One cannot understand this entry point
unless one understands that they assume that individuals
do and will differ in this fundamental way. This
presumption of human conflict rests on a more
fundamental belief that the good, even for one individual,
is not one but pluralistic....®
If people's conceptions of the good differ in general, it
necessarily follows that individuals will have different conceptions of
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what is good in specific situations. Thus, for Kohiberg, any
consideration of the actual consequences of specific moral judgments
is necessarily relative to the particular context of the judgement being
made. In fact, it is not necessary to posit subjective "goods” (what I
term subjective relativism") in order to hold that the good as it is
manifested in particular situations is relative to its context (what I
term "contextual relativism"). But it is worth mentioning Kohiberg's
more extreme position to show that he is as sensitive as any
contextual relativist to the difficulties inherent in determining the good
in particular situations. (Indeed, as I will argue shortly, it is this very
postulation of multiple subjective goods that makes Kohiberg's
solution to the problem of moral relativism ultimately unworkable.)
It is what Kohiberg does to circumvent the problem which the
relativity of the good poses for a universal moral criterion that
distinguishes him from contextual relativists like Gilligan. Since
conceptions of the good are, for Kohiberg, contextually and
subjectively relative, the search for a universal moral criterion, he
reasons, must limit them from its purview:
Morality as justice best renders our view of morality as
universal. It restricts morality to a central minimal core,
striving for universal agreement in the face of more
relativist conceptions of the good.®
Thus, justice is not a guide for choosing between alternative moral
constructions or conceptions of the good (a central task of moral
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theory for teleologists), a point which Kohiberg emphasizes
repeatedly:
I make no direct claims about the ultimate aims of
people, about the good life, or about other problems that
a teleological theory must handle. These are problems
beyond the scope of the sphere of morality or moral
principles, which I define as principles of choice for
resolving conflicts of obligation.^
Rather, justice is a guide for regulating human interaction -specifically, through the mandate that each person's claim to pursue
his own individual good should be given equal and impartial
consideration.

The Primacy of Justice

Part of what makes justice the best guide for adjudicating
between conflicting claims, according to Kohiberg, is that it is that
principle on which all rational persons can agree, regardless of their
specific aims and corresponding conceptions of the good. Of all the
moral principles which philosophers have ever put forth, Kohiberg
maintains, justice best achieves this (theoretical) universality because
it is the most reversible logically -- people can adhere to it regardless
of their position in the moral equation, and regardless of their
individual preferences for this or that moral outcome. What makes
justice the most reversible of all moral principles, for Kohiberg, is that
it is the most "differentiated" -- it best filters out all that is
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contextually or individually relative, that is, "non-moral," from the
moral domain. In other words, it "solves" the problem of moral
relativism by reducing morality to the one principle people can agree
on, given the shared assumption that they can't agree on what is
good.
Kohiberg's exegesis of why a formal stage 6 principle of
deontological justice is more adequate morally than either a stage 5,
act utilitarian principle of benevolence or a rule utilitarian conception
of social contract® illustrates how this restriction of the definition of
morality "solves" the problem of moral relativism. Unlike stage 4
morality, which ignores the problem of moral relativism by construing
all opinions that deviate from established custom as simply immoral
and unlawful, stage 5 morality provides a rational criterion - the
maximization of welfare, or benevolence - that acknowledges the
right of individuals to pursue their own ends as long as those ends do
not conflict with the greater good. This criterion, Kohiberg maintains,
is manifest in both act utilitarianism - "consider the amount of good
and harm produced" - and rule utilitarianism - "consider the results of
everyone's acting on the rule."®
Although he doesn't state it explicitly, it is fair to assume that
the problem with benevolence, for Kohiberg, is that although it can be
universalized in the sense that we should take into account the
"good" of everyone, people's conceptions as to what is, in fact.
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good differ. Thus, as Kohlberg sees it, the consequences or
"results" which both forms of utilitarianism obligate us to consider are
not something that can be agreed on. As a result, utilitarianism
imposes a conception of the aggregate good at the expense of the
good of the least advantaged. It must resort to this solution.
according to Kohlberg, because it fails to differentiate adequately the
consequences of moral judgement from the form:
Although benevolence can be universalized (that is,
everyone should care for the welfare of all other
humans), it cannot resolve a conflict of welfares, except
by quantitative maximization. The content of moral
concerns and claims is always welfare, but maximization
is no true moral principle....Concern for the welfare of
other beings...is the precondition for experiencing a moral
conflict rather than a mechanism for its resolution. The
moral question is 'Whose role do I take?' or 'Whose claim
do I favor?' The working core of the utilitarian principle is
the maximization principle. As everyone knows, and our
studies document, 'Consider everyone's happiness
equally' is not a working principle of justice.’®
Welfare, in other words, is both contextually and subjectively
relative for Kohlberg, in that it means different things in different
circumstances and for different people. As such, he eliminates it as a
basis for agreement by differentiating it from the formal principles of
equality and respect from which he claims it is derived. In the end,
Kohlberg claims, we are left with a universal moral criterion that is not
subject to changing conceptions of the good.
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"The Dilemma of the Fant"

Kohiberg's postulation of a formal justice principle as the most
philosophically and psychologically adequate moral criterion has met
with considerable criticism from his former student and colleague,
Carol Gilligan. Aside from the more well-known charge of sex bias
itself, Gilligan makes at least the following claims: (1) that the
contextual and relativistic properties of mature moral thought are not
adequately covered by a model of justice reasoning, (2) that moral
reasoning based solely on formal justice structures cannot adequately
solve the problem of moral relativism, and (3) that justice and caring
define separate moral contexts which inevitably conflict, but which
can be regulated by personal commitment within a moral universe
understood to be contextually relative.
According to Gilligan and her colleague John Murphy,”
research shows that the problem of moral relativism often persists
after people are scored at Stage 5, at which point the problem was
supposed to have been solved, by Kohiberg's account. Even after the
1978 revisions of the original Kohiberg scoring manual, which yielded
relatively high rates of regression from stages 5 and 6 to either preprincipled stages or to the transitional 4/5 stage, Gilligan and Murphy
found instances of regressive scores due to subjects framing the
hypothetical dilemmas in more contextual terms than in their earlier
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responses. Such contextual framing of moral dilemmas is the result,
they claim, of adult encounters with real-life moral dilemmas in which
people discover the existence of alternative value frames of reference
for interpreting moral situations. They go on to say that mature moral
reasoning actually witnesses the abandonment of a universal justice
criterion in favor of a more contextual form of thinking which admits
of different criteria — of which justice is but one -- appropriate to
different moral contexts.
To date, Gilligan has specified only one other possible "moral
context than that of justice concerns, and that is the domain of
special obligations defined by a criterion of caring (that domain more
associated with women than with men), a context that she maintains
inevitably conflicts with interpretations framed in terms of justice.’^
"The dilemma of the fact" offers an example of a real life
situation in which Gilligan claims such a conflict occurs. Faced with
the decision of whether to reveal to his lover's husband that he was
having an affair with her, or to withhold that truth temporarily in order
to protect his lover from undue emotional stress. Philosopher Two
(previously scored at Stage 5) chose not to inform the husband, even
though he believed it was the "fair" or "just" thing to do. Philosopher
Two had this to say about his decision:
The justice approach....really blinded me to a lot of
realities of the problem....! think that the moral issue was
simply the matter of honesty and truth in the relationship.
But even if that had been fulfilled, we would have been
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left with the interpersonal dilemma of life choices, of
what kind of relationship you want in your life....And
morality won't do you one bit of good in that
decision.’^
(Although neither Philosopher Two nor Gilligan and Murphy specify
what they mean, exactly, by "life choices," it is safe to assume they
mean such options as 'to uphold truth at the expense of the well¬
being of loved ones,' 'to value the well-being of loved ones over
honesty,' 'to remain in a relationship with someone who is married to
someone else,' 'to refuse to be involved with someone who is married
to someone else,' etc. A justice principle, they claim, does not
adequately address such options. Thus, commitment to any one of
them would constitute an example of what Gilligan means by
"commitment in relativism.")
Citing this example, Gilligan and Murphy maintain that a justice
approach (equated with "morality" by Philosopher Two) does not
provide an adequate guide for making the life choices that underlie the
contextual decision making process inherent in any "moral" judgement
(in the broad sense of the term):
Equating morality with 'the justice approach'...The
perceived disparity between the justice solution (telling
the truth to honor respect) and the remaining problems of
responsibility and consequence leads [Philosopher Two]
to the further realization that while the problem was at
once both moral and not moral, the 'moral' solution
wouldn't solve the problem. Then the question becomes
one of definition as to what is included in the moral
domain, since the justice approach does not adequately
address the responsibilities and obligations that ensue
from 'life choices.
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Redefining the Moral

Kohiberg's response to these criticisms^® is mixed. He agrees
that his model does not give an adequate description of the contextual
aspects of moral reasoning, but he also explains that It was never
supposed to do so. Justice, for Kohiberg, only insures that other
people s claims to pursue their own life choices are honored. Life
choices themselves, and the contextual judgments that follow from
them, are, for Kohiberg, part of the content of moral judgments, not
of their form, and as such are not covered by a formal justice
principle. He reiterates that his decision to focus on justice concerns
stemmed largely from his desire to locate a universal moral criterion
on which people could agree regardless of differences due to
contextual interpretations and varying conceptions of the good, and
that such a principle must meet certain formal requirements,
particularly reversibility, which is impossible with contextual principles
like benevolence or caring.
Kohiberg does concede, however, that his earlier restriction of
the definition of morality to the domain of justice concerns was
misleading; (what he was really doing was restricting the scope of his
inquiry). Admitting that justice Is not an adequate moral principle by
Itself, he accordingly broadened his definition of morality to include
not merely contextual thinking^® -- considerations of the specific
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welfare outcomes of moral judgments - but also the underlying ethical
conceptions of human nature, society, the good, and reality itself”
on which those more contextual judgments are based. And although
he sees these contextual and ethical concerns as an integral part of
mature moral thinking, he also argues that they must be the subjects
of "soft stage," that is, non-formal, analyses.
Nonetheless, this broadening of the scope of morality amounts
to the admission that the problem of moral relativism is not
adequately dealt with by a theory of justice reasoning per se. For
although a formal justice criterion tells us to respect other people's
right to pursue their own individual goods (It even provides us with a
mutually acceptable method for doing so - Ideal Role Taking, or Moral
Musical Chairs), when it comes to actually deciding whose claim is
reversible in a moral conflict, contextual and ethical judgments not
covered by a formal justice criterion inevitably arise.
In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what Philosopher Two
wants to know Is whether he should tell the husband the truth or
withhold it to protect his lover. Assuming (for now) that Kohiberg is
correct that this dilemma does not constitute a conflict between
justice and caring, but rather that Philosopher Two fell short of
applying his justice principle in this particular context,^® even if
Philosopher Two had completed the deliberative process of Moral
Musical Chairs, he would still have been faced with the decision of
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whose claim to honor: the husband's or the wife's. Kohiberg says this
about the decision:
assuming it is correct that disclosure of the truth would
risk the wife's sanity, then if Philosopher 2 were to
imaginatively continue the process and ask whether the
husband's claim to truth would be valid if he placed
himself in the wife's position, he would be likely to
conclude that justice is better served by withholding the
truth, because if the husband puts himself in the wife's
position he sees her right to sanity. In other words, in
this case Philosopher 2 realizes that choosing sanity over
truth telling is a more reversible decision than the
converse.^®
There are two assumptions here, one factual, the other ethical,
neither of which is supported by a formal justice principle. The factual
assumption, as Kohiberg himself notes, is that one of the likely
consequences of Philosopher Two's telling the truth would, in fact, be
the loss of the wife's "sanity" {assuming, of course, that we can
agree on its definition). A plethora of contextual judgments go into the
making of such an inference: the nature of the wife's other problems,
the relevance of her history in handling emotional stress, the extent of
her feelings of guilt, the husband's likely response (will he fly into a
rage? will he be understanding? will he seek a divorce?), the pattern
of the husband and wife's relationship, etc. Such contextual
judgments are."factual" because they attempt to answer the question:
what would the likely outcome be? And as Kohiberg himself points
out, "...the most problematic, changing, historically relative aspect of
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moral choice is attending to the factual aspects of a moral
dilemma."^®
Of course there will never be a principled moral criterion that
can answer such questions, so we can hardly fault justice for not
doing so.^’ But implicit in Kohiberg's conclusion that Philosopher
Two would have chosen the wife's right to sanity as the more
reversible claim -- i.e., as the more "just" solution - is the ethical
assumption that sanity is more intrinsically valuable than either
honesty or the right to truth. Such a conclusion is hardly a given (the
husband might or might not choose the wife's right to sanity as the
more reversible claim in this dilemma), and necessarily implies
epistemological and ethical assumptions not covered by a justice
principle -- for example, that one person's "well-being" justifies lying
to another, and that a person can be considered "well" or "sane"
though living in deceit. My purpose is not to pass judgement on these
assumptions; avoiding a nervous breakdown may justify deceit in
some situations. Rather, the point is that a formal justice criterion fails
to provide an adequate guide for making or evaluating these sorts of
contextual life choices, or for choosing which underlying conception
of the good to embrace in general.
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Justice and Caring

Nevertheless, while Kohiberg admits that justice by itself is not
a sufficient moral principle — precisely because it does not provide an
adequate guide for making life choices -- he still maintains that it is a
necessary one, and, as such, does not conflict with decisions framed
in terms of caring. In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what
Gilligan construes as a conflict between justice and caring, Kohiberg
sees as uncertainty about how to apply justice in a specific context:
In our interpretation. Philosopher 2 is struggling to
formulate a principle of justice which would resolve the
situation of conflict between the husband's right to the
truth and the wife's right to sanity.
Viewed in this light, it is hard to see how Gilligan infers that justice
conflicts with caring, unless one confuses "justice" with a narrow
adherence to "honesty and truth" (as Philosopher Two does), or as
"telling the truth to honor respect" (as Gilligan and Murphy seem to
do).^^ But, as Kohiberg points out, even Philosopher Two frames the
dilemma in justice terms when he asks, "was [the wife's] right to
sanity, which I think was being jeopardized, less important than [the
husband's] right to know?"^'^ The point is that a formal justice
principle does not, and is not supposed to, prescribe contextual
judgments such as "tell the truth" or "protect loved ones," which are
part of the content, not the form, of morality; its whole purpose.
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rather, is to leave room for such decisions to be made contextually
(which is, of course, both its strength and its limitation).
There is, however, another sense in which justice and caring
could be said to conflict, and that is not as moral principles but as
two human capacities that are sometimes difficult to integrate. As
Philosopher Two puts it:
the dilemma I have is in the fact that....the Veil of
Ignorance is not down. It is very difficult for me to
completely withdraw from the situation and say if I was
K. or if I were T., I would certainly want to know the
truth.
But, if anything, this difficulty only points to the need for a principle
of justice, so that the husband's claim be given equal and impartial
consideration when compared with the wife's. Besides, Philosopher
Two's inability to employ the Veil of Ignorance (i.e., to be impartial)
violates not only his own sense of justice but of caring, or "principled
non-violence," as well, since it prevents him from fully considering the
welfare consequences which withholding the truth might have for the
husband. Thus, rather than demonstrating that justice and caring
comprise two contradictory ways of framing moral dilemmas, the
dilemma of the fact illustrates the "fact" that human beings are not
(generally) capable of universal or impartial love.
To construe this difficulty as a conflict between justice and
caring is to frame the dilemma in conventional, "genderized" terms,
for it is when principles are interpreted as rules that they inevitably
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conflict. Such conflicts are unavoidably the case with all conventional
moralities, which are, by definition, contextually determined. And the
postulation of different moral contexts defined by gender is no
different than that of different moral contexts defined by culture. The
combined facts (1) that women have tended to function in different
social contexts than men, and (2) that the role expectations which
society imposes on them at the conventional level differ, are enough
to explain why men and women might (and I believe they do) tend to
follow different developmental paths, a point which Gilligan makes
poignantly in In a Different Voice.^^ But to infer from these facts that
moral principles necessarily conflict is to commit a form of the
naturalistic fallacy: specifically, to confuse the conventional, social
"is" with the principled, moral "ought."
Rather than mature moral reasoning being characterized by the
criteria which distinguish conventional, "genderized" moral thought,
moral reasoning at the post-conventional level should transcend such
dichotomization, leading to neither "justice" nor "caring," but to some
sort of reconciliation. Gilligan is actually an advocate of such a
resolution, but her postulation of multiple moral contexts, each with
its own guiding criterion to be chosen on the basis of personal
commitment, does not provide one, for it fails to articulate the basis
on which such personal commitments are to be made -- a basis,
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moreover, which would define a more encompassing value context
that contradicts the postulation of multiple moral contexts.
Murphy and Gilligan assert that there are:
two essentially different kinds of moral relativism which
stand in different relation to postconventional or
principled moral judgement. In making this distinction, we
rely on the contrast described by Perry ... between
relativistic multiplicity (position 4 in Perry's scheme), the
postulation that there are many right answers to moral
problems and no way of choosing among them, and
contextual relativism (position 5), the position that while
no answer may be objectively right in the sense of being
context-free, some answers and some ways of thinking
are better than others.^®
By this account, the transition from "multiplicity" to "contextual
relativism" marks the key transition from immature to mature moral
reasoning, where the individual postulates that although there are no
absolute, universal, or objective moral referents ("multiplicity"),
relative judgments are nevertheless possible ("contextual relativism").
There are, however, two related problems with this distinction. The
obvious one is that neither Murphy and Gilligan (nor Perry) articulate
any criteria by which "some answers and some ways of thinking" can
be determined as "better." Nor does Perry's model of the higher
stages of commitment^® provide an answer. It merely asserts that
we commit ourselves to our evolving conceptions of the good,
without indicating the direction which that evolution should take, or
helping us decide which conception is better or how to reconcile them
when they conflict. In this sense, the "contextual relativism" which
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Gilligan posits as the hallmark of mature moral reasoning is little
different than the stage of "multiplicity” which precedes it, except
that it replaces uncertainty" with "commitment" about which good
to pursue. Thus, although this transition seems to mark an important
psychological step in the related processes of intellectual development
and identity formation, it is dubious that the two stages differ morally
in any significant sense.
More importantly, however, this failure to articulate a criterion
on which to base personal commitment reveals the fundamental
difficulty with Gilligan and Murphy's conception of "contextual
relativism" as a solution to the problem of moral relativism, and that is
that it begs the question: commitment to what, on the basis of what?
The postulation that "some answers and some ways of thinking are
better than others" implies the existence of some broader, more
encompassing value criterion (whether formal or contextual), since
different value contexts cannot be regulated by "personal
commitment" alone. That commitment must be to something if the
question of which moral construction to embrace is to be answered.
And that "something" implies a larger, more encompassing value
context that contradicts the postulation of discrete multiple moral
contexts as defining the moral domain. Moreover, because the
principle referent by which Gilligan and Murphy (and Perry, except
that his is a psychological and not an ethical theory) would have us
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regulate what are otherwise relative moral values is the self, or
personal commitment," their position would, in fact, be better termed
"subjective relativism" than "contextual relativism."
Gilligan and Murphy have attempted to show, it could be
argued, that mature moral reasoners "commit" themselves to the
actual welfare consequences of their moral judgments. But although
this positing of responsibility for consequences gives necessary
substance to Kohiberg's conception of the formal properties of mature
moral reasoning, it still fails to answer the question: which welfare
consequences are desirable? And, as I have tried to argue, such
judgments, though "contextually relative" (in the sense that they, of
necessity, vary with the contextual realities of particular moral
situations), ultimately depend on one's ethical conception of the good.
In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what Philosopher Two
needs is some guide for choosing, not just between the wife's "right"
to sanity and the husband's "right" to the truth, but between the two
sets of likely "welfare consequences" that accompany the two
avenues his decision might take. What will happen to the wife if he
talks to the husband? What will happen to the husband if he remains
silent? Who will be more hurt? Phrased in this way, the dilemma of
the fact is both a "caring" and a "justice" dilemma.^® But the
decision itself, if taken to the level of reflectivity, ultimately rests on
Philosopher Two's conception of what constitutes "hurt," which is
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nothing more than the opposite of "welfare." And it is "welfare" that
ultimately needs defining in this situation, if Philosopher Two's
judgement is to be morally adequate.

Reframinq the Problem

Kohiberg s criticism of utilitarianism, it will be recalled, is that it
ultimately solves moral conflicts by prescribing those judgments which
deliver the greatest good to the greatest number, and that this
principle of maximization is a less than satisfying solution morally
because it does not adequately represent the claims of the least
advantaged.^’ But it will also be recalled that this criticism rests on
the premise that "the good" is subjectively relative -- i.e., that,
ultimately, people cannot agree on it or its content. Given this
assumption, Kohiberg restricts any concern with defining "the good"
from his formal model of the ontogenesis of "universal" justice
reasoning, (though he does flirt with it in his postulation of a seventh
stage of ethical reflectivity), and in so doing bypasses the teleological
question in the problem of moral relativism.
Gilligan's critique, on the other hand, despite its failure to show
that justice and caring define separate moral contexts at the principled
level, makes it apparent that when people are faced with choices
between two or more alternative courses of action that each lead to
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discrete welfare outcomes, they must ultimately choose between
alternative conceptions of the good. But this necessary foray into
teleology does not commit us, as she would have it, to subjective
commitments within an otherwise contextually relative moral universe.
Such a solution to the problem of moral relativism is really a nonsolution, since it denies the very question it begs: to which "moral
context" should I commit myself?
In fact, Kohiberg's and Gilligan's underlying assumption of
irreconcilable subjectively relative goods is the same, but the scope of
the problem of moral relativism goes beyond what either of them
considers. What Kohiberg appears to have overlooked is the possibility
that it is not the quantity of welfare but its quality which lies at the
heart of all moral conflicts.And although Gilligan does not reduce
the concern with welfare to a question of quantity, her postulation of
multiple moral contexts regulated by personal commitment never
really comes to terms with the question of quality, either. In actuality,
any genuine moral conflict, when taken to the level of reflectivity,
leads to a reappraisal of either one's conception of the good or of how
it manifests itself in a particular context -- a reappraisal not adequately
dealt with by either "personal commitment" or "justice."
In Carina: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral
Education.Nel Noddings offers "caring" as a principled, natural
moral criterion, accessible to and ultimately desired by all persons.
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This postulation of caring as an ultimate good is premised on the
assumption that the meeting between subjective human
consciousnesses evokes an affective response of "joy” that is a
natural good for human beings, whether they are conscious of it or
not. For Noddings, moral judgement relies, finally, not on principles,
which she argues are ultimately ambiguous, but rather on the "ethical
ideal we each construct of ourselves as "ones-caring" in our effort to
consciously reproduce those feelings of connectedness that we
remember from previous experiences of "natural caring." As pursuers
of the ethical ideal we see ourselves as people who seek not only to
appreciate the needs and goals of others but to nurture that
receptivity in others as well.

In such an ethic (to paraphrase

Noddings somewhat loosely), "welfare" -- as an outcome desired by
subjective "individuals" -- is subordinated to "welfare" - as the
enhancement of caring relations between "persons," who are in any
case connected by virtue of living in society together. The caring
relationship, in turn, it could be argued, leads to a shared vision of
desirable outcomes, of which caring itself is the most important.
Thus, in a conflict of welfares the caring ethic that Noddings puts
forth prescribes the following imperative: "Do that which best fosters
future caring," which, for her, means to do that which best nurtures
the ethical ideal in oneself and in others. In other words, rather than
avoiding or begging the question of which good to pursue, a caring
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ethic posits enhanced relations through conscious, reciprocal
"motivational displacement" as an end in itself.
Probably the most serious criticism leveled against Noddings'
"feminine" ethic is that it requires face-to-face contact to produce the
necessary motivational displacement for a full appreciation of others.
Betty Sichel writes:
Caring and response focus morality on a very limited
population, which may be directly affected by our moral
voice, which may hear our response, feel and be affected
by our care. Should moral agents only be concerned with
this narrowed moral universe and ignore all of the world's
millions of unfortunates?...Can the feminine approach to
ethics include these unfortunates? If not, are we left with
a theory which concentrates on limited, concentric circles
and thus, focusses on the traditional categories of
women's private lives?^'^
As Sichel points out, although Noddings advocates the application of
a "feminine" ethic to the public domain, it is not clear how such an
ethic can be applied, given the limited "moral context" it assumes —
that of intimate circles and chains of caring. Rather than accepting
Gilligan's and (to a lesser extent)^® Noddings' premise that men's
and women's moralities comprise two different approaches in need of
reconciliation, Sichel suggests instead that we concentrate on
constructing a more comprehensive ethic and model of moral
development which transcends the limitations of "genderized ethics"
from the start (without ignoring that which both conceptions have to
offer).^®
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Towards that end we can see that implicit in Noddings'
feminine ethic lies an intrinsic valuing of ongoing dialogue and
enhanced relations as moral aims. If we combine her notion of caring,
as an ethical ideal which motivates us to maintain and extend our
special relations, with a criterion of justice, which mandates that we
universalize our ideal through practiced impartiality, we arrive at a
more extensive, public moral criterion which not only promotes those
conditions that foster "caring" but which also promotes a more
comprehensive ethical ideal of world unity.
John Dewey's moral and educational writings^^ do precisely
this by positing "growth" itself as the ultimate moral criterion, in
which the moral aim is to cultivate a social disposition that seeks
always to broaden and deepen our shared experience. Such an ethic
offers a solution to the problem of moral relativism that neither
suspends from the moral domain subjectively relative conceptions of
the good, nor begs the question "which conception do I adopt?" It
suggests, rather, that the problem of moral relativism is not so much a
question of choosing between conflicting moral conceptions as of
continually reconstructing a more encompassing one, (always with the
understanding that the increase and enhancement of shared meaning
is an end which needs no justification).
The details of such a resolution are the subject of another
essay, but a few general features are worth noting here. Growth
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defines a broader moral context than genderized moralities - a context
within which both justice reasoning and a caring disposition could
conceivably be seen to develop. For Dewey.^« how we reason, feel,
and behave are all the result of pre-established active tendencies, or
habits, which in turn stem from the interaction of personal
dispositions with given social conditions. Thus, our primary moral
concern should be with establishing those habits of reasoning, feeling
and acting most conducive to growth
” the expanding and deepening of shared meanings.^®
An ethic defined by growth offers the sort of principled
resolution to subjective and contextual moral differences that Gilligan
seeks, without denying the validity of the multiple moral contexts idea
as descriptive of relative moralities prior to dialogue. Like Gilligan's
ethic, Dewey's prescribes dialogue, but his offers the possibility for a
reflective transformation of relative moralities that is more workable
than Gilligan's notion of irreconcilable contexts. It does this by
positing a dynamic, principled criterion that both prescribes the
direction of change and maximizes the role of reflective intelligence.
With the exception of her postulation of the irreconcilability of
separate moral contexts, the rest of Gilligan's model makes a great
deal of sense within Dewey's framework, particularly her description
of the role self-concept plays in the ontogenesis of principled moral
reasoning.
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Dewey s ethic of growth, like Noddings' of caring, posits the
ethical ideal -- the intervening means between a natural good and a
consciously desired one -- as the primary faculty of moral judgement
and the primary moral concern. But it also generalizes this ideal from
the individual to the societal level. Like Noddings, Dewey believes that
what matters most morally is the effect of moral judgments on
people s characters', both those of the people affected by our
judgments, and that of the moral agent herself. Consistent with
Noddings,^® but more reminiscent of Kohiberg, however, Dewey
sees a habit of reasoning in accordance with principles of impartiality
and justice as a strong component of a moral character.'^’ And, like
Kohiberg, he believes democracy (as a mode of associated living
rather than as a form of government per se) to be a necessary social
condition of growth.''^
Growth combines the rational criterion of justice with the
intrinsic valuing of social connections of caring, and, in so doing,
solves the problem of moral relativism by providing a principled,
natural criterion which simultaneously stands up to formal
requirements of inclusiveness, prescriptivity, and universality, while
also explaining the role of deliberation and character in handling
contextual variations. Above all, life choices, personal commitments,
and conceptions of the good are not subjectively relative within a
moral perspective guided by a criterion of growth, which defines a
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sufficiently expanded conception of morality to provide a referent for
making moral judgments on the basis of their impact on the quality of
communal life. For all these reasons, growth, as an educational
principle, mandates that autonomous rationality and a sense of
community be complementary aims of a complete moral education.
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CHAPTER 5

THE INDETERMINACY OF KNOWLEDGE
AND DISCOURSE COMMUNITIES: HOW
COGNITION AND CONTEXT INTERACT
IN REFLECTIVE THINKING AND WRITING

One of the more fruitful debates in composition studies of late
has been over the relative importance of individual cognition and
social context in the writing process. On one side of the fence sit
cognitive theorists (Flower/ Kroll,^ Larson,^ Perl/ Sommers/ and
so on), who emphasize the thinking and composing strategies by
which successful writers make and communicate meaning. On the
other side sit social constructionists (Bartholomae,® Berlin,^
Berthoff,® Bizzell,® Bruffee,’° et cetera), who concern themselves
chiefly with the social contexts in which thinking and writing take
place.
Although proponents of the two schools frame what is being
debated somewhat differently, the following formulation more or less
captures the gist of that debate. Social constructionists basically
accuse cognitive theorists of holding a conception of language as
nothing more than a medium of communication which people use to
achieve purposes formed independently of their sociolinguistic
contexts, contexts which social constructionists believe are actually
the major determinants of how we think and act in the world.
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Cognitive theorists, in their turn, charge social constructionists with a
determinism that undervalues the role of the self-conscious individual
in negotiating among and between socially constrained options,
options which cognitive theorists admit may indeed shape a great deal
of our thinking but which do not override the capacity of individuals to
construct their own meanings and achieve their own purposes.
Part of what has made the debate a fruitful one is that it has
compelled both camps to refine and broaden their respective
conceptions in response to the shortcomings raised by the opposition.
Even more promising have been the overtures made on both sides
towards a model of writing in which cognition and context are
conceived as interacting components in a single, dynamic process.
Thus, cognitive process theorist Linda Flower advocates
a grounded vision that can place cognition in its context,
while celebrating the power of cognition to change that
context, in a theory so richly specified that it can
describe how individual writers develop those powers for
themselves.’^
And social constructionist James Berlin advances a "notion of rhetoric
as a political act involving a dialectical interaction engaging the
material, the social, and the individual writer, with language as the
agency of mediation."’^
Such overtures are encouraging. Yet, as the above quotations
suggest, both parties still tend to focus on their own particular
agendas, saying little that is specific (or constructive) about the

184

complementary" perspective. This phenomenon is largely the result
of the need to clarify misunderstandings which have arisen between
the two camps. Linda Flower, for example, devotes virtually the entire
second half of her most accommodating essay to date’^ essentially
to countering the charge that she construes her observation-based
theory as anything other than one possible rhetorical mode (albeit a
very fruitful one) among many. Although no comparably conciliatory
response has (as yet) come from the social constructionist camp,
proponents of that perspective^^ have made respectable efforts to
show that their socially-driven model, despite its relative determinism,
not only leaves room for but advocates individual choice. Although the
defensiveness of such responses may seem an obstacle to the
construction of a more interactive conception, it is in fact a positive
and necessary step, and signifies the desire on both sides to
communicate their perspectives in terms the other can understand.
The present essay supports such efforts and seeks to take them
one step further. Its primary aim is to suggest an interactive
conception of the writing process that cognitive theorists and social
constructionists alike might find plausible. The key to such a
conception, I believe, lies in the often-heard but rarely explored notion
that cognition and context, thought and language, operate in a
"dialectical" relationship with each other. While many composition
theorists share this hypothesis, it nevertheless needs considerable
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development, both conceptually and empirically. In particular, we need
to consider much more carefully than we have what we mean by it,
how it might manifest in the writing process, and what its implications
for writing instruction might be.
The present essay attempts to advance our conceptual
understanding of this dialectic in some small measure. It begins with
an analysis of the social constructionist critique that cognitive process
models underestimate the role context plays in forming ideas and
purposes. It next considers the cognitive theorists' charge that social
constructionist models do not adequately explain the role cognition
plays in navigating among and between alternative social and
linguistic contexts. In both cases, rejoinders are considered and
conclusions drawn about the validity and implications of the various
arguments.
The third part of the essay attempts to reconcile the dichotomy
by advancing the idea that cognition and context only make sense in
terms of one another, and that we thus diminish our conception of
both to the extent that we devalue either one. Cognition, I argue, can
no more be disembedded from context than context can be
understood as determining cognition. There are two reasons for this.
First, while the cognitive theorists' claim that the individual agent
constructs and communicates her own unique representations of
reality is true, formal and structural models of thinking and writing can
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never adequately represent the contextual nature of these processes
in practice. Second, while it is thus also true that all thinking and
writing are necessarily contextually situated, there is no such thing as
a definitive context. All contexts, including the knowledge and
discourse communities" into which we seek to "initiate" students,
are themselves indeterminate. Reflective inquiry and discourse are
precisely the attempt to make sense of this indeterminacy.
As the means by which we negotiate among indeterminate
contexts of experience, reflective inquiry and discourse are not so
rriuch general cognitive or contextually determined functions as they
are intercontextual ones. As such, they are constantly in the process
of inventing, reconstructing, and integrating themselves, and can only
be understood as entailing the interaction of cognition and context.
What such a conception means for writing instruction is
essentially this: that the key to teaching students to write
meaningfully is neither to provide them with formal problem-solving
strategies and heuristics nor to explain to them the discourse
conventions and concerns of a variety of knowledge communities
(though these are both important objectives); it is rather to provide
students with situations which they experience as both indeterminate
and socially compelling, thus motivating them to construct and
negotiate their own ways of knowing and communicating in order to
achieve psychologically and socially satisfying resolutions. Creating
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such conditions is primarily a matter of juxtaposing competing or
alternative interpretive frameworks that challenge students' habitual
ways of thinking and conversing. Such a pedagogy requires teachers
who are sensitive to both individual cognition and the multitude of
interpretive frameworks which characterize all human inquiry.

Limitations of Cognitive Formalism

A significant portion of the cognition/context debate has
revolved around Linda Flower and John Hayes's "cognitive process"
model of writing,^® widely regarded as the most comprehensive of
its kind.’® Based on the thinking-aloud protocols of writers engaged
in writing, the Flower-Hayes model seeks to describe the basic
cognitive processes which underlie all successful composing. The
model itself consists of three main divisions: the "task environment"
(or writing context), the "writer's long-term memory" (a sort of data
storage component), and the actual "writing processes" which guide
composing.
It is the "writing processes" which constitute the main subject
of Flower and Hayes's research, and Flower and Hayes divide these
processes into four main groups. "Planning" refers to the ways in
which writers formulate ideas and purposes, and is sub-divided into
"generating," "organizing," and "goal-setting." "Translating" denotes
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the putting of thoughts into language. "Reviewing" includes the
"evaluating" and "revising" of writing once it has been recorded. And
the

monitor is that part of the writer's mind which governs the

whole process, deciding which sub-processes to employ and when.
The Flower-Hayes model has been hailed generally for its
characterization of the writing process as a complex phenomenon
involving the "recursive" networking of distinctive but interrelated
sub-processes. What is controversial about the model is primarily the
way it disembeds cognitive processes from the sociolinguistic
contexts in which they necessarily operate. In describing the writing
process in terms of underlying cognitive processes, Flower and Hayes
assume that cognition can be usefully described in general terms,
outside the constraints of particular linguistic and social contexts.
In a process model, the major units of analysis are
elementary mental processes, such as the process of
generating ideas... One major advantage of identifying
these basic cognitive processes or thinking skills writers
use is that we can then compare the composing
strategies of good and poor writers. And we can look at
writing in a much more detailed way.’^
Pedagogically, Flower and Hayes's aim is to articulate a set of
basic cognitive processing tools which writers can use to generate,
communicate, and revise their own interpretations of experience.
By placing emphasis on the inventive power of the writer,
who is able to explore ideas, to develop, act on, test, and
regenerate his or her own goals, we are putting an
important part of creativity where it belongs -- in the
hands of the working, thinking writer.^®
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This disembedding of cognitive skills from their sociolinguistic
contexts has been the source of much controversy. Criticism has been
along several lines, with critics leveling charges of positivism, political
obfuscation, and educational insensitivity, to name a few. While these
charges are sometimes based on debatable interpretations of the
methods and motives of cognitive research, they all entail the
legitimate questioning of the formalist assumptions on which cognitive
theory is based. I will begin with the charge of positivism, as it is the
most misplaced.
Echoing Ann Berthoff's 1971 critique^® of Janice Lauer's
1970 essay, "Heuristics and Composition,”^® Patricia Bizzell takes
Flower and Hayes to task for pursuing the kind of positivistic certainty
that "is supposed to end all debate" on the grounds that they base
their model on "the supposedly unimpeachable evidence" of empirical
research.^’ Berthoff, too, in a 1984 essayrenews her earlier line
of attack when she argues.
Empiricists do not generally recognize that all method,
including scientific method, entails interpretation; they do
not generally recognize that there are no raw data; there
are no self-sufficient facts; there is no context-free
evaluation. Their method is not to recognize the fact that
all knowledge is mediated and that facts must be
formulated, but to proceed as if interpretation were
supererogatory.^®
Flower's response to such charges^'^ provides a most helpful
overview of what is in fact her non-positivistic approach to scientific
inquiry, and is required reading for anyone unfamiliar with the
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discourse conventions and knowledge-making procedures of empirical
research in the area of composition studies. Besides refuting the
charge of positivism, her exegesis illustrates that Flower views the
empirical approach to composition studies as only one possible mode
of inquiry and discourse - one that attempts to guard against its own
limitations by relying on communally-established procedures and
standards. As Flower puts it,
Terms such as "evidence," "results," and validity" are
loaded concepts to a reader entering the discourse. They
contribute to misunderstandings in part because their
meaning must be grasped in the context of specific
research methods. Seen in situ, they do not refer to
ultimates or absolutes, but to tools that help build more
persuasive arguments.^®
Flower goes on to explain how tests of "reliability" and "fit" are not
efforts at certainty but are rather methods for guarding against the
preconceived theoretical biases which researchers "inevitably,
constantly, and energetically impose ... on the data of experience."^®
"The point of all this," writes Flower, "is not to prove a claim but to
understand more about the strength and predictive power of the
patterns we have created.
In fact, the charge that cognitive researchers are on a
positivistic quest for empirical certainty is a red herring. All theory is
based on empirical evidence, and all theorists must assume a tentative
isomorphism between their models and objective reality; without this
assumption all inquiry would halt, just as it would if absolute certainty
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were ever claimed. Empirical research is simply one way of
proceeding, just as Frank D'Angelo's phenomenological approach^®
and James Berlin's historicist approach are others. "lAjrguments
based on the permanent rational structures of the universe ... should
not be accepted without question," writes Berlin.^® But Flower never
claims otherwise.
What is problematic about cognitive research is not its alleged
positivism, or even its supposed claim to a superior methodology.
(The tone of Flower's rationales, after all, has always been more
justificatory and defensive than incontestable or irrefutable. And one
can hardly fault her for the unwarranted faith which many people put
in "science" narrowly conceived, any more than one can fault social
constructionists for the unthinking relativism of college freshpersons
who hold "that every belief ... is as good as every other."®®)
What is really at issue here is the fruitfulness of a model which
postulates universal cognitive processes as providing the underlying
structure of all acts of composing. Flower believes that such a model
is useful because it offers a concrete means for empowering novice
writers regardless of the varied contexts in which specific acts of
writing take place. Social constructionists question the fruitfulness of
such an approach on the grounds that cognition cannot be separated
from the plurality of contexts which give it meaning and determine its
contents and functioning.
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In this regard, the major criticisms which social constructionists
have launched against the Flower-Hayes model are
(1)

that it ignores the generative force of language in
cognition,

(2)

that it does not account for the influence of the rhetorical
situation in invention, organization, and goal-setting.

(3)

that it neglects the interpretive, and hence generative,
function of discourse communities and their attendant
conventions.

(4)

that it overlooks the ways in which historically and
culturally embedded assumptions shape thinking.

(5)

that its alleged value-neutrality begs the ideological
question of which social and political arrangements it
supports.

(6)

that it is insensitive to the need - of poor writers in
particular - to learn discourse conventions and not to
"advance" cognitively.

and

(7)

that its pedagogy tends to put form before function.

In the years since Flower and Hayes first introduced their
cognitive procoss theory, Flower has responded to most of these
criticisms without substantially altering the original model. Most
notably, in "Cognition, Context, and Theory Building," she takes to
task her own early work with Hayes for failing "to account for how
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the situation in which the writer operates might shape composing."^’
Declaring "context cues cognition" as one of three major principles of
a more interactive conception, she outlines the many ways in which it
does so: from the unconscious cultural and linguistically embedded
assumptions people hold, to the specific goals, criteria, and strategies
which the rhetorical situation imposes on the individual writer.She
nevertheless defends her formal approach on the grounds that general
cognitive processes provide a powerful means for negotiating among
the constraints imposed by these contextual factors.
I want a framework that acknowledges the pressure and
the potential the social context can provide, at the same
time it explains how writers negotiate that context,
create their own goals, and develop a sense of
themselves as problem-solvers, speakers, or subjects
who create meaning and affect other people through their
writing.
As to why such an approach focuses on general problem
solving strategies as opposed to how people manipulate the
contextual elements of the rhetorical situation. Flower intimates that
observation-based theory can't really say anything useful about the
latter.
Cognitive action is often initiated in response to a cue
from the environment -- in response to an "ill-defined
problem" that the "solver" may have to define from
limited and ambiguous cues in the world around.
Research in cognition tends to concentrate on the
response of the individual rather than on the situational
cues, for obvious reasons: one can observe a writer's
actions with some clarity; however, the cues which
stimulated a given action often need to be inferred or
34
may even remain a mystery.
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Here lies the real limitation of Flower's approach, not in its
alleged attempt at certainty. In essence, she leaves the learning and
implementation of the contextual elements of the rhetorical situation
out of account. She does so apparently because she thinks useful
empirical generalizations about such processes cannot be made. While
It

should be said in Flower's defense that she has come to recognize

this limitation, one wonders why it should be any more difficult to
make inferences about how people manipulate the contextual
elements in a rhetorical situation than the cognitive ones (assuming
the two can even be separated). And even if it is more difficult, does
that mean we shouldn't try? Isn't this, after all, something like what
social constructionists do, for example, when they analyze discourse
conventions?
When social constructionists take this line of argument, they
are on solid ground. Bizzell states the point and it implications most
succinctly:
The Flower-Hayes model of writing ... cannot alone give
us a complete picture of the process. We might say that
if this model describes the form of the composing
process, the process cannot go on without the content
which is knowledge of the conventions of discourse
communities. In practice, however, form and content
cannot be separated in this way, since discourse
conventions shape the goals that drive the writing
process. To let the model stand alone as an account of
composing is to mask the necessity for the socially
situated knowledge without which no writing project gets
under way. The problems of letting this model stand
alone can be seen in the pedagogy emerging from Flower
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and Hayes's work. They are inclined to treat the model
itself as an heuristic...^®
Writing about heuristic-based models in general, John Gage
develops this last point:
In writing, the sort of competence we desire is not the
mere ability to exercise paradigmatic patterns, but the
ability to adjust and fine tune those means to fit
particular situations... The problem for teachers is not,
however, to factor the rules for making this adjustment
out of the composing process so that they can be taught
prescriptively, even though such factoring seems to be
the goal of much current research into the composing
process... We mislead our students and ourselves when
by our methods we imply that the difference between
knowing how to write and not knowing how to write is a
matter of being in possession of some secret
formula...^®
I resist absolute categorization, but such methods as
teach what I have called empty forms ... seem to
promulgate just such a faith in a priori, mechanistic
means of solving problems of knowledge and persuasion.
I disagree that, by idealizing the form, we can discover
the formula in which thought is presumed to be at its
objective best.®^
Flower's response to such criticisms, as already mentioned, has
been to acknowledge the role of context in idea and purpose
formation. However, as part of her effort to suggest how her model
can function within a more comprehensive framework made up of
many alternative approaches, she still chooses to put faith in the
notion of universal structures of the mind, as processes over which
students can exercise some conscious control. The corollary to
"context cues cognition" thus becomes "cognition mediates context,"
with the idea that it does so, at least in part, through the use of
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formal processes of problem solving and invention. The problem with
this solution is that it doesn't say enough about how cognition does
that. In other words, how does cognition apply these various
strategies in specific rhetorical situations? In essence, the formalism
of the model bypasses what is probably the most important function
of cognition as mediation: the way it negotiates the contextual factors
-- the needs of the relevant knowledge communities, the various
discourse conventions, the culturally embedded assumptions, etcetera
-- of the rhetorical situation.

Ambiguities of Sociolinauistic Determinism

As far as social constructionists are concerned, the
shortcomings of the cognitive process approach reside in cognitivists'
failure to grasp fully the ways in which sociolinguistic context
conditions thinking. Such conditioning, they maintain, occurs at
several levels, beginning with the generative force of language in
thought itself. According to social constructionists, language and
thought are linked in a way that cognitive process models disregard.
Language, they maintain, doesn't simply express our thoughts; it
profoundly affects what we think. Bizzell, for example, objects to the
separation of planning and translating in the Flower-Hayes model.
During planning, the writer generates and organizes ideas
before struggling to put them into words. Language itself
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is not seen as having a generative force in the planning
process, except insofar as it stands as a record of the
current progress of the writer's thinking in "text
produced so far." Planning processes, therefore, have to
be elaborated because they are all the writer has to guide
her toward a solution to the particular writing problem.
What's missing here is the connection to social context
afforded by recognition of the dialectical relationship
between thought and language.^®
Bizzell cites Lev Vygotsky's conception of this dialectic:
At first, language use and thinking develop separately in
the child. But eventually the child comes to understand
that language not only names ideas but develops and
evaluates them... The child's linguistic and cognitive
development culminates in "verbal thought," which "is
not a natural, innate form of behavior but is determined
by a historical-cultural process..." To illustrate the mature
relationship between thought and language, Vygotsky
uses situations that are strongly context-bound, such as
conversations between lovers or among actors In a
play.®®
Bizzell goes on to argue that Vygotsky's analysis advises against
separating planning and translating in "describing adult language-using
because these activities are never separate in adult language¬
using. •I 40
In fact, however, Vygotsky's position is extremely complex and
open to other interpretations. For Vygotsky, the convergence of
thought and language is indeed a culminating step in the child s
linguistic and cognitive development, an achievement which Vygotsky
remarks upon as the feature which most distinguishes humans from
other mammals.But it is hardly the culminating step in the adult s
linguistic and cognitive development, which, according to him, is in
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fact marked by the increasing differentiation of two forms of verbal
thought: inner speech and social speech (both oral and written).
What Vygotsky^^ is illustrating in the context-bound examples
to which Bizzell refers is in fact the separate structure and function of
these two forms of verbal thought. True, inner speech remains a form
of verbal thought, and Vygotsky even holds that one of its semantic
peculiarities is the preponderance of the contextual sense of words
over their dictionary meanings.'^^ But he nevertheless regards inner
speech as an autonomous speech function, one which is in turn
supported by a more inward plane of verbal thought still: thought
itself. "The flow of thought," he writes, "is not accompanied by a
simultaneous unfolding of speech. The two processes are not
identical, and there is no rigid correspondence between the units of
thought and speech.
Vygotsky's research on transfer, moreover, coupled with his
criticisms of Thorndike in this regard,'*® led him to postulate that
awareness, abstraction, and control are general and transferable
characteristics of all the higher cognitive functions. All these passages
suggest that it may in fact be fruitful to separate planning and
translating in describing the way people write, though the full
implications of Vygotsky's analysis remain unclear.
At the very least, Vygotsky's research does suggest that any
attempt to circumvent context in describing the writing process wiil
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lead to an incomplete description. But Flower already acknowledges
this fact. Social constructionists, however, are prone to overstate the
case by denying the usefulness of postulating formal structures of
reasoning altogether. "[Oluter-directed theorists," writes Bizzell,
believe that universal, fundamental structures can't be taught;
thinking and language use can never occur free of a social context
that conditions them."'^®
In fact, this argument is a non sequitur; the undeniable
contextuality of thought and language does not preclude the existence
of universal structures of reasoning any more than the specific skills
involved in hitting a tennis ball preclude the existence of the general
skill of "keeping one's eye on the ball." While the specific
manifestations of this general skill necessarily vary from sport to sport
(e.g., from tennis to baseball to golf -- to all of which this skill is
crucial), the skill remains a transferable one, given that the individual
can make the connection. A minimum condition for making the
connection is, of course, that one learn the peculiarities of the
relevant sport, just as one needs to learn the discourse conventions of
the relevant knowledge community in order to think and write within
its interpretive framework. But the fact that the skill has peculiar
manifestations does not contravene its existence. By the same token,
the fact that all thinking is contextual does not rule out the existence
of general thinking processes, though it does raise the question of
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how far a formal model can take us. In postulating such structures,
however. Flower is really only suggesting that a knowledge of general
cognitive processes can increase a writers's awareness and control of
what he's about (her tendency to rely on them too heavily
notwithstanding).
In defending her approach against the charge that the
postulation of universal structures is fruitless. Flower maintains that
social constructionists have yet to specify a constructive alternative
which can explain the power of the individual to make choices within
the constraints imposed by context.
If we would understand how cognition and context
interact, we cannot remain satisfied with speculative
theories based only on abstract social or political
imperatives... Nor can we rely on contributions that offer
us only a deconstruction or critique without offering in
turn a substantive -- and in some way substantiated —
alternative.
More precisely. Flower maintains that social constructionists
have yet to "face the troubled issue of intentionality[:] Are writers
'determined' by their situation, or do they 'control' the meanings they
make...?"'*®
Social theorists who attack the illusion of control, who
would locate purpose in the unconscious and dismiss the
ephemera of cognition, have a special agenda -- to
understand why context and culture controls us as much
as it does. Writing researchers and educators may be
quite happy to acknowledge such forces, but their
agenda is not to explicate or reify them. Rather it is to
ask where, within this looming landscape of internalized
forces we do not control, does human agency and
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so?^®

insert itself? And when it does, how does it do

The fact is, social constructionist approaches in general remain
extremely vague about the role of individual cognition in overcoming
the constraints of social and linguistic determinism. Flower cites peer
response as a case in point.
Peer response places writing in a teacher-designed
community of response. If we see writing as a social,
context-driven event, this instructional move makes
sense because it seems to enact our image of writing as
a social, cultural process, happening within a classroom
community. But what is happening to the cognition of
individual students in this instructional context?... It
seems naive to assume that the cognitive processes we
desire will naturally follow from the social situations we
engineer.®®
The excessive claims of peer response advocates (of which I
nonetheless consider myself one) is a subject in itself (and one which I
take up in the next chapter). So it is enough for now to note the
accuracy of Flower's critique. In "Collaborative Learning and the
'Conversation of Mankind'," Kenneth Bruffee advances what is to
date the most ambitious attempt at a theoretical rationale for the
alleged "necessity" of peer collaboration. Yet, although he refers
repeatedly to knowledge-making as a process of "socially justifying
belief" within a "community of knowledgeable peers," he really says
very little about what that process entails, either in the minds of
individuals or, for that matter, communally (though the little he does
say®^ helps). Moreover, his rationale for why peer collaboration will
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stimulate students to "sociallv justify belief is based on the highly
dubious Claim that reflective thought is not only the product of social
conversation but is functionally the same. In support of this claim,
Bruffee, like Bizzell, alludes to Vygotsky's conception of the
relationship of thought and language, somehow missing the fact that
for Vygotsky not only is the "dialectic" of thought and language a
two-way street (neither being the product of the other) but "(ilnner
speech is not the interior aspect of external speech - it is a function
in Itself."” Here we see another example of the tendency of social
constructionists to emphasize sociolinguistic context at the expense
of an account of individual cognition.
One of the strongest theoretical statements to come from the
social constructionist camp of the relationship between sociolinguistic
context and individual cognition comes from Berlin.In order to
grasp his model it is helpful to visualize it schematically. (What
follows is my own representation; I do not guarantee its
correspondence to Berlin's conception.) Picture three equally
interlocking circles (the Ballantine beer logo) surrounded by two
concentric circles. The interlocking circles represent the individual self,
the material conditions of reality, and the social group or discourse
community in which the individual is functioning. The curved triangle
where the circles intersect represents knowledge. The smaller of the
two concentric circles represents language -- the medium through
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which the three interacting elements and their interactions, including
knowledge, are understood and constructed. And the larger circle
represents the social-historical moment in which all the other
components are situated.
Berlin describes his conception as follows (I quote him at length
so that readers may judge for themselves the accuracy of my
representation):
[T]he real is located in a relationship that involves the
dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse
community (social group) in which the observer is
functioning, and the material conditions of existence.
Knowledge is never found in any one of these but can
only be posited as a product of the dialectic in which all
three come together... Most important, this dialectic is
grounded in language: the observer, the discourse
community, and the material conditions of existence are
all verbal constructs. This does not mean that the three
do not exist apart from language: they do. This does
mean that we cannot talk and write about them indeed, we cannot know them - apart from language.
Furthermore, since language is a social phenomenon that
is a product of a particular historical moment, our notions
of the observing self, the communities in which the self
functions, and the very structures of the material world
are social constructions -- all specific to a particular time
and culture. These social constructions are thus inscribed
in the very language we are given to inhabit in
responding to our experience.
In elaborating on this initial description, Berlin anticipates the
objection that the model leaves little room for individual agency.
The self is always a creation of a particular historical and
cultural moment. This is not to say that individuals do
not ever act as individuals. It is to assert, however, that
they never act with complete freedom. As Marx
indicated, we make our own histories, but we do not
make them just as we wish.®®
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He goes on to explain that while consciousness is constrained by the
material conditions of reality, it can also affect that reality, but that it
always does so through the interpretive framework of one or another
discourse community. At the same time, however, according to Berlin,
communities themselves can be affected not only by the constraints
imposed on them by material reality but by individuals as well: "The
community in turn is influenced by the subject and the material
conditions of the moment."^®
The passage thus suggests a conception of self, material
reality, and discourse community as more or less equivalent forces in
a single dynamic interaction. It thus comes as some surprise (though
not really, given his initial description -- the one I have tried to
represent pictorially) that his next step is to situate this entire
interaction within the constraints imposed by socially-determined
language-using practices.
Thus, the perceiving subject, the discourse communities
of which the subject is a part, and the material world
itself are all the constructions of an historical discourse,
of the ideological formulations inscribed in the languagemediated practical activity of a particular time and
place.
Exactly what Berlin intends here is a bit confusing. On the one
hand he ascribes to individuals the ability to affect the discourse
communities to which they belong. On the other he declares that
process itself to be constrained by socially-determined language-using
practices, as if to imply that some larger sociolinguistic force
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supervenes not only over the individual and her interactions with
material reality but over the individual's interactions with
sociolinguistic context as well.
Knowledge, after all, is an historically bound social
fabrication rather than an eternal and invariable
phenomenon located in some uncomplicated repository -in the material object or in the subject or in the social
realm.®®
One is led to wonder not only how knowledge can be a social
fabrication without residing in the social realm but just what the
producer of knowledge is in this scheme. Is knowledge a product of
the interaction of individual consciousnesses, the knowledge
communities to which individuals belong, and the material conditions
of reality? Or is it the product of socially-determined language using
practices? Or is it the result of some larger, historically-bound
sociolinguistic force? And if there is such a force, of what is it
comprised if not of the interaction of individuals, the multitude of
knowledge communities to which individuals belong, and the material
conditions of reality (of which, it should be pointed out, people, social
groups, and written marks and spoken sounds are all a part)? And,
concerning the issue at hand, what exactly is the role of individual
cognition in this scheme? Berlin should be given his due for
articulating a model which raises such difficult and thought-provoking
questions; unlike many Marxian influenced accounts, his is no simple
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diatribe against the inequities and lack of political sophistication of
conventional approaches. But the above questions still remain.
As part of his effort to offer a constructive alternative to
cognitive-based models, Berlin cites the critical learning approach of
Ira Shor®® as the pedagogical manifestation of his social-epistemic
rhetoric. In so doing, he again attempts to come to terms with what
Flower refers to as "the troubled issue of intentionality[:] Are writers
determined' by their situation, or do they 'control' the meanings they
make...?" Berlin writes:
Shor ... situates the individual within social processes,
examining in detail the interferences to critical thought
that would enable "students to be their own agents for
social change, their own creators of democratic
culture"...®®
The self ... is regarded as the product of a dialectical
relationship between the individual and the social, each
given significance by the other. Self-autonomy and selffulfillment are thus possible not through becoming
detached from the social, but through resisting those
social influences that alienate and disempower, doing so,
moreover, in and through social activity.®^
While I appreciate this stressing of the need to develop
consciousness through social activity, what puzzles me about this
scheme is the ambiguous account of individual agency it advances.
Who or what is resisting these interferences to critical thought? What
is it that these negative social influences are alienating from what? In
overcoming these influences what agency is at work? What is the
difference between detachment and resistance? How do we know the
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difference between "false consciousness” and "liberated"
consciousness -- i.e., how do we know we are resisting — if not
through some form of detachment? Throughout this exegesis Berlin
seems to affirm the capacities of individuals to achieve selfconsciousness and to act autonomously at the same time that he
denies them.
Like so much Marxist-based theory, what this entire account
seems to demonstrate is the inherent contradiction of its own
determinism:
(1)

Social arrangements determine ideology.

(2)

Only a change in ideology can alter social
arrangements.

(3)

Therefore, while change through human agency
should be impossible, it is possible.

It would seem that in declaring the ability of individuals to resist the
influence of social and linguistic context, Berlin essentially replaces
the premise that cognition is conditioned by context with the premise
that it is only conditioned by context to some extent. If such is the
case, what remains unclear is the basis on which individual agency
rests -- one of the very things Flower attempts to explain with her
postulation of universal structures of reasoning.
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The Indeterminacy of Context’
The Intercontextualitv of Connitinn

Whatever Berlin's actual intent, one thing remains evident:
social constructionists reject the idea of universal cognitive structures
which can be formulated and taught outside particular sociolinguistic
contexts. It is just as evident, however, that they do want to
acknowledge the role of individual cognition in mediating context, just
as Flower wants to acknowledge the role of social context in
generating and organizing ideas and forming purposes. The problem is
that neither has given an account of how cognition and context
interact that satisfies the other.
There is, however, a way of looking at the interplay of
cognition and context which unites in a single interactive theory the
full range of ways in which context cues cognition as well as the role
of cognition in mediating context. It begins from the premise, common
to both cognitive process and social constructionist frameworks, that
all encounters between cognition and context are mediated (to
whatever extent) by community-generated, language-based
interpretive frameworks. What neither social constructionists nor
cognitive theorists seem to have fully considered - though they both
touch on it at times - is that these interpretive frameworks are
themselves indeterminate, as are the knowledge and discourse
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communities to which they are connected. It is within the context of
this indeterminacy that cognition takes on its mediating function -- not
as a formal problem solving agent, but as an agent of the
reconstructive integration of otherwise discrete and indeterminate
ways of interpreting experience.
As social constructionists frequently point out, some
community-generated interpretive framework always stands between
the individual and experience. "'[R]eality,'" writes Bizzell, "only makes
sense when organized by the interpretive conventions of a discourse
community."®^ But the fact is, there is no such thing as a definitive
interpretive framework which can cope with all the permutations of
experience. Anomalies are always present; what makes sense in one
context falls short in another. As a result, no individual subscribes to
only one Interpretive framework but has present within her interpretive
repertoire a multitude of frameworks. Inevitably, what are otherwise
discrete frameworks for interpreting experience come into conflict,
and the individual must negotiate some sort of resolution, either by
adopting one or the other of these frameworks, or by constructing a
more encompassing framework which integrates the elements of the
previous ones.
Something like this same process goes on at the social level.
Each person's experience is necessarily unique, and no two individuals
construe their experience in exactly the same way. Although the ways
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in which people interpret experience are learned -- not only from other
people but from the dominant culture — there is no single framework
which can successfully explain all aspects of experience, just as there
is no person who is subject to the influence of only one framework.
The dominant ideology of a society is a powerful force, but even
sociolinguistic determinists acknowledge that resistance is possible.
To get at the source of that resistance, however, it is not necessary
to postulate some innate capacity for self-consciousness which
transcends cultural and historical conditioning (though in the last
analysis I personally don't see how we could resist that conditioning
otherwise). All that's needed is the recognition that no interpretive
framework is omnipotent or omnipresent. Ideological conditioning in
some degree is a fact of life, one which we must constantly resist.
Fortunately, the possibility that any single ideological framework could
be everywhere at once or seem to provide all the answers is unlikely
(as long as we don't assume that it's too unlikely). In short,
indeterminacy is a pervasive characteristic of experience - one,
moreover, that we should embrace.
In an effort to make sense of this indeterminacy and to control
the flow of experience, individuals come together and seek to
construct ways of talking that they can agree on. But these attempts
also fall short, with the result that no discourse community is
monolithic; no two people within the same community subscribe to
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exactly the same interpretive framework, nor do they as individuals
subscribe to only one framework or belong to only that one
community. In fact, not only is there no one-to-one correspondence
between discourse communities and interpretive frameworks but
neither are there any standard conditions for defining any discourse
community as such. And any community that could establish such
conditions would have ceased to be an instrument of human inquiry
and growth. The term "discourse community" is in fact a
convenience, a linguistic and interpretive construct. It refers to an
approximate network of people who have agreed to use certain
interpretive and language-using frameworks, even while recognizing
that there can never be total agreement about those frameworks, and
that their whole purpose in coming together is eventually to supplant
those frameworks with more comprehensive ones.
Human experience is thus saturated with indeterminacies which
we negotiate by means of a multitude of interpretive frameworks
which are themselves indeterminate. If we accept this premise (which
I take to be the basis of John Dewey's pragmatic theory of inquiry,®^
as well as the foundation of Richard Rorty's "edifying" philosophy®'^),
then the only possible role cognition can have as a producer of
knowledge is that of constructing mediating connections between
what are otherwise discrete interpretive frameworks (what Rorty calls
"hermeneutics"®^). Reflective inquiry and discourse, according to this
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scheme, are the deliberate attempt to construct just such integrating
connections - the "ideal" aim being to construct a comprehensive
picture of how this multitude of interpretive frameworks hangs
together.®® Cognitivism and social constructionism thus become two
different perspectives for viewing the same intercontextual process:
the ongoing construction and reconstruction of ever more integrated
knowledge systems. This process entails not so much the application
of general cognitive strategies or the utilization of determinate (or
normal ) discourse conventions as it does the intercontextual
reconstruction and integration of otherwise discrete and indeterminate
ways of interpreting experience, what is sometimes called "abnormal
discourse."

Educational Implications

Flower and Bizzell both remark on institutional failures to
provide the necessary conditions for students to respond appropriately
to college writing assignments:
Academics are, perhaps, too ready to assume that such
operations as 'describe' or 'analyze' are self-evident,
when in fact they have meanings specific to the
academic discourse community and specific to disciplines
within that community... To help poor writers, then, we
need to explain that their writing takes place within a
community, and to explain what the community's
conventions are.®^
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Teachers ... hope the holy words of college assignments
(e.g., 'analyze,' 'interpret') will cue the bundle of
intellectual maneuvers every student should have learned.
But 'transfer' is a perennial problem in education in part
because the context of a new class may fail to cue a
student to use strategies which are appropriate, but were
learned elsewhere in a different context... [Clould meta¬
knowledge and awareness of one's own process play a
role in expanding the cues students perceive and the
options they entertain?®®
In the passage above, Bizzell proposes to rectify the problems
of poor and inexperienced writers by explaining to them the discourse
conventions and concerns of the relevant knowledge communities.
Flower's solution is to provide them with general problem solving
strategies and inventional heuristics which would help students
respond to situational cues. Bizzell seems to think that if students are
first made familiar with the conventions and concerns of discourse
communities, they will then know how to respond to the problems of
those communities. Flower seems to think that if students are made
aware of their own cognitive options, they will then know how to
apply those options in specific situations.
Both recommendations miss that the problem of inappropriate
student responses lies not so much in students' lack of specific
knowledge or general cognitive skills {although either lack can
certainly be a sufficient cause for failure. II prefer to think of
■•cognitive skills," incidentally, as "intellectual habits," as opposed to
some kind of "developmental structures.")) Rather, "student" failure
lies more in the fact that the assignments in such cases have no
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particular meaning for students themselves. The task is prescribed by
an outside agent, the teacher, who tries to provide students with the
necessary background and tools to cope with it. Such assignments fail
students because they do not elicit doubt about an indeterminacy
which the students themselves perceive: they only produce doubt
about how to attend to the task at hand. Discourse conventions and
problem solving strategies thus become tools for completing tasks
assigned by someone else, rather than means for making sense of the
indeterminacies of students' own interpretations of experience.
Meaningful writing doesn't come from discourse communities
and their conventions. Nor does it come from problem solving
strategies and heuristics. It comes from mind deliberately making
sense of the indeterminacies of experience. To enjoin someone to
"analyze," "discuss," or "interpret" some allegedly problematic
situation about which she has not herself experienced a state of doubt
is misguided. Neither making students aware that other people think
something is problematic nor making them aware of their own options
in solving such problems is going to make students adopt such
problems as their own. The difficulties of poor writers aren't
overcome by teaching these things. They are solved by designing
assignments which induce in students themselves doubt about how to
interpret experience, thus compelling students to construct their own
solutions. Such a method requires that we focus our attention not on

215

individual cognition or sociolinguistic context but on the interaction of
the two. In short, it means that we must attend to the ways in which
the indeterminacies of academic discourse lead students to construct
their own interpretive frameworks through the mutual reconstruction
of their own active belief systems and the discourse conventions
which they encounter.
A key principle here thus becomes that all learning entails
abnormal discourse, even the learning of normal discourse
conventions, a point upon which Bruffee remarks in promoting his
notion of collaborative learning:
[Elntering an existing knowledge community involves a
process of negotiation. Followed to its logical conclusion
this principle implies that education is not a rite a
passage in which students passively become initiated
into an institution that is monolithic and unchanging. It
implies that the means by which students learn to
negotiate this entry ... models how knowledge is
generated, how it changes and grows.®®
"Abnormal discourse is therefore necessary to learning," Bruffee later
goes on to say, although it cannot be taught directly.
What we can teach are the tools of normal discourse...
To leave openings for change, however, we must not
teach these tools as universals. We must teach ... in
such a way that, when necessary, students can turn to
abnormal discourse in order to undermine their own and
other people's reliance on ... normal discourse. We must
teach the use of these tools in such a way that students
can set them aside ... for the purpose of generating new
knowledge, for the purpose, that is, of reconstituting
knowledge communities in more satisfactory ways.^°
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While I am in basic agreement with Bruffee on these points,
there is a complication here which he doesn't seem to have fully
considered. If students can only learn the conventions of normal
discourse by means of abnormal discourse, then they cannot be
expected to do so by means of normal discourse, although that is
what Bruffee, like Bizzell, seems to be proposing. What distinguishes
Bruffee s recommendations from Bizzell's, however, (though I'm quite
sure she would agree with him on this point -- and rightly so) is his
suggestion that normal discourse should be taught "in such a way"
that it can become abnormal discourse. For Bruffee, that way is
"collaborative learning." But collaborative learning, as he describes it,
is an extremely vague notion ranging anywhere from students talking
together about their writing to the very process of thought itself.
Bruffee blurs the meaningful distinctions which could be drawn
between these manifestations for the sake of advancing his dubious
argument that students must work together in collaborative groups in
order to embody the principle that knowledge-making is a social
activity. Unfortunately, what gets shortchanged is an account of the
role of cognition as the intercontextual mediator of otherwise discrete
and indeterminate ways of interpreting experience, the sort of account
which I have tried to give here.
What an intercontextual account of cognition suggests is that
the means to teaching normal discourse so that it can become
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abnormal discourse is, in fact, abnormal discourse itself (of which peer
collaboration is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition’’), the
reason being that all discourse communities are themselves
indeterminate. What makes them communities is that the people who
write and speak within them are deliberately trying to negotiate an
integrated picture of how their otherwise diverse and indeterminate
ways of constructing experience hang together. That process may
involve, among other things, direct challenges to another member's
interpretations and choice of language, but it is still driven by a desire
to communicate and negotiate an alternative vision.
What such an account also suggests, then, is that more
important than the particular conventions students learn and even the
particular interpretations they construct are the active habits of
reconstructive discourse and inquiry they acquire. In other words,
more than introducing students to new discourse communities, we
want to instill in them the desire and means to negotiate such
connections themselves as an ongoing function in their lives. And we
do this chiefly by demonstrating to students
-- through challenges to their active, social belief structures -- the
desirability of ongoing, reflective inquiry and discourse.
The teacher's job is thus not so much that of providing problem
solving strategies or explaining discourse conventions as it is of
creating a learning environment that induces in students doubt about
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what to believe or do. Since reflective thinking and discourse do not
originate in social contexts or in individual cognition but in the
interaction of the two, there are two conditions of such an
environment. The first is that the indeterminacies with which teachers
present students be indeterminacies which students themselves feel.
Since no two people construct their experience in precisely the same
way, this necessarily requires some flexibility on the teacher's part.
Teachers must themselves be students of their students' cognitive
processes -- of the ways in which students construct and reconstruct
their own interpretive and language-using frameworks. Formal
processing models can play an important role here, but they should
not obscure the fact that it is the unique ways in which individuals
manage the particular elements of specific rhetorical contexts and
their own prior experience that is the greater concern. More important
still are the intellectual and communicative habits which students
acquire in the process of negotiating these constructions.
Fortunately, although the ways in which individuals construct
their experience are ultimately unique, general patterns do exist, and
individuals can be roughly categorized according to learning style,
interests, background, etc. I'm not proposing any absolute
categorization. I'm merely pointing out that with teaching experience
comes the recognition of similarities in the ways students learn, and in
the ways we can facilitate that learning. For example, in challenging
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students to negotiate their way between competing interpretive
frameworks, we invariably see that some students form strong
opinions without giving due consideration to alternative viewpoints,
while others give proper consideration to alternatives but are unable or
unwilling to formulate an interpretation of their own. Generally
speaking, what we try to do is find ways to get the first type of
student to see the shortcomings of their interpretations and the
second type of student the strengths of theirs. Both strategies depend
on maneuvering students into positions where they experience doubt
about what to believe or do.
This brings us to the second condition of a successful learning
environment. In order that students might develop the ability to share
their interpretations and purposes with others, it is not enough to
present them with indeterminacies only they perceive. The context of
learning must be social; it must involve the shared concerns and
purposes of some community or communities. Peer collaboration in its
many forms (peer response, coauthoring, workshopping, etcetera) can
play an important role here. Its use, however, should not obscure the
fact that it isn't the social arrangements per se which are thought
provoking; it is the interaction of a structuring mind with a context
which that mind perceives as indeterminate. Discourse necessarily
involves the needs of some community, but that community need not
be the other students in a class. Indeed (as I argue in the next
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chapter), it is far more important that students be exposed to the
concerns of discourse communities beyond the scope represented in
the immediate needs and interests of their peers. It is important that
they see the ways in which their own habits of thinking and language¬
using can be situated within those communities, and that they begin
building their own unique interpretive frameworks through the mutual
reconstruction of those larger communities' frameworks and their own
active belief systems.
The same holds true for the teaching of discourse conventions.
Explaining the conventions of alternative discourse communities to
students plays a role in their learning to negotiate their way within
and between those communities. But it should not obscure the fact
that students must ultimately negotiate the connections themselves.
Students learn that writing takes place in communities by reading and
writing within and for those communities, and they learn the
conventions the same way. Although explaining comes into play,
students learn conventions of writing and thinking chiefly by trying
them out and revising them as necessary. That "necessity" arises
from giving them assignments which require students to write within
a social context that elicits doubt in students' own minds about what
to believe or do. Again, the key principle here is that it is neither
context nor cognition that elicits reflective activity but the interaction
of the two.
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As long as this principle is deliberately respected and
systematically attended to, there is really no limit to the ways in
which students can be taught to think and write. Some varied
examples of instructional approaches which attempt, in my mind, to
do so include Berthoff's use of assignments which force students to
reevaluate their perceptions in the light of new contexts,^^ Gage's
use of enthymeme as a tool for making sense of discrete viewpoints
in a stasis, or indeterminate rhetorical situation,Annette
Rottenberg s employment of the Toulmin model (which is essentially
enthymemic) to specific social issues which students find
compelling,James Reither and Douglas Vipond's nurturing of
reflective inquiry and discourse within a scholarly field through
collaborative projects,^® Kenneth Dowst's epistemic approach,^®
Charles Kay Smith's rhetoric of reperception,and Marilyn Coopers'
ecological approach.^® Indeed, most any approach that I have read
about can work; what distinguishes the ones I have just mentioned,
however, is that they all make, or speak of the need to make, specific
provisions for an indeterminate rhetorical situation which fosters
intercontextual thinking and writing, rather than leaving such a
situation to chance. They all acknowledge, in short, that learning can
only occur where there is the interaction of individual cognition and
social context.
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Near the beginning of this essay I wrote that cognition can no
more be disembedded from context than context can be understood
as determining cognition. The reason this is so is that cognition and
context produce one another. Context cannot determine cognition
because, as a human and social artifact, it is itself indeterminate;
cognition cannot be disembedded from context because, as a product
of social interaction, it is itself intercontextual. In a very real sense,
cognition and context are the same thing; cognitivism and
constructionism are but two ways of looking at the same interactive
process -- a process about which a great deal more needs to be said.
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CHAPTER 6

PERSONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL RESERVATIONS
ABOUT COLLABORATIVE LEARNING

University faculty from across the disciplines are increasingly
turning to collaborative learning" as an alternative to more traditional
modes of instruction. The term itself denotes a general pedagogical
style which emphasizes cooperation -- either among students or
between students and faculty — as the basic mode of learning.’
Founded on the premise that learning is fundamentally a social
process, collaborative learning seeks to replicate that process in the
classroom. In practice, it can take the form of small-group exercises,
collaborative research projects, peer-review methods, cooperative
course development, or reconfigured lecture formats - to name some
of the more widely used techniques.^
I have no intention here of raising the usual doubts about
collaborative learning - that it usurps the teacher's authority, that it
sacrifices coverage of course content in favor of student involvement,
that it asks of students more initiative and commitment than they can
give, that I've tried it and it hasn't worked. During the two years that
I worked as an instructional consultant advising university faculty and
teaching assistants from a range of disciplines, I heard these and
similar objections many times. Yet I probably recommended that
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teachers try making their classes more collaborative as often as any
other piece of advice. I personally developed confidence in the
effectiveness of collaborative techniques during a six year stint
teaching freshman composition in a university writing program noted
for its advocacy of peer group methods. So when I raise my doubts
about collaborative learning, I do so as a proponent of its techniques
but as someone who is nevertheless reluctant to jump on the
collaborative bandwagon.
My reservations about collaborative learning stem primarily from
too many of its proponents ascribing to it educative powers it doesn't
necessarily possess. In saying this I do not mean to deny those
powers which it does possess but merely to suggest that we have not
yet made an adequate effort to ask what those powers might in fact
be. Far too often the objections which I listed at the outset of this
essay are presented as the only possible ones, as if the only real
grounds for questioning collaboration as a mode of learning are that
one isn't comfortable with it or that one doesn't get it. Such an
assumption leads to treating all objections as something to be refuted
rather than as possible guides to further inquiry.
Unsuccessful efforts to teach collaboratively, for instance, are
often diagnosed as having neglected to provide adequate direction or
structure. But it is peer collaboration and not the type of direction or
structure employed to which good results, when they do occur, are
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frequently attributed. In research circles this type of inductive mistake
is known as the confounding of variables, though one needn't be an
empiricist to see the error: unless one controls the variables (and in
this case I'm not sure we can), there is no reliable way of inferring
which results follow from which technique.
The truth is I have a good deal of faith in teachers' ability to
know if what they're doing is working or not. But when I hear
colleagues persist in extolling the virtues of any particular technique
over all others, then I begin to worry. I'm all for playing what Peter
Elbow.calls the "believing game,"^ but to play it exclusively with
one's own convictions is not what I think he had in mind. The virtue
of suspending disbelief is that it leads to new ideas. But to increase
the power of those ideas we need to play the doubting game -- to
entertain objections, to explore limitations, to seek counterexamples,
and so on. Indeed, doing so is necessary to the believing game itself,
as new ideas do not arise in a vacuum but can only do so in the
context of some doubt.
By no means am I saying, then, that there's anything wrong
with allowing, encouraging, and even requiring students to work in
groups. On the contrary, I believe there are good pedagogical reasons
for doing so. What I am saying is that I don't think we yet know what
those reasons are as weil as we might think we do. Without a clear
understanding of what collaborative learning does and, just as
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importantly, does not do, we lack a coherent sense of which
techniques to employ, at which points in the learning process, and
with which students. Rather than being viewed as objections, then,
my reservations should be taken as part of a more general effort to
increase our understanding and control of collaborative pedagogy.
Proponents of collaborative learning generally attribute to it
three related learning outcomes; increased responsibility for learning,
the understanding that knowledge is socially constructed, and the
development of higher order reasoning skills (by which is meant
primarily the ability to construct and negotiate alternative
interpretations of experience both within and between established
knowledge/discourse communities). My own experience and
ruminations lead me to a more cautious position; while collaborative
techniques are excellent motivators and promoters of intellectual
tolerance, the development of higher order reasoning in socially
significant contexts depends far more on the learning task and how it
is structured than on face-to-face interactions with peers. Peer
collaboration in its many forms is extremely useful in the teaching of
reflective, dialogical thinking. But far more important is a learning
environment which is structured so as to sustain and regulate the
interplay of doubt and belief in students' reasoning. While
collaborative techniques almost invariably enhance such an
environment, there is nothing about them per se which provides one.
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Neither do they offer the best kind of practice in constructing and
negotiating alternative interpretations of experience, though they do
provide a useful context in which students can experiment with
unfamiliar interpretive and linguistic frameworks.

Personal Reservations

I arrived at these notions by two related paths. The first is my
own experience as a student and teacher in various collaborative
settings. The second is through my theoretical explorations of college
teaching and learning in my home discipline of educational philosophy.
Though the two accounts overlap, I'll begin with the first.

Mv Experience as a Student

My earliest recollection of collaborative learning is as a teenager
in a progressive Long Island high school in the late 1960's. At the
first meeting of our eighth grade science class, Mr. Marganoff
announced that we would spend the next nine months working in
groups: conducting experiments, formulating hypotheses, analyzing
results, and coming to some sort of consensus about our conclusions.
Our first task was to identify fifteen minerals on the basis of their
various properties. Though there was only one "right answer, I don t
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recall being graded on it. We didn't hand in any overly formal
presentation, either. What I do remember is the spirit of cooperation
and friendly competition that permeated the room like the late morning
sun. When the Apollo mission landed on the moon a short time later, I
don t think a single person from that class missed that this was a
shared accomplishment, one made possible by a massive group effort,
and one in which we felt we had almost played a part.
Collaborative learning made its way into the English curriculum,
too. I remember the year it happened: 1970. One semester Mr. Blake
was lecturing to us about images of light and darkness in Hamlet: the
next we were reading Jerry Farber's The Student as Niooer.'* forming
collaborative groups from which to launch related inquiries of our own
choosing, and convening as a class to "rap" about our ongoing
explorations. This class was anything but the "authoritarianindividualist" experience described by Kenneth Bruffee in "The Way
Out."® Indeed, to paraphrase something which John Dewey once
overheard in a child-centered classroom in the 1920's, my attitude
towards this class can be summed up by the following question which
I once put to Mr. Blake: "Do we have to work in groups today?"
(Dewey's tidbit is a good deal more quotable: "Do we have to do
what we want today?") I didn't learn much in the way of content that
year. And I didn't learn much about collaboration as a form of
knowledge making, either. What 1 did get out of the class I got "on
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my own, that is, without much input from my peers or teacher. In
the vacuum left by a teacher who saw all external structure as a form
of coercion, I spent my time exploring Eastern philosophy, an area for
which I still hold much interest.
I m led to wonder what the difference between these two
experiences is. Perhaps it was the relative lack of structure or
guidance provided by the English teacher. Or it could have been the
absence of any specific task in his class. While I think these are both
appropriate answers, I think the most distinguishing feature between
the two classes was the deficiency in the English class — for me -- of
any shared sense of purpose with the other people in the class. I can
remember other class members enjoying and looking forward to their
collaborations, both inside and outside of school. My collaborations,
on the other hand, were with people removed from me in time and
space. I wasn't able to converse with Alan Watts, Erich Fromm, or
Herman Hesse about the differences between their interpretations of
Eastern religious thought, but neither did I miss the point that their
conjectures either involved or implied ongoing interactions with and
interpretations of the works and lives of others: Confucius, Lao Tzu,
Gautama Buddha, etc. I wonder, though, just to whom I owe this
realization: Mr. Marganoff or Mr. Blake?
In college I had a somewhat different experience, one which is
again quite the opposite of the sort which Bruffee and Elbow write
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about in their own lives. For them, the college classroom was usually
a teacher-dominated arena, involving students as either passive
recipients or intellectual adversaries competing for recognition.
(Interestingly enough, and I'm quite serious on this point, the main
places where I've had such experiences have been college English
classes.) Collaborative learning, with its non-authoritarian philosophy
and underlying spirit of cooperation, is a much needed remedy to the
excesses of this top-down, competitive approach. As a student of
philosophy and education, however, I took dozens of courses which
employed collaborative techniques, primarily small groups in which we
would interpret passages and books, respond to each others' writing,
and negotiate group conclusions with the rest of the class.
What's interesting about this experience is that while I much
preferred the collaborative classes to the authoritarian-competitive
ones (and I enjoyed the ones which encouraged non-competitive,
independent work the most - more on that in a moment), I often
found the collaborative classes extremely frustrating. What I enjoyed
were the face-to-face interactions and the exposure to other people's
ideas and experiences. What frustrated me was not the lack of closure
one might expect but the premature closure which often resulted from
the undiscriminating acceptance of "agreeable" ideas and the equally
undiscriminating rejection of "disagreeable* ideas.
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I couldn t count, for example, the number of times I listened to
other students criticize B.F. Skinner without any serious consideration
of the obvious merits of his model. And in reading and discussing
John Dewey, the way people would select those passages which
confirmed their own thinking at the expense of those which did not
never ceased (and never ceases) to amaze me. (There is, for instance,
a good deal of behaviorism in Dewey which many people overlook.
Indeed, Dewey® is much closer to Skinner than he is, say, to Carl
Rogers. ) Though mine was often the only dissenting voice, I
generally expressed my reservations -- a quality which endeared me to
many teachers though not generally to other students. But as my
opinions were only half-formed and I was seldom very articulate, my
contributions had little impact on the group.
One might suggest that I could have used these experiences as
opportunities better to formulate and articulate my ideas to the class.
This is, after all, what we do as professionals in our fields, as well as
members of the larger community of liberally educated persons
generally. Although I often set out to do just that, what happened
instead was that I found myself writing not to my peers in the class
but to the community of people whose works we were reading. In
other words, I found that my interest in articulating my views to my
peers was for the most part supplanted by my desire to enter into the
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written dialogue of the knowledge/discourse communities we were
studying.
Collaboration was occurring, of course, but a great deal of it
was internal. Indeed, whether I had been collaborating with my fellow
students or not, the more involved I became in the intricacies of the
interpretive frameworks I was studying, the more I found I needed to
work privately. The ideas were simply too challenging, and my
interactions with them too complex, for spontaneous, in-class
negotiations to take me as far as I wanted to go. I participated in
class discussions, of course, and enjoyed both hearing other people
talk about their ideas and sharing my own. But even here, the people
with the most interesting ideas were the ones who had put in a great
deal of "individual" effort. For them, as for me, collaborating directly
with the other people in the class simply wasn't a priority. Like my
experience in Mr. Blake's English class, our collaborations were chiefly
with people and communities removed in space and time. And the
evidence seemed to indicate that it was collaborations such as these
which were the most fruitful and instructive.
Some teachers did require group work, both in and out of class;
joint written statements, oral reports, peer response on individual
writing, and so on. While I went along with all this cheerfully enough,
I never really got that enthused, and found that as time went on I
increasingly did only what was required of me and no more. It was in
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fact much easier to get enthused about what other people were doing
when group work was not required. In such cases, collaboration
evolved spontaneously, as a result of our individual involvement with
and enthusiasm for the rhetorical situations in which we were
engaged. In-class collective efforts may have been small -recommending to someone an essay or book, giving somebody a
photocopy of one of your own papers, suggesting that they go talk to
a particular professor or fellow student, continuing class discussions
in the hallway, cafeteria, dorm room, or parking lot — but they were
genuine. Above all, such collaborations evolved out of our individual
and shared involvement with academic discourse communities beyond
the classroom. The classroom was its own community, of course, but
not the most compelling one. Indeed, it clearly depended on the larger
knowledge/discourse communities of the academy.
Looking back over the whole of my undergraduate and graduate
experience, I would say that the most important factors in my own
learning were not the classroom interactions but rather my interest in
the subject, the extent to which my instructors allowed me to pursue
that interest, and the challenges to my own thinking and writing
regarding that.subject with which they provided me. The most
important results were that I learned actively to use written sources to
challenge my own thinking and writing and to enter into
reconstructive dialogue with the knowledge/discourse communities
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that generated those sources. In my own educational experience, the
role which face-to-face interactions with peers played in such learning
was minimal.

My Experience as a Teacher

As I said near the beginning of this essay, peer response is a
major component in the writing program where I learned to teach. In
structuring peer response groups, one of the first things I learned is
that, in the absence of teacher supervision, students need advanced
preparation and clear guidelines - not simply to keep them on task but
more importantly to help them know what sorts of things to look for
and how to respond to them. By my second semester as a writing
instructor, I had learned to frame questions on peer response sheets in
ways that required substantive responses -- primarily by asking that
responders make concrete citations and suggestions (e.g., "Cite at
least one passage where the author could have used more detailed
support." "Invent some hypothetical support of your own to illustrate
what you mean").
Even more important than preparation and guidelines, however,
were the assignments themselves. In my first semester teaching
writing, I gave assignments which asked students to write about and
generalize from personal experience. This "experiential approach"®
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worked fine for the first essay; students could generally find
something that both compelled themselves and evoked interest in
others. But I was unhappy with the limited content and interaction
with other viewpoints that such assignments elicited from students.
What these assignments essentially did, I began to realize, was to
send students in search of something to write about for the sake of
meeting course requirements. So I started to develop assignments
which from the start compelled students by challenging them to
interact with alternative ways of seeing and talking about experience,
especially the larger, more complex interpretive frameworks of
academic knowledge/discourse communities.
With these assignments, student motivation increased, as did
the quality of student writing. Students were motivated by the
challenge of negotiating among competing interpretive frameworks, as
well as their own success in handling those challenges. The only
problem was that the peer response groups seemed to be increasingly
ineffective. The level of knowledge construction and discursive
exchange at which students were now operating demanded responses
and challenges which the students could not generally provide each
another without assistance. They started to rely more and more
heavily on my written comments because they didn't know how to
offer substantive comments themselves. And we all knew this was
happening.
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A solution came from my observations of a senior colleague's
course which employed teacher-facilitated peer groups. Instead of
adding my written comments to the comments which student peers
had written and discussed in class, I started facilitating, one at a time,
small groups of four to six students in pre-arranged meetings. We
substituted each of these meetings for two regular class meetings and
my written comments. The trade-off was favorable on all counts. In
the groups we covered five papers in seventy-five minutes (fifteen
minutes per paper), and accomplished more than peer response and
my written comments did put together.
The key was that I offered as little as possible in the way of
suggestions or direct comments myself. Instead I asked questions
which allowed students to comment in constructive ways which they
couldn't quite conceive on their own. What made these questions
different than the ones on peer response sheets was that they were
paper-specific - they dealt directly with the content and interpretive
frameworks involved in the papers themselves. Thus, instead of
responding to the questions "Where could the author better support
her main argument?" or "Can you suggest an alternative interpretation
she might have overlooked?" students could answer directly such
questions as "What, according to Connie, is the connection between
the fundamentalist stance on the issues of sex education and
abortion?" "What do you think she is trying to say?" "Okay, but why
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IS

it unfair to deny the right to an abortion to someone whom you

have also denied sex education?" and "What would a pro-life
advocate say?"
Another advantage I found to teacher-facilitated peer groups is
that I could direct these response-eliciting questions to particular
students on the basis of the kinds of contributions I knew they could
make. Thus, a student with an opposing, or simply different,
viewpoint could provide a challenge or explanation at a timely moment
(in the above example, for instance, we could hear an actual pro-life
stance). Or a more abstract thinker might be able to articulate where
she saw a line of thought heading that the author might have missed.
Or, conversely, I could ask a more concrete thinker if he understood a
particular line of abstract thought, just where it might need clarifying,
and what sorts of clarification he might suggest. And of course there
was always the simple fact that I could, by these interventions, help
outspoken students learn to listen, and quiet students to speak up,
while still respecting their different learning styles.
The actual outcome of these meetings was never planned, and
students remained the primary makers and negotiators of knowledge.
But through my eliciting and modeling of content- and context-specific
questions, students were learning to make and negotiate knowledge
at a level beyond their normal discourse. They were learning not only
how to ask questions of others in face-to-face situations, but also
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how to develop their own lines of questioning in their own
academically-situated writing. And they were getting to see the same
principles of argument, support, development, and so on, worked out
in different rhetorical contexts.
I continued to use non-facilitated groups in our regular class
meetings. These were not, however, peer response groups but groups
where 1 asked students to attend to such small tasks as generating
supporting paragraphs for undeveloped ideas, summarizing in their
own words the main point of a short piece of academic writing, or
coming up with and generating support for objections to a
controversial passage. A basic requirement, however, was always that
students generate their own individual responses first. My reason for
doing this was not only to make sure everybody participated and had
something to contribute but also that they all took the time to reflect
individually on the problem I had set.
The key to such activities, however, lay not so much in the
collaboration as in the task. It had to be something which challenged
students to interact with and negotiate between alternative
interpretive frameworks. The collaboration, it seemed to me, met most
of the students' need for social interaction, and even provided a
iimited kind of practice in negotiating alternative ways of seeing and
talking. The main practice, however, went on internally and in writing.
Students shared this writing, and the groups gave them more impetus
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to write than merely writing for a teacher would have. But the key
was that the assignments had to be good ones -- ones which
challenged students to reconstruct their normal ways of thinking and
writing. While the groups sometimes enhanced these challenges, by
providing an array of interpretations, the challenges needed to come
from the assignments themselves.
Even with good assignments, I found that collaborative learning
was not for everyone. Some students were simply too "independent,"
as opposed to those who were basically "collaborative." I use these
terms, incidentally, in the narrow sense -- to refer to the amount of
interpersonal interaction students sought in learning situations -- for
there is no denying that we are all collaborative learners in the broad
sense of social constructors of knowledge. The question is how much
do the two senses have to do with one another?
My experience as a teacher suggests one possible answer: It
depends on students' individual learning preferences and their
intellectual maturity. Let me make perfectly that I see these as quite
distinct factors in student learning. Mature learners can be either
independent or collaborative, just as immature learners can also be
independent or collaborative. By "intellectual maturity,

incidentally, I

mean the quality of a person's intellectual and discourse habits, which
are partly a function of biological development but are primarily a
function of the quality of a person's total learning environment - both
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formal and informal. The index of maturity, it seems to me, is the
extent to which students can create and take advantage of their own
learning opportunities, as opposed to having to depend on someone
else to do these things for them. Collaborative groups are one kind of
planned learning environment.
I found that collaborative learning was, at times, inappropriate
for all four types of students in this informal taxonomy, but
particularly for immature collaborators and mature independents.
Immature collaborators working together tended towards superficial
agreement, and generally needed to practice complex negotiations
with alternative viewpoints on their own. They were also in greater
need of the more substantive challenges which a teacher versed in the
concerns of the relevant knowledge/discourse communities could
provide. Mature independents, on the other hand, like mature
collaborators, already knew how to collaborate, but they did so
internally. For whatever reasons, they tended to function better alone.
The benefits of direct collaboration -- e.g., the diversity of viewpoints
experienced, the immediate feedback provided, the feeling of
commitment to the group, etcetera -- weren't as important for them,
and could even be distracting. Such was my learning experience, and 1
recognized and respected these feelings in many of my students.
There were, on the other hand, those students who clearly
benefitted from direct collaboration. Mature collaborators, for
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instance, clearly found group work stimulating, though they didn't
depend on it to the exclusion of careful independent thinking and
writing. And immature independents clearly needed the exposure to
alternative viewpoints, which face-to-face contact provided, to help
them break out of their otherwise narrow intellectual and discursive
tendencies. In both cases, however, the "need" for independent
writing and thinking was always present, as was the "need" for a task
or assignment which made connections between students' present
tendencies and the knowledge/discourse communities of the
academy. While collaborative group work usually helped to motivate
students, increased their participation, and made the exposure to
alternative viewpoints more direct, it was never, to my mind,
"necessary" to college learning, though it was extremely helpful.

Philosophical Reservations

A close reading of the literature on collaborative learning reveals
that what most distinguishes it from merely working in groups is that
it entails the active negotiation of alternative ways of interpreting and
talking about experience, precisely the characteristic which I have
emphasized so far. What gives collaborative learning this distinction,
its advocates stress, is its dependence on a task which demands that
students arrive at some type of consensus, whether it be actual
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agreement or an agreement to disagree. The task, in other words,
must require students to negotiate among their own alternative ways
of seeing and talking in an effort to construct this consensus.®
Proponents of collaborative learning claim that in thus negotiating
between alternative interpretive and linguistic frameworks, students
not only learn that knowledge is socially constructed, but they also
learn how socially to construct it, as well as to take more
responsibility for doing so. These outcomes are achieved, ostensibly,
through the combination of the collaborative group setting and a task
requiring negotiation.
While proponents of collaborative learning thus acknowledge
that group work is not a sufficient condition of learning to engage in
the social construction of knowledge, they often argue that it is a
necessary condition. In "Collaborative Learning and the 'Conversation
of Mankind',"’® Kenneth Bruffee, the main spokesperson for
collaborative learning, offers a lengthy rationalization for this
necessity. Bruffee draws heavily on the work of Thomas Kuhn and
Richard Rorty, both outspoken advocates of the widely accepted
notion that knowledge is a social artifact constructed through a
process of socially justifying belief. But the social justification of belief
obviously requires no such thing as people working in face-to-face
collaborative groups, and there is nothing in either Kuhn or Rorty to
suggest otherwise. A community of people with shared ways of
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construing and talking about experience is obviously necessary, but
the process rarely goes on in the form of person-to-person exchanges.
Bruffee acknowledges this fact when he writes that "the
particular thing I write every time" is not necessarily "something I
have talked over with other people first, although 1 may well often do
just that. ’’ Yet he goes on to argue that, as teachers, "our task
must involve engaging students in conversation among themselves at
as many points in both the writing and the reading process as
possible."’^ He expresses much the same idea again in "Writing and
Reading as Collaborative or Social Acts,"^^ when he insists that
"collaborative learning, which is the institutionalized counterpart of
the social or collaborative nature of knowledge and thought, is not
merely a helpful pedagogical technique incidental to writing. It is
essential to writing."^"* What leads Bruffee to make these remarkable
and seemingly unwarranted claims?
Much of the answer, unfortunately, lies in his equivocal use of
the term "collaborative learning." On the one hand, he uses it to refer
to the various pedagogical techniques normally associated with the
term: peer editing, coauthoring, peer tutoring, etc. In this usage,
"collaboration'.’ denotes face-to-face exchanges between people who
elicit each others' direct input. In its other usage, "collaborative
learning" is used to refer to the general philosophical principle that all
knowledge is socially constructed. Here "collaboration denotes the
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fact that knowledge is inescapably social in its functions and origins,
as well as in the ways that we generate, test, and revise it.
Drawing on the work of Lev Vygotsky,’® Bruffee essentially
argues that the connection between the two usages resides in the
fact that thought is internalized conversation. In other words,
according to Bruffee, we learn to think -- that is, to carry on the
internal dialogue known as thought -- by first learning to converse that is, to elicit, receive, coordinate, accommodate, and respond to
the diverse viewpoints of others. The implication, for Bruffee, is that,
in order for college students to learn to think like, say, historians, they
have to talk like them first. He assumes, in other words, that for
college students to understand what it is to participate in a particular
knowledge community, they must have face-to-face interactions with
their peers within the context of that community's concerns.
There are two problems with this assumption. The first is that
the relationship between language and thought is hardly as linear as
Bruffee assumes. To maintain, as Bruffee does, that we learn to think
in ways we have learned to talk hardly states the case fairly. For it is
just as true that we learn to talk in ways we have learned to think, as
Vygotsky himself holds. Bruffee maintains that Vygotsky "has shown
that reflective thought is public or social conversation internalized.""
In fact, however, Vygotsky asserts that from the beginning language
and thought stand in a dialectical relationship to each other.
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A child's thought, precisely because it is born as a dim,
amorphous whole, must find expression in a single word.
As his thought becomes more differentiated, the child is
less apt to express it in single words but constructs a
composite whole. Conversely, progress in speech to the
differentiated whole of a sentence helps the child's
thoughts to progress from a homogeneous whole to welldefined parts. Thought and word are not cut from one
pattern. In a sense, there are more differences than
likenesses between them.^^
For Vygotsky, growth in thought clears a path by which language
grows in complexity; at the same time, growth in language supplies
structures by which thought becomes more conscious and deliberate.
Furthermore, while Vygotsky does assert that the young child's
intellectual development culminates in the convergence of thought
and language in verbal thought’® - a process which depends upon
children having linguistic interactions with others
-- by far the larger portion of his work is devoted to explaining the
ways in which inner speech then gradually distinguishes itself from
conversation, through the natural experiment of egocentric speech.
This emphasis in Vygotsky on the differentiation of speech for oneself
and speech for others brings us to the second problem with Bruffee's
assertion that peer collaboration is essential to college learning, and
that is that he fails to specify the bearing which the need for
conversation in children's intellectual development has on college
learning. For all intents and purposes, when Bruffee claims that
conversation between peers is a necessary part of the entry into
academic discourse, he is assuming that the initial process by which
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children learn to think linguistically and the process by which young
adults enter an academic discourse community are structurally and
functionally the same.
Bruffee finds the connection in Vygotsky's notion of the "zone
of proximal development": "the distance between the actual
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving
and the level of potential development as determined through problem
solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable
peers."’® For Vygotsky, the significance of the zone of proximal
development is that since development always lags behind learning -the latter providing the external structures by which the former can
advance -- "the only 'good learning' is that which is in advance of
dev lopment."^® Bruffee, on the other hand, construes the zone of
proximal development as evidence that students need to work
collaboratively amongst themselves as part of their induction into new
knowledge communities. "We learn," writes Bruffee, "by reaching
beyond what we can already do into a 'zone of proximal
development.' Whatever the next thing we have to learn ... we learn it
best in the society of, and with the help of, our peers.
There are, again, several problems with such an inference. For
one thing, the "collaboration" which Vygotsky cites as fostering
development is that which occurs not so much between a chiid and
her peers but between the chiid and an aduit or more capable peers.
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The implication here would thus seem to be that children learn to
think in ways they have learned to talk not so much with their peers
as with people who are more knowledgeable.
There are, however, two passages in which Vygotsky refers to
children learning through peer collaboration specifically. In the first
instance, he notes that, in certain experiments, what subjects "could
do only under guidance, in collaboration, and in groups at the age of
three-to-five years they could do independently when they reached
the age of five-to-seven years.It is doubtful, however, if he
meant to imply by this that peer collaboration is itself a means of
formal learning, especially in light of his continued emphasis on
"external knowledge" and "scientific concepts" as the instruments of
development in learning. In the other instance, he comments that
"learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that
are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in
his environment and in cooperation with his peers.Here
Vygotsky, like Piaget, clearly means that children develop cognitively
through peer interaction. But the passage occurs in the context of his
discussion of the ways in which children internalize social speech as
an instrument of thought, not the ways they later differentiate inner
speech from social speech through the experiment of egocentric
speech, nor the way adults learn the discourse conventions of
academic knowledge communities.
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This latter point brings us to a second difficulty with Bruffee's
inferences (1) that the ways children learn to think linguistically are
the same as the ways college students learn academic discourse, and
(2) that the zone of proximal development signifies the necessity of
peer collaboration in college learning. Namely, there is a difference
between how a child collaborates and how a young adult does. A very
young child who has not yet learned to differentiate inner speech from
social speech has only two avenues of recourse in solving difficult
problems requiring verbal thought. One is to elicit overt help in the
form of either physical or oral assistance. The other is to talk the
problem through out loud using egocentric speech. The young adult,
on the other hand, by virtue of having already internalized the ability
to collaborate, does not need to do so overtly. "Once these
[developmental] processes are internalized," writes Vygotsky, "they
become part of the child's independent developmental
achievement."^^ Moreover, in those cases when a college student or
any adult does "think out loud," he is not employing undifferentiated
egocentric speech but attempting to establish a text on which further
thought can build.
This brings us to the third problem with Bruffee's inference.
The more difficult the situation which calls forth reflection, the more
we resort not to social speech, as Bruffee seems to think, but to inner
speech. Vygotsky cites the example of how a young girl, in figuring
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out how to get at some candy on a high shelf, talks through her
solution out loud.^® According to Bruffee, "What is evidently
happening in this example is that the child is using social speech (as
opposed to 'egocentric' speech) instrumentally to help get something
done."^® But according to Vygotsky, it is precisely "egocentric
speech" which the child uses in this situation. "Our experimental
results indicate," writes Vygotsky, "that the function of egocentric
speech is ... [that] it helps in overcoming difficulties; it is speech for
oneself, intimately and usefully connected with the child's thinking...
In the end, it becomes inner speech.
Vygotsky's research into the structure and function of inner
speech (which is invisible and impervious to empirical observation) is
based entirely on the assumption that egocentric speech (which we
can observe) is its precursor. Hence, even if Bruffee were correct that
the ways in which children convert social speech into inner speech are
functionally the same as the ways in which young adults learn the
speech conventions of academic discourse communities, it would only
go to show that college students negotiate difficult challenges not
through conversation but through inner speech, or "internal
collaboration." In other words, the more complex the subject matter,
the more intricate its structures, and the more it intersects,
converges, and diverges with other interpretive schemes, the more
vital it becomes to work out those complexities in thought. If
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anything, then, Vygotsky's analysis would seem to suggest that
adults learn academic discourse primarily through inner speech and
not social speech, simply because of the sheer complexity of the task
of negotiating between one's own interpretive and linguistic
frameworks and those of the academy. The more difficult the
negotiation, the more imperative the need for Inner speech.
Bruffee, however, seems to think collaborative group work can
teach extremely complex processes of interpretive negotiation:
We all see things differently. Group discussion helps each
of us see In just what way our own views differ from
others' and also perhaps why. Once we see these
differences we can choose to change our views or try to
convince others to change theirs. In the process, we
negotiate toward a consensus of judgment which reflects
a tempered, adequately Informed, well-thought out
conception of the issue in question.^®
Surely he overstates the role of collaborative groups In accomplishing
these things. While face-to-face interactions certainly can help us see
how and why our views differ from those of others, the more complex
the differences, the greater is the need for inner speech, which is
private and individual. Furthermore, the negotiation of "a tempered,
adequately informed, well-thought out conception” is surely the
product not of group discussion but of careful independent
deliberation. Such deliberation is, of course, collaborative in the broad
sense that it occurs and gets tested within the context of shared
human concerns and ways of interpreting experience. But
collaboration of this sort occurs primarily in reading and writing, not
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group discussion. And students learn to collaborate in such a manner
in precisely the same way, by reading, writing, and thinking about the
shared concerns of larger communities outside the classroom.
Oral speech about shared problems does have certain
advantages. It is faster, more efficient, more spontaneous, and
requires less explicit contextualizing; it is good for generating ideas,
eliciting and judging gut reactions, and considering possibilities. Its
disadvantages are the same ones that lead to the beginnings of inner
speech in egocentric speech in the first place. It is superficial,
Impermanent, and unable to handle much complexity; it is bad for
developing, weighing, and testing ideas, considering implications, and
negotiating satisfactory and more stable reconstructions.
What concerns me about Bruffee's enthusiastic appraisal of
collaborative learning is not that peer collaboration can't help students
learn academic discourse (by providing them with a context in which
they can receive concrete and immediate, if limited, feedback on the
social implications of their thinking and writing). What bothers me is
the disproportionate amount of attention he gives to extoiiing the
principie that knowledge is something people construct socially at the
expense of specifying how and why they do it. Although he cautions
many times that merely putting students together in groups does not
constitute a learning environment, he nevertheless puts an
unwarranted amount of faith in the power of groups to create |ust
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such an environment. At least two things get shortchanged in the
process. One is an account of the ways in which people actually learn
to justify belief socially. The other is an account of why they do so.
I'll begin with the second.
According to Bruffee, collaborative learning is supported
theoretically by social constructionism. In fact, however, where social
constructionists stress the importance of sociolinguistic context in
defining the rhetorical situation and providing the stimulus to write,
Bruffee tends to focus more narrowly on the peer group and the
individual as the sources of invention.
[Cjollaborative learning can help with "invention." In the
process of "working up" a topic for an essay, students
should learn how to use each other effectively as *
sounding boards for ideas, as resources for information,
and as prods to further elaboration and explanation.^®
It's not that students shouldn't do these things; they should. But
Bruffee makes it sound as though it is the peer group which motivates
and guides the writing process, and not the shared concerns and
norms of the larger discourse communities of the academy.
At other times he indicates that invention is a process of
students generating "ideas out of personal experience, perceiving
issues implicit in those experiences, and generalizing on those
issues.
[Elssays are normally written from the inside out. Writers
begin by thinking about what they want to say and how
to defend or explain their views. Only then do they
consider how to introduce their views to a reader and
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how to draw what they have to said to a satisfactory
close.
In this scheme, the influence of the larger academic community only
comes In at the end of the process, when "teachers evaluate
[students'] work ..., comparing it with professional standards and the
work other students have done, both currently and In the past.

•t 33

Little account Is given of the ways in which sociolinguistic context not
only motivates composing but provides it norms, procedures, and
content from the first. Bruffee says little more on this subject than
that the task with which the teacher provides students should allow
for more than one answer and require students to come to some kind
of consensus.
As a result, how students learn to deliberate and converse
about the shared concerns of academic communities also gets
shortchanged. Bruffee makes it sound as though students conversing
in autonomous groups about academic concerns will thereby learn
academic discourse, ostensibly by modeling the process of sociaily
justifying beiief with each other. In fact, however, collaborative
learning models the social construction of knowledge on a very
concrete level. The ways in which knowledge is actually socially
constructed go much deeper. And the only way for students to learn
those processes is not through unfacilitated peer group discussions,
but through reading, writing, and thinking about the concerns of those
communities. Where the emphasis on peer collaboration falls most
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short, then, is that it makes no particular provision for the need of
students as individuals to negotiate their own complex entries into
unfamiliar discourse communities for themselves. Bruffee claims that
peer collaboration gives students practice in negotiating alternative
interpretive frameworks, but the real practice is that which goes on
between student and discourse community, in the form of critical
reading, thinking, and writing.
What would teachers need to do to promote such reflective
activity that structuring peer groups to negotiate solutions to assigned
tasks does not do? The answer is that they would provide more
deliberate control of the interplay of doubt and belief in students'
reading, writing, thinking, and conversing. They would do this not by
simply engineering situations where student peers are likely to
negotiate among themselves, then leaving that process to follow its
own course. They would do it rather by attending to the specific,
personal interactions which individual students have with both their
peers and the knowledge/discourse communities of the academy.
To expect that collaborative groups, no matter how carefully
prepared and structured, will generate the kind of reflective thinking
and discourse.we want students to learn is to ignore the only genuine
authority we as teachers have. That authority comes not from our
possession of knowledge conceived as a non-negotiable commodity
which we transmit to students. Rather it comes, just as Bruffee says.

263

from our being representatives of the knowledge/discourse
communities which students aspire to join. But our authority also
comes from another source: our knowledge of the processes by which
students -- working together and alone -- negotiate their way into
those communities.
What teachers can do that students themselves can't is
recognize points in the process that call for specific interventions.
Such interventions do not strip students of responsibility for their own
learning, as Bruffee seems to think they inevitably must (except,
ironically, when it comes time to evaluate students' work). Rather,
they help make students more responsible than they would be if left
strictly to their own devices. Teachers, by virtue of their experience
with and study of the learning processes of students, particularly in
their own areas of expertise, are in a much better position than are
students themselves to recognize when students should be allowed to
continue along a particular course unhindered, when they need to be
encouraged, when they should be presented with challenges, and,
especially, which challenges to present.
The danger is always present that teachers will try to prevent
students from making "mistakes," which in the long run teaches
students to rely too heavily on authority, discouraging the very habits
of rational inquiry and discourse we are striving to foster. But the
danger of miseducative experiences is even more present in

264

unfacilitated collaborative groups, where students influence each
other with far less knowledge of the bearing their interactions have on
the intellectual and discursive habits we seek to foster in the long run.
Teaching, as Bruffee says, is not the simple transmitting of
subject matter. But the negative consequences that accrue from
teachers approaching their work as if it were should not lead us to
dispense too much with the guidance teachers can provide. Such is
the theme of what is one of John Dewey's most concise educational
statements. Experience and Education.^'* which he wrote in 1938,
following his experience with the excessively student-centered
schools of the 1920's. Dewey takes so-called "progressive" education
to task for defining itself on the basis of its criticisms of traditional
schooling rather than in terms of its own constructive theory of how
personal experience interacts with subject matter to produce learning.
Especially pertinent to this discussion are Dewey's repeated
reminders that educational freedom should not be equated with a
lessening of teacher control;
Because the older education imposed the knowledge,
methods, and the rules of conduct of the mature person
upon the young, it does not follow, except upon the
basis of the extreme Either-Or philosophy, that the
knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive
value for the experience of the immature. On the
contrary, basing education upon personal experience may
mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts
between the mature and the immature than ever existed
in the traditional schooi, and consequently more, rather
than less, guidance by others.
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Bruffee and other advocates of collaborative learning^® argue
the need for teacher guidance in the structuring of groups and
activities, but they generally rule out the teacher's role as a facilitator
of group interactions, insisting that "collaboration advances best when
groups are pretty much left to the students themselves.Where
the teacher does offer guidance, they say, is as a "synthesizer,"
"referee,"^® or "arbiter of last resort" at the end of the group
process.®® They tend to downplay this function, however, offering
no specific guidelines as to how the teacher should fulfill it.
Most troublesome, however, is that they say virtually nothing at
all about the teacher's interactions with individual students or the
students' interactions with the academic discourse communities in
which their learning is situated. That learning will occur as a result of
group Interactions is simply taken for granted. In the process, how
and why students are motivated to negotiate their way into unfamiliar
knowledge/discourse communities gets left out of account, as does
the teacher's role in facilitating that process. The danger is all too
great that teachers, overconfident about the intrinsic educative power
of collaborative peer groups, will, quite simpiv, stop teaching, leaving
the formation of students' habits of academic inquiry and discourse to
accident.
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Notes

1. The Collaborative Learning Action Community of the American
Association of Higher Education defines collaborative learning as
follows:
Collaborative education is a pedagogical style which
emphasizes cooperative efforts among students, faculty,
and administrators. Rooted in the belief that knowledge is
inherently social in nature, it stresses common inquiry as
the basic learning process.
See Jean Sheridan, Ann C. Byrne, and Kathryn Quina, "Collaborative
Learning: Notes From the Field," College Teaching. 37 (1989): 49-53.
2. For a concise description of some or the major techniques, see
Sheridan, Byrne, and Quina, "Collaborative Learning."
3. Peter Elbow, "Methodological Doubting and Believing: Contraries
in Inquiry," Embracing Contraries (Oxford: New York, 1986), pp. 254300.
4. Jerry Farber, The Student as Niooer: Essavs and Stories (North
Hollywood: Contact Books, 1969).
5. Kenneth Bruffee, "The Way Out," College English. 33 (1972):
457-70.
6. See, e.g., John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct. 1922. New
York: Modern Library, 1930, which is in many respects a behavioristic
account of the development of morality and reflective thinking.
7. The famous debate between the two occurred in Carl Rogers and
B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human
Behavior," Science. 124 (1956): 1057-1066.
8. See Stephen Judy, "The Experiential Approach: Inner Worlds to
Outer Worlds," in Timothy R. Donovan and Ben W. McClelland, eds.
Eight Approaches to Teaching Composition (Urbana, IL: National
Council of Teachers of English), pp. 37-51.
9
Harvey S. Weiner, "Collaborative Learning in the Classroom,"
Cnlleae English. 48 (1986): 54; cf. Kenneth A. Bruffee, A Shojt
Course in Writing. 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, 1985), p. 45.
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10. Kenneth A. Bruffee, "Collaborative Learning and the
'Conversation of Mankind,'" College English. 46 (1984): 635-652.
11. Bruffee, "Conversation," p. 641.
12. Bruffee, "Conversation," p. 642.
13. Kenneth A. Bruffee, "Writing and Reading as Collaborative or
Social Acts," in J.N. Hays, P.A. Roth, J.R. Ramsey, and R.D. Foulke,
eds., The Writer's Mind: Writing as a Mode of Thinking (Urbana, IL:
National Council of Teachers of English, 1983), pp. 159-169.
14. Bruffee, "Writing and Reading," p. 165.
15. Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language, trans., Eugenia
Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar (Boston: MIT Press, 1962); Mind in
Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, eds.,
Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner, and Ellen Souberman
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).
16. Bruffee, "Conversation," p. 639.
17. Vygotsky. Thought, o. 126.
18. Vygotsky, Thought, pp. 51, 57; Mind, p. 24.
19. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 86.
20. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 89.
21. Bruffee, A Short Course, p. 105.
22. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 87.
23. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 90.
24. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 90.
25. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 25.
26. Bruffee, "Writing and Reading," p. 161.
27. Vygotsky, Mind, p. 133.
28. Bruffee, A Short Course, p. 111 •
29. see. e.g.. Patricia Bizzeii, "Cognition Convent,on, a^
What We Need to Know about Writing, PRE/TEKL, 3 (1982).
207.

268

30. Bruffee, A Short CoursR. p. 106.
31. Bruffee, A Short Course, p. xvi.
32. Bruffee, A Short Course, p. xiii).
33. Kenneth A. Bruffee, "The Art of Collaborative Learning: Making
the Most of Knowledgeable Peers," Change. March/April (1987): 46.
34. John Dewey, Experience and Education. 1938 (New York: Collier
Macmillan, 1963).
35. Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 21.
36. See, e.g., Weiner, "Collaborative Learning."
37. Weiner, "Collaborative Learning," p. 58.
38. Weiner, "Collaborative Learning," pp. 58-59.
39. Bruffee, A Short Course, p. 112.
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CHAPTER 7

COMMON THEMES AND KEY PRINCIPLES
OF AN INTERACTIVE EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTION

In reviewing the six previous chapters, no simple pattern
emerges, no unambiguous representation which holds true for all the
topics discussed. What does emerge is a story of apparent oppositions
tending towards resolution in an interactive conception that is itself
surprisingly consistent. Before outlining the broad features of that
conception, it is worth noting some of the shared patterns by which
that conception emerges.

Common Themes

All the chapters deal with issues that either explicitly or
implicitly involve dichotomous educational conceptions. While the
dichotomies themselves vary, they all seem to stem from an initial
demarcation of otherwise interacting components, followed by various
attempts to bring the severed components back together. Clearly,
chapters three, four, and five -- those on critical thinking, genderized
ethics, and college writing - all address specific oppositions directly.
By contrast, the first, second, and sixth chapters -- the ones on
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student involvement in learning, national cultural literacy, and
collaborative learning - involve implicit dichotomies.
In chapter one, for example, the NIE Study Group starts from
the premise that students' interests and subject matter are intrinsically
opposed. Their suggestion that external standards be used to secure
student involvement is an attempt to bring these two allegedly
opposing forces together — by supplanting one with the other.
Similarly, in chapter two, although he insists that there is no
necessary opposition between an extensive curriculum of shared
cultural knowledge and an intensive curriculum adapted to student
interests, Hirsch ultimately puts his faith in the transmission of a
prearranged extensive curriculum. In chapter six, proponents of
collaborative learning assume essentially the same opposition. But in
advocating that students be allowed to negotiate their own knowledge
and standards without the constraints imposed by a teacher in
authority, they go in the other direction from Hirsch and the Study
Group.
Taken as a whole, the dichotomies themselves seem to fall
along two axes. One axis is the apparent dichotomy between the form
of learning and the contexts in which it occurs. The other axis is the
apparent dichotomy between student development and the
transmission of subject matter. The two axes are not the same. The
general skills approach to critical thinking, the justice approach to
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moral education, the cognitive process approach to college writing,
and the content-neutral curriculum criticized by Hirsch all emphasize
student learning over subject matter. But instead of emphasizing the
interests and backgrounds of individual students, as romantics tend to
do, the above conceptions are formal and general. Conversely, the
subject-specific approach to critical thinking and the social
constructionist approach to college writing both emphasize teaching
subject matter within specific learning contexts. On the other hand,
collaborative learning and the caring approach to moral education both
combine a romantic, subjectivist conception of spontaneous student
development with a contextual model of learning. While Hirsch and
the Study Group take a traditional cultural transmission approach that
utilizes formal presentation and the imposition of external standards.
In short, the preceding chapters suggest something like a fourquadrant framework for categorizing educational approaches.
Formalists sometimes direct their attention to subject matter and
sometimes to student cognition. Similarly, contextualists sometimes
concentrate on the conditions which promote student development
and sometimes on those which sensitize students to existing
knowledge and discourse communities. The four quadrants are thus
roughly essentialism, cognitivism, romanticism, and reconstructionism
(I list them in the order of their approximate political affiliation - from
right to left - though of course there are anomalies: Kohlberg, for
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example, is clearly of the moderate left, while McPeck is of the
moderate right). My intention here is not to draw any hard and fast
categories, but simply to frame a possible way of sorting out
educational dichotomies, and to note that it is sometimes unclear who
is objecting to what or what alternative conception they are
advancing. Hirsch is a prime example, for in criticizing one type of
formalism he only endorses another. Bruffee offers a different
example, for although he claims to ascribe to social constructionism
he is clearly more romantic.
In any case, certain themes are common to some issues, and
others to others. The tension between attending to securing student
involvement and transmitting subject matter is most evident in the
first, second, and sixth chapters, as discussed earlier. The tension
between formalism and contextualism, on the other hand, is most
evident in the critical thinking, moral education, and college writing
literatures, and goes something like this.
Kohiberg, Flower, and the advocates of general thinking skills
all believe in the fruitfulness of trying to discern those mental
processes which transcend context. Gilligan, Bizzell and Berlin, and
McPeck, on the other hand, all attack such formalism on the grounds
that form and context cannot be thus dissociated. But in so doing,
they all advance a contextual relativism which leaves unexplained how
people are able to negotiate their way between otherwise discrete
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contexts. For Gilligan, this manifests as the irreconcilability of justice
and caring. For Bizzell and Berlin, as a sociolinguistic determinism
which leaves no room for original thought. And for McPeck, as a
logical atomism that leaves no room for multi-logical thinking.
Formalists fare little better, however, since models that divorce
reasoning from context fail to capture the undeniable contextspecificity of thought; for all their complexity, the models of Kohiberg,
Flower, and general skills advocates alike are descriptively somewhat
sterile and prescriptively weak.
In all three literatures, theorists from both camps have called for
a reconciliation of formalism and contextualism, although they have
each tended to remain somewhat entrenched in their respective
positions. The way out which I have argued here lies in the notion
that thinking, moral reasoning, and writing are neither general nor
context-specific processes but intercontextual ones which entail the
reconstructive transfer, transformation, and integration of what would
otherwise remain discrete interpretations of experience. This means
that critical thinking is not something we either transfer or do only in
specific contexts; it is itself transfer - the constructing of more
integrated and comprehensive knowledge systems. Similarly, moral
reasoning isn't something that either follows a universal form or is
constrained by specific contexts; it is a reconstructive dialogue that
makes connections between previously separate value systems.
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creating a more shared understanding. Again, writing is not the
application of general cognitive processes or the following of
predetermined lines of thought and discourse; it is an intercontextual
dialogue that tends towards the same comprehensiveness mentioned
in the previous two examples.
In all three cases, then, it is not so much form or context which
is the educational concern as it is the habits of thinking, valuing, and
conversing that students develop. Such habits are fostered not by
attending to cognitive form or social context alone, but by creating
indeterminate and socially compelling situations which elicit students'
uncertainty about what to believe or do — the interaction of cognition
and context.
In the hypothesis of this dissertation, I postulated three
conditions of an educative situation. These conditions were doubt,
dialogue, and commitment. Looking back over the previous chapters,
it seems that cognitive formalists tend to concentrate on the condition
of doubt, and contextualists on the condition of dialogue. But neither
doubt nor dialogue guarantees that students will be engaged.
Engagement requires commitment, and that would seem to occur only
where students experience an uncertainty that matters. It is not
enough, in other words, that they be merely uncertain. Nor is enough
that the uncertainty matters to someone else. It must matter to
students themselves. But commitment does not stand alone either, as
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commitment without doubt leads to neither reflection nor dialogue,
but to prejudice and dogmatism. Again, my intention here is not to
advance this framework as complete or exclusive. It is simply to
suggest a set of criteria that educators might find helpful, and that
might help us understand under what conditions learning occurs and
what to do when it doesn't.

Key Principles

The following ten principles strike me as characteristic of the
interactive conception of higher learning which has emerged in these
pages. They also serve to provide an overview of higher learning as I
am led to conceive it at the present time.
(1) Learning is best understood as neither an absorbing from
without nor an unfolding from within but as the interaction of people's
structuring tendencies with the people and things around them. It is a
constructive process, in which people make sense of their experience
through the mutual accommodation of prior interpretive frameworks
and the data of present experience.
(2) We grow intellectually and socially through a process of
ongoing revision of our knowledge and beliefs, primarily by
constructing integrating connections between otherwise discrete
interpretations of experience, including the experience of others.
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(3) Teaching, then, is not so much a matter of transmitting
subject matter or developing skills as it is of creating conditions which
compel students to seek integrating connections.
(4) The primary condition for eliciting this search is to provide
such challenges to students' habitual ways of thinking as will compel
them to construct a superior and common understanding,
(5) In order that students might develop the ability to share
their understanding and purposes with others, the context of learning
must be social; it must involve the shared concerns and purposes of
some community.
(6) The paramount, though not the only, aim of education is to
instill in students the active disposition to reconstruct and integrate
their understanding of experience, including the experience of others.
This is the educational aim to which acquired skills and knowledge are
means.
(7) As the best means humanity has developed for making
sense of and controlling experience, the subject areas indicate the
direction of growth as well as its means.
(8) But to grasp the subject areas as means, students need to
learn them in the context of solving difficulties which they perceive -that is, in the process of reconstructing and integrating their own and
other people's understanding of experience -- and not as products to
be recited on demand.
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(9) Genuine learning of this sort necessarily entails a mutual
accommodation of subject matter and student cognition; in other
words, both students and subject matter are transformed in the
process. Students take genuine ownership of subject matter only
when they are led somehow to construct it for themselves as part of
their own active knowledge and belief systems.
(10) Demonstrations of such integrating transformations
towards the resolution of some social concern are the best evidence
of learning at the college level. For example, colleges could require as
a condition of graduation that all students complete a thesis or project
which integrates knowledge and procedures from more than one
discipline towards the solution of a viable social concern. A
precondition for students' being able to undertake such projects would
be that they first take more responsibility for constructing their own,
faculty-approved courses of study.

Closing Thoughts

At the present time, I know of only a handful of colleges whose
programs seem consistent with these principles. They are Antioch
University in Ohio; Hampshire College in Massachusetts; Marlboro
College in Vermont; and Reed College in Oregon; though I'm sure
there are many others with which I'm unfamiliar. Many colleges and
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universities also offer independent, interdisciplinary majors which are
along much the same lines, such as our own Bachelor's Degree with
Individual Concentration (BDIC) here at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst.
The objection naturally arises that the reason there are only a
handful of such programs is that there are only a handful of students
who have the personal initiative to undertake such self-directed study.
In this era of public cries for excellence and higher expectations, I am
surprised that few commentators on the educational scene advance
the expectation that students should take more responsibility in
directing their own learning. {Ernest Boyer is one of the exceptions.)
Part of the problem would seem to be that students have sometimes
been given freedom without responsibility, and have predictably
faltered. But such would seem to be a case of low expectations rather
than high.
On the other hand, most high school graduates probably aren't
ready for the sort of program I'm recommending. What this suggests
to me is not some intrinsic inability to think for themselves or to
negotiate knowledge and purposes with others, but rather that they
have not had an education which fosters independence of thought and
democratic habits of participation. Perhaps if more colleges set such
expectations, more high schools (and more elementary schools) would
do what they could to prepare students to meet them. But such a
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transformation would require at the very least the dissemination of an
interactive conception of learning that is far more articulate and
accessible than that presented here. In the meantime I, for one, watch
with great interest the continuing experiments of those colleges,
universities, independent majors, and courses that seek to realize the
democratic vision of knowledge and purpose in educational policy and
teaching practice.
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